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ABSTRACT 
 
Risk disclosure by listed companies has received an upsurge of attention since the 
global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. The financial crisis, together with calls by 
professional bodies, has place pressure on company directors and securities regulators 
to bring about greater corporate risk disclosure. In practice, such corporate disclosures 
have been found deficient, and there is limited evidence on factors influencing risk 
disclosure decisions by management. Given this situation, the aim of this research study 
is to investigate the nature, extent and determinants of risk information disclosed, using 
the context of corporate reporting in Malaysia. Key management personnel and 
controlling shareholders are chosen as the two types of players expected to influence 
corporate risk disclosure decisions. In terms of key management personnel, this study 
draws on upper echelons theory to develop hypotheses about the effects of demographic 
and other background influences of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chair of 
Audit Committee (CAC) on corporate risk disclosure. In respect of ownership structure, 
aspects of agency theory are invoked to develop hypotheses about the effect of different 
categories of controlling shareholders on corporate risk disclosure decisions. 
Additionally, in order to establish the value-relevance of risk disclosures in annual 
reports, this study draws on the ‘clean-surplus valuation model’ to examine the 
association between the nature and extent of risk disclosures and the companies’ share 
price.   
 
Sampling from the 200 top listed companies on Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board, data are 
hand-collected from annual reports for the year 2009. Content analysis is applied and 
risk disclosure in annual reports is coded and aggregated according to the number of 
sentences in which pre-determined risk-related keywords appeared. Risk disclosure 
sentences are classified according to four sub-categories: operational risk, 
environmental risk, financial risk and strategic risk. Demographic data for CEOs and 
CACs is collected, including age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity. 
Ownership structure is categorised by size of shareholding of family owners, 
government owners and foreign owners. A share price for the year ended 2009 is used 
to measure the company’s market value.  
 
The study finds, in aggregate, financial risk and operational risk disclosures are the 
highest type of risk disclosure in annual reports. These two types of risks dominate over 
the other two types of risk disclosures – strategic and environmental risks. These results 
suggest that there is not a comprehensive scope of risk-related information disclosed by 
companies in their annual reports. Despite the fact that all categories of risk disclosures 
could have relevance to investors and other stakeholders, the textual content in annual 
reports is found to be relatively limited or vague, particularly in risk categories that are 
not covered by prescriptive regulations.  
 
Generally, the findings of this study show evidence of little influence of the observable 
demographic characteristics of key management players on corporate risk disclosure in 
Malaysia. Nonetheless, focusing on total risk disclosure, the CEOs’ functional track, 
tenure and ethnicity are found to significantly relate to corporate risk disclosure. CEOs 
with Bumiputera ethnicity, with shorter-tenured and with output functional backgrounds 
are associated with higher corporate risk disclosure. The inference is that ethnicity 
which is highly correlated with Islamic beliefs and is characterised by deeply-held 
xv 
 
values of transparency towards others, together with a shorter-tenure and an output 
functional background during which the CEO remains open to a culture of transparency, 
will positively affect risk disclosure decisions. However, in contrast, the background of 
CACs is found to have no significant influence. This result suggests that the CAC’s 
observable demographic characteristics, which can include professional accounting 
qualifications, do not carry enough influence to affect decisions on corporate risk 
disclosure. Turning to the influence of shareholders, government ownership is found to 
be significantly and positively related to risk disclosure, but family ownership and 
foreign ownership are found to have an insignificant association with the level of risk 
disclosure. These findings suggest that government controlling shareholders generate an 
incentive for directors to encourage corporate transparency because of their high 
monitoring power. An alternative interpretation is a willingness by management to 
supply greater proprietary information about corporate risk because of a restricted 
market for ownership control of government-owned enterprises in Malaysia.  
 
Despite the conventional arguments that greater disclosure increases stock price of 
company, this study finds no significant relationship between total risk disclosure, 
regulated risk disclosure and non-regulated risk disclosure and company’s share price. 
Interestingly, this study finds a significantly positive relationship between share price 
and the interaction term for corporate risk disclosure and family-controlled firms. This 
implies that firms with a higher proportion of family members on the board that disclose 
higher risk information are treated as having more value-relevance by investors. By 
comparison, the interaction term for government-controlled firms and corporate risk 
disclosure is not significantly associated with share price. This implies that firms with 
greater risk disclosure do not influence the company’s share price on the grounds that 
they are a government controller. This study further finds a negative significant 
association with share price of the interaction of foreign-controlled firms and corporate 
risk disclosure. The inference is that foreign-controlled company that disclose higher 
risk information are viewed by investors as being more willing to provide ‘bad news’ 
information, that would cause the market to revise their share value downwards.  
 
This study makes a contribution to extant literature on risk disclosure and has practical 
implications for corporate regulators. First, the literature on approaches to designing a 
classification typology for corporate risk is unsettled. This study develops a typology 
and associated definitions that can minimize the ambiguity and maximize the objectivity 
of measuring the nature and extent of corporate risk disclosure. Second, in  terms of key 
management players and the controlling shareholders, prior literature has not provide 
evidence on the influence of the CEO or CAC on risk disclosure, and the prior evidence 
on shareholder influence has been limited and mixed. This study provides new evidence 
on manager-specific effects in respect of the CEO and CAC. It also provides additional 
evidence on the effects of family, government and foreign shareholders on risk 
disclosure.  A further feature of the contribution of this study is the evidence that there 
is no value relevance for total risk disclosure as well as each category of risk disclosure 
to the Malaysian share market. The inference is that securities regulators need to 
consider ways of strengthening risk disclosure practices, otherwise the current 
requirements will remain a costly compliance exercise for Malaysian companies without 
providing significant offsetting benefits to shareholders from reduced information 
asymmetry.  
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   CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Calls for corporate reporting in relation to risk management and uncertainties have 
increased since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. Recently, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) in the United Kingdom (UK) 
made a call to company boards to bring about greater risk disclosure regarding financial 
and operational risks in their corporate reports
1. Similarly, the UK’s Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) recommended that companies increase their key strategic risk 
information
2. In a press release in 2011 titled ‘corporate reports must prioritise major 
risk’, the FRC casts a clear leadership role for top management as well as audit 
committees in prioritizing risk management tasks and ensuring the disclosure of these 
risk priorities to investors, rather than reporting ‘indiscriminate lists of risks that all 
companies face’3. Prior to the GFC, there were corporate governance reforms4 of the 
early 2000’s triggered by the large-scale Enron et al. collapses and financial scandals. 
These reforms included new regulations, stock exchange guidelines and international 
financial reporting standards concerning corporate risk management and disclosures. 
                                               
1
 The Accountant, July 24, 2012, ‘ICAEW calls for greater risk disclosure’. Retrieved from 
http://www.theaccountant-online.com/news/icaew-calls-for-greater-risk-disclosure/ on November 19, 
2012.   
2
 The Accountant, September 1, 2011, ‘FRC proposes to increase reporting on strategic risks’. Retrieved 
from http://www.theaccountant-online.com/news/frc-proposes-to-increase-reporting-on-strategic-risks/ on 
November 19, 2012.  
3
 Accountancy Age, September 1, 2011, ‘FRC: corporate reports must prioritise major risk’. Retrieved 
from http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2105825/frc-corporate-reports-prioritise-major-risk/ on 
November 19, 2012. 
4
 See e.g. Cadbury Report 1992, Greenbury Report 1995, Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
2000, Singapore Code of Corporate Governance 2001, Thailand Code for Best Practice for Directors of 
Listed Companies 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, NYSE Corporate Governance Rules 2003, 
Bangladesh Code of Corporate Governance 2004, Hong Kong Corporate Governance Code 2004 at 
http://www.micg.net/code.htm   
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Financial risk, especially relating to financial instruments, was the area of greatest 
increase in corporate risk disclosure requirements arising in the mid 2000’s. 
 
In the United States (US), the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Financial 
Reporting Release No.48 (FRR48) in 1997, which requires SEC registrants to disclose 
their financial condition as well as quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market 
risks in the Management, Discussion and Analysis (MDA) section. In Germany, 
German Accounting Standard No.5 (GAS5) requires companies to present risk 
information in a separate section of the management report as well as in the 
consolidated financial statement. Similar initiatives have been undertaken by other 
countries as shown in previous studies such as France (Combes-Thuelin et al., 2006), 
European Union (Abraham and Cox, 2007) and Portugal (Oliveira et al., 2011). In fact, 
in the UK, the most notable risk disclosure framework issued by the ICAEW entitled 
‘Financial Reporting of Risk – Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk’ has been 
published in the year 1997. The ICAEW proposed and stressed that directors provide 
and enhance risk information in the annual reports to facilitate informed decision 
making by investors and restore investors confidence (Linsley and Shrives, 2006; 
Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Solomon et al., 2000). These reporting regulations and 
frameworks, to some extent, could develop good corporate governance practice through 
the lens of the growing importance of risk information (Amran et al., 2009).  
 
The extent to which companies provide transparency about the management of their 
various types of risk is a central issue in good corporate governance and risk 
management practices. The emergence of a sound risk management practice by 
companies is important since investors want to assess a company’s future cash flows 
and financial condition. Furthermore, investors want disclosures about uncertainties i.e., 
within company and in the industry that could underlie their assessment about the 
company. In essence, managers’ should expand their knowledge and experience in risk 
management practices in which this can be reflected through disclosures of risk 
information. Therefore, companies need to maintain a sound system of internal control
5
 
                                               
5
 Internal control, risk management and risk reporting have been embedded in corporate governance. The 
awareness was in the the form of improved guidance on developing and implementing internal control 
system internationally as evidenced by, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the US and 
Turnbull Report (1999) in the UK.  
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and risk management procedures in which the disclosure of risk information should be 
prioritised and emphasized. Research into the factors that drive risk disclosure decisions 
by managers can provide a way forward to help better explain and understand how to 
enhance the corporate practice of risk reporting. Recent empirical evidence (e.g., Amran 
et al., 2009; Abraham and Cox, 2007, Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Lajili and Zegal, 
2005) reveals that risk information presented in companies' annual reports is limited and 
deficient. Prior literature also suggests that corporate annual reports require sufficient 
appropriate risk information so that investors can assess a company's risk profile and 
make informed and rational decisions about the allocation of their capital (e.g., Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Solomon et al., 2000; Linsley and Shrives, 2000). These research 
findings together with calls by professional bodies, has highlight the urgency for the 
corporate and securities regulators to increase corporate risk disclosure requirements. It 
can also influence management and controlling shareholders to increase the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of corporate risk information. More broadly, the dynamic nature of 
the business environment nowadays has increased public demand for greater disclosure 
by firms relating to risks and uncertainties (Linsley and Shrives, 2005). 
 
1.2 RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION AND OBJECTIVE 
 
Previous studies focusing on risk reporting have sought to quantify the extent of 
disclosure in financial statements for specific categories of risks such as market risk and 
credit risk (e.g., Rajgopal, 1999; Linsmeier et al., 2002). Others have examined more 
comprehensive risk information in annual reports, taking into accounts a broader range 
of risk such as financial risk and operational risk (e.g., Lajili and Zhegal, 2005; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007). The extent of risk reporting has also 
been studied in companies’ interim reports (e.g., Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012) and 
prospectuses (e.g., Deumes, 2008). Until lately, most of these comprehensive risk 
disclosure studies have been undertaken in Western settings where the ownership 
structure is relatively diffused. Examples are Solomon et al. (2000), Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) and Abraham and Cox (2007) in the UK, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) in Italy 
and Oliveira et al. (2011) in Portugal. Corporate risk reporting practices have not been 
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studied as extensively in developing economies where ownership structure is more 
concentrated. 
 
Even though there are studies of risk disclosures in emerging capital markets such as 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Hassan et al., 2011; Hassan, 2009) as well as Malaysia 
(Arshad et al., 2012; Amran et al., 2009), these empirical studies which investigate risk 
information under the broader perspective are still limited. For example, Hasan et al. 
(2011) and Amran et al. (2009) examine risk disclosure in non-financial UAE and 
Malaysian companies, respectively, by exploring only company-specific variables, 
without exploring other possible determinants of risk disclosure. Non-financial 
companies are samples that exclude companies in banking, finance and insurance 
industries. Arshad et al. (2012) examine risk disclosure in non-financial Malaysian 
companies, and apart from family and government ownership structures, other 
ownership structures are not tested. Furthermore, as far as this study is concerned, 
studies on upper echelon’s cognitive characteristics have not been done using Malaysian 
background.   
 
The objectives of this study are four-fold. First, to present a picture of the extent of risk 
information disclosed in annual report and to establish the diversity of risk disclosure of 
Malaysian listed companies for the year under study (i.e. 2009).  This purpose is to 
provide a snapshot of the volume and types of risk information disclosed in annual 
reports. Although there have been published studies on risk disclosures in Malaysia, 
there has not been comprehensive evidence on the extent of risk disclosures in response 
to the pressure from increasing demand for risk information due to the global financial 
crisis. It is thus instructional to identify how corporations in an emerging capital market 
(i.e. Malaysia) practice risk reporting. The literature on voluntary disclosures shows that 
companies are willing to disclose their voluntary information in response to a number of 
factors. Some of the reasons may be attributed to benefits outweighing the costs of 
disclosing the voluntary information. Examples of benefits and costs are developing 
corporate image, increasing legislation or because of specific events (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). Based on signalling and proprietary cost theories, it is expected that 
companies’ risk reporting should reflect the developments in corporate governance and 
regulations made over the past years. The global financial crisis has provided an 
impetus for increasing corporate risk management and disclosure.  
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Second, this study determines whether upper echelons’ cognitive characteristics 
underlying observable demographic characteristics such as age, functional track, 
education, tenure and ethnicity of key management players have an influence on 
corporate risk disclosure. The purpose is to determine whether differences in the 
background characteristics of upper management influence the extent and variety of 
disclosure of risk information by Malaysian companies in terms of the management’s 
cost-benefit decisions. 
 
Third, the study will look at the impact of ownership structures on the corporate risk 
disclosure practices in Malaysia. The association between corporate disclosure and 
ownership structures has long been of interest to accounting researchers (e.g., Liu and 
Sun, 2010; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hossain et al., 1994). This is 
because of the separation of ownership and control of a corporation which raises the 
issue of information asymmetry. Disclosure is seen as one of the mechanisms to 
mitigate adverse selection by reducing information asymmetry between owners and 
managers. However, the extents to which different ownership structures could increase 
or reduce information asymmetry problems still remains unclear. In addition, some of 
the ownership structures and corporate disclosures relationships are weak and not 
verified in the literature. Moreover, evidence of the ownership structure and corporate 
disclosure relationships is limited. The only Malaysian evidence is found in a 
conference paper by Arshad et al., 2012 in relation to family ownership. The findings of 
previous research do provide a good starting point to further examine the relationship 
between risk disclosure and a firm’s concentrated ownership structures. This study thus 
relates the level of risk disclosure to three types of ownership concentration, namely, 
family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership. These are the most 
commonly found ownership structures in Malaysia.  
 
Fourth, this study determines the impact of risk disclosure in the share market (i.e. its 
value-relevance) in Malaysia. The question whether greater disclosure level increases 
firm value is a matter of considerable interest and importance to investors and securities 
regulators. However, theoretical argument suggests that greater disclosure is associated 
with an increase in firm value. Information disclosure is important to investors. Through 
sufficient information, investors can properly monitor and judge the opportunities and 
the risks of their investment opportunities. Moreover, the more they know, the more 
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accurately they will be able to determine a company’s value. Therefore, disclosing more 
information is expected to grant investors with more relevant signals about the company 
and therefore investors are more able to accurately determine the company’s value. 
However, empirical evidence does not consistently support such signalling theory and 
produces mixed findings. On the one hand, it is argued that risk disclosure can only 
serve as a mechanism to increase the company’s value if investors perceive that the 
information is credible and relevant. On the other hand, it could be argued that a 
company with a higher level of risk may demonstrate a reluctance to reveal such 
information in order to divert attention from their riskiness. Whereas risk disclosure is 
increasingly required in annual reports, the current regulations only focusing on a 
specific type of risk information (i.e. financial risk) and allow firms a degree of 
discretion with regard to the other types of risk information to be disclosed. Hence risk 
disclosures depend on a manager’s willingness to actively disclose the right information 
(Deumes, 2008). Indeed, the decisions of the management whether to increase 
transparency or reduce competitiveness will make risk disclosures contain ‘boilerplate’ 
disclosure elements that do not help investors to make accurate decisions. Existing 
literature (e.g., Ismail et al., 2012) suggests that there is still demand for empirical work 
to examine the impact of risk disclosures on the company’s value. Thus, based on 
mixed findings from prior research, this study will determine the relationship between 
risk disclosures which include regulated and non-regulated risk disclosures and firms’ 
market value.  
 
Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1 shows the conceptual framework and theoretical perspectives, 
empirical objectives and research questions of the study.  
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Figure 1.1: 
Conceptual Framework of Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 depicts the conceptualisation of relationships to be investigated in this thesis. 
It views the inherent cognitions of the key management players in the organization 
(based on upper echelons theory) as antecedent to the management decisions about 
disclosure of corporate risk (based on signalling and proprietary costs theories). It also 
includes the influence of shareholders on corporate risk disclosure in terms of the extent 
of access of larger shareholders to inside information (information asymmetry 
perspectives). Finally, the relevance of corporate risk disclosure to investors is 
considered. Hence, the framework addresses not only the influence of key managers and 
owners on the extent of corporate risk disclosure but also on whether that disclosure has 
usefulness in the share market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management’s 
cognitive 
characteristics 
based on upper 
echelons theory 
Management’s 
cost-benefit 
decision based on 
signalling and 
proprietary cost 
theories 
Shareholder concentration 
and information asymmetry 
related to ownership control 
separation 
Corporate disclosure of risk 
Relevance of regulated / 
non-regulated risk 
disclosures to investors 
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Table 1.1:  
Summary of the Study’s Invoked Theories, Empirical Objectives and Research 
Questions 
 Theoretical 
Perspective 
Empirical Objectives Research Questions 
1. Signalling, 
Proprietary cost 
To identify the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure in 
various categories.  
What is the nature, extent and industry 
difference of risk reported in aggregate 
and under categories of operational 
risk, environmental risk, financial risk 
and strategic risk in annual reports of 
large listed companies in Malaysia?   
2. Upper echelons To determine the effects of 
upper echelons factors on 
corporate risk disclosure.   
Do manager-specific factors of top 
management (i.e. age, functional track, 
education, tenure and ethnicity) 
influence the nature and extent of 
corporate risk disclosure? 
3. Agency To determine the effects of 
ownership structure on 
corporate risk disclosure.  
Does shareholder concentration in 
terms of family ownership, government 
ownership and foreign ownership have 
an influence on the nature and extent of 
corporate risk disclosure?  
4. Signalling To determine the impact of 
corporate risk information in 
the share market (i.e. its 
value-relevance).  
Does the extent of total, regulated and 
unregulated risk disclosure have value 
relevance in the Malaysian share 
market? 
 
1.3 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
The comprehensive, systematic and reliable disclosures of corporate risk through formal 
channel of annual reports could be a key benefit to shareholders, lenders, suppliers, 
employees and other stakeholders. But such disclosure, other than financial risks 
mandated under accounting standards, has been deficient. To achieve improved risk 
disclosures, an understanding is sought in this study of the influence of two types of 
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corporate players expected to influence corporate risk disclosure decisions, namely, top 
level management and controlling shareholders. To this end, this study provides new 
evidence on the extent to which the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chair of Audit 
Committee (CAC), as well as family, government and foreign controlling shareholders 
have an effect on the nature and extent of corporate risk disclosure. The perspectives of 
signalling theory, proprietary cost theory, upper echelons theory and agency 
shareholder-manager separation theory are invoked to provide an improved framework 
for investigating the factors affecting corporate risk disclosure. Additionally, the prior 
approaches to designing a classification typology for corporate risk are reviewed and a 
revised classification scheme and set of definitions is developed. The aim is to develop 
a typology and associated definitions that can minimize the ambiguity and maximize the 
objectivity of measuring the nature and extent of corporate risk disclosure. The findings 
can then potentially have use in predicting which companies are more or less conducive 
to initiatives or pressures that encourage greater risk disclosures.  
 
As an extension, this study undertakes the modelling of, and provides evidence on, the 
value-relevance of such risk disclosures in the share market in Malaysia, in terms of 
whether such information significantly affects share prices. This can give an indicator of 
whether corporate risk disclosure practices in 2009, at a time of high financial volatility 
in the share market and economic uncertainty for companies, were viewed by investors 
as having information benefits that outweighed the cost to the company of providing the 
information. If corporate risk disclosures are found to lack value-relevance, then 
securities regulators would need to consider ways of strengthening risk disclosure 
practices. Otherwise the current requirements would remain a costly compliance 
exercise for Malaysian companies without significant offsetting benefits to shareholders 
from reduced information asymmetry.   
 
This study contributes to the literature on the association between upper echelons 
characteristics, ownership structures, firm value and corporate risk disclosure in several 
ways: 
 
1. It responds to the Bamber et al.’s (2010, p. 1134) suggestion that ‘...exploring the 
roles individual managers play in other financial reporting choices is a fruitful 
avenue for future research.’ Bamber et al. (2010) especially find that the 
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magnitude of managers’ influence varies extensively and significantly in firms’ 
voluntary disclosure decision making. This influence of top managements’ 
personal characteristics on decision-making by firms offers an interesting 
perspective in explaining cross sectional differences in corporate disclosure 
(Bamber et al., 2010). Bamber et al. (2010) show that these personal 
characteristics of managers play an important role in firm earnings guidance 
characteristics; Dyreng et al. (2010) examine these personal characteristics with 
respect to tax avoidance behaviour and find that such characteristics cannot 
explain manager fixed effects; Ge et al. (2009) examine Chief Financial Officers’ 
(CFO) characteristics and their effects across the firm’s financial reporting 
choices. Taking these approaches into account, this study will contribute to the 
embryonic manager-effects literature in regards of risk disclosure decisions by top 
management.  
 
2. In spite of increasing regulations (created by accounting standards and Bursa 
Malaysia listing requirements) that require companies to disclose information, the 
current rules are not comprehensive (Lazar and Choo, 2008) especially in relation 
to risk disclosure. They depend largely on managers' willingness to actively 
disclose the right information. Top management may choose to disclose company 
information exceeding the level mandated by regulation or in advance of 
compliance date (i.e., voluntarily). Therefore, upper echelons theory is invoked to 
address the factors of the top management background that would influence their 
willingness to disclose risk information. In relation to this study, the focus is on 
the role of observable demographic characteristics of top managers’ background 
since upper echelons theory proposes that ‘an emphasis on background 
characteristics, rather than psychological dimensions, seems essential’ (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984, p. 196).  
 
3. In response to Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1990) call for research on the 
influence of executives beyond the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) level, the study 
will add the Chair of Audit Committee (CAC) to exhibit distinct risk disclosure 
influences. In particular, the CEO is chosen since he/she is the foremost executive 
ranked position in the corporation that might influence the overall decisions 
within the organisation. On the other hand, the CAC is chosen because normally 
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that position oversees the financial reporting, auditing, internal control and risk 
management processes of the firm. In addition, the CAC is also included since 
he/she holds responsibility for the effective functioning of the audit committee. 
Audit committee plays a significant monitoring role in assuring the quality of 
financial reporting and corporate accountability (Carcello and Neal, 2000). Given 
corporate risk disclosure is part of risk management and internal control, it is 
appropriate to study the influence of the CAC together with the CEO in relation to 
risk information disclosure by companies.  
 
4. Additionally, Malaysia is a multiethnic society with Chinese and Malays 
dominating its economics and politics. Therefore, the socio-economic background 
of top management in Malaysian corporations would be an interesting issue to be 
addressed. While prior studies on ethnicity focus largely on political cost and 
legitimacy theories (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 2005), this study will bring a 
different theoretical perspective under the umbrella of upper echelons theory. As 
the directors of Malaysian corporations come from different ethnic backgrounds, 
examination of their influence over the disclosure of risk information will impart a 
new direction on the sociological aspects of corporate disclosure research.  
 
5. Generally, there are a number of empirical studies that discuss the role of the 
ownership structure in corporate disclosure (e.g., Liu and Sun, 2010; Eng and 
Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) and precisely in corporate risk disclosure 
(e.g., Arshad et al., 2012). On the whole, empirical results show inconclusive 
evidence due to limitation of ownership concentration that ignores the issues of 
shareholders’ identities (Chu and Cheah, 2006). This study extends the existing 
literature by including different types of ownership structure and its impact on 
corporate risk disclosure focusing on the Malaysian business environment where 
concentrated ownership structure is prevalent. For example, the conflicting 
theoretical viewpoints as regards the relationship between family ownership and 
agency costs have been specified in previous studies. The arguments are whether 
the family ownership firms create or reduce agency costs. The current evidence of 
family ownership in Arshad et al (2012) in relation to corporate risk disclosure 
quality and quantity is insignificant. Hence, this study attempts to provide 
evidence on the effect of family ownership on corporate risk disclosure.  
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6. It adds to recent literature showing the links to corporate risk disclosure of 
government ownership and foreign ownership in a different institutional setting 
specifically from a developing country such as Malaysia. Despite studies 
concerning government ownership being common in Asia, the results are 
inconclusive since there are conflicting arguments with regards to agency costs. A 
number of prior studies have shown positive relationships between foreign 
ownership and corporate voluntary disclosure. Nevertheless, there is very limited 
research on the relationship between foreign ownership structure and corporate 
risk disclosure. Therefore, with the inclusion of government and foreign 
ownership structures, this study fills a gap in the literature.     
 
7. Recent literature examines risk disclosures in specific areas (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004). It only focuses on a narrow set of risks, essentially market risk 
and credit risk as well as those associated with the use of financial instruments. In 
Malaysia, a study on this matter has been done among Malaysian listed firms to 
examine the compliance with FRS132 Financial Instruments – Disclosure and 
Presentation (Othman and Ameer, 2009). Other prior studies on corporate risk 
disclosure with empirical evidence on the factors affecting the extent of disclosure 
(e.g. Linsley and Shrives, 2006) and empirical literature that examines risk under 
its comprehensive perspectives remains limited. Therefore, this study extends 
prior studies by examining a broad perspective to corporate risk disclosure in the 
Malaysian context. The study is useful in assisting both regulators and investors in 
(i) identifying the broad nature and extent of risk information disclosed; and (ii) 
raising awareness in presenting risk disclosure by companies in Malaysia. 
 
8. Moreover, the impact of disclosing accounting numbers on stock returns is well 
documented in the literature (Ohlson, 1995), but the impact of disclosing a certain 
category of information, such as risk information, is yet to be adequately 
explored. In this regard, prior studies however, focus either (to name a few) on 
investigating the association between voluntary disclosure levels and a proxy of 
the cost of equity capital (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002), equity offerings (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm, 2000) or a stock market liquidity (e.g., Healy et al., 1999). 
However, there is insufficient empirical evidence with regard to the direct 
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relationship between corporate risk disclosure and firm value in general and for 
emerging markets in particular. For this reason, this study tests the impact of both 
regulated and non-regulated corporate risk disclosure on the firms’ market value. 
 
1.4 MALAYSIAN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT  
 
The East Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998 as well as massive business losses around 
the globe ten years later exposed weak governance which in turn weakened investors’ 
confidence in the global capital market including Malaysia (Nam and Nam, 2004). The 
problem affecting corporate governance turned out to hit listed companies heavily 
because of the certain features of the corporate sector in Malaysia. These features are an 
economy that is generally characterised with a high level of ownership concentration, 
excessive government intervention, significant participation of owners in management, 
and a weak legal systems and enforcement (La Porta et al., 1999; Chu and Cheah, 
2006).  
 
Compared to widely held business corporations in developed countries such as the UK 
and the US, Malaysian corporations exhibit a different pattern of ownership in which 
there is more concentrated ownership by families and significant equity holdings by 
government (Abdullah, 2006). The government intervention in the form of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, which was due to the ethnic rioting in 1969 was 
intended to eliminate the race identification with economic functions (Tam and Tan, 
2007; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). The NEP was introduced by the government to 
completely rectify the imbalance between Chinese and indigenous Malays in the 
economy. The economy nevertheless, still retained Chinese family-owned and run 
businesses to the exclusion of Malays (Gul, 2006). The implementation of NEP was 
intended to be a form of institutionalised positive discrimination towards Bumiputera
6
 
that could affect corporate behaviour in the Malaysian business environment (Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005). To effectively implement the NEP, the government passed the 
Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) in 1975. As against economic domination by Chinese 
ethnics, the NEP was committed to achieve 30 percent Bumiputera ownership share of 
                                               
6
 Bumiputera refers to Malaysian for Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups (Haniffa and Cooke 
2005, p.398). 
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the corporate sector by 1990.  Since then, the Bumiputera have been given priority and 
various concessions including business contracts, access to capital and other subsidies 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Since the ownership structure in Malaysia is substantially a 
result of the national economic agenda (Gomez and Jomo, 1999), the Malaysian market 
may provide a unique setting for the implementation of corporate disclosure compared 
to other countries within the Asian region. 
 
As a fact, Malaysian development of company law and practice is closely connected to 
the development of the UK’s company legislation. This rigid and dominated 
development in Malaysia reflects the country as a former British colony. Moreover, the 
Malaysian accounting and auditing standards replicate standards in the UK and other 
commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand (Gul, 2006).  In spite of 
having broad similarities in favours to accounting and regulatory environments with the 
UK, however, there is different institutional environment as characterised among 
Malaysian firms (Gul, 2006). Furthermore, Malaysian business environment is 
characterised by the existence of politically favoured corporations (Gul, 2006). 
 
As shown in Table 1.2, although Bumiputera ownership has grown greatly from 2.4 
percent in 1970 to 18.7 percent in 2002, the ownership still totally fell short of the initial 
target of 30 percent. By comparison, Chinese equity ownership has increased to more 
than double that of the Bumiputera. As evidenced by Jomo (1995), Tam and Tan (2007) 
state that the Malaysian market is dominated by large government trust funds such as 
the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) and the Employees Provident Fund (EPF). 
Before 1990, foreign ownership has decreased tremendously and only started to increase 
in the early 1990s after the introduction of the ICA in 1975 which has liberalised capital 
ﬂows (Suto, 2001) to favour not only non-Bumiputera but also foreign business 
communities (Tam and Tan, 2007). In relation to this study, the environment of 
ownership structure in Malaysia which mainly concentrating on family, government and 
foreign shareholding could influence the nature and extent of risk disclosure by 
companies. The impact of the shift in corporate ownership brought about by Malaysia’s 
‘new economic policy’ reforms has been of continuing interest to government policy-
makers. One area of impact of relevance to corporate governance and securities market 
policy-makers is the impact on voluntary corporate risk disclosure. With this area of 
policy-making interest in mind, this study develops and tests a hypothesis about the 
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Table 1.2: 
Ownership of Share Capital (at par value)
a
 of Limited Companies, 
1969, 1970
b
, 1975, 1980
c
, 1983, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1999 and 2002 
 
 
 Sources: Adapted from Jomo (2004). 
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effects of bumiputra and non-bumiputra ethnic ownership on the extent of corporate 
risk disclosure. 
 
1.5 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
 
Chapter one provides an introduction to this thesis together with an outline of the key 
objectives of the research. This chapter also covers the research motivation and 
contribution as well as an overview of the Malaysian business environment. 
 
Chapter two discusses the issue in corporate disclosure; begin with special focus on the 
debate of mandatory and voluntary disclosure as well as disclosure principle with the 
signalling and proprietary cost theories. The chapter then discusses the regulatory 
context for this study. After that, the chapter discusses corporate risk disclosure 
definition, classification and related literature on risk-related disclosure. This is 
followed by a comprehensive review of the upper echelons characteristics, ownership 
structures and value-relevance of corporate risk disclosure. This covers upper echelons 
theory, agency theory and value-relevance model. 
 
Chapter three presents the empirical schema of this study, which includes upper 
management characteristics, ownership structures and context-specific factors. The aim 
is to understand what influences managers to disclose additional risk information 
regarding their firms. This is followed by a section devoted to explaining hypotheses 
development. Following this, the sample selection, measurement of dependent and 
independent variables are discussed. Then, a regression model presented on the 
relationship between corporate risk disclosure and the determinants used in this study as 
well as its value-relevance model.  
 
Chapter four describes and reports the results of content analysis. It gives a broad 
explanation of the results of content analysis. Hypothesis, H01 will be tested in this 
chapter. A discussion of the results will be given.  
 
Chapter five reports the results of empirical analysis which examines the relationship 
between corporate risk disclosure and upper management characteristics and ownership 
structures. The chapter also constitutes the empirical analysis of value-relevance of 
17 
 
corporate risk disclosure (that is, the impact of risk disclosure on the firm value). Then 
the results of this chapter are explained and discussed. 
 
Chapter six summarizes and concludes the overall results and acknowledges 
contributions, implications, scope and limitations of study as well as suggestions for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In corporate reporting literature, the issue of corporate risk disclosure has been fairly 
developed into a substantial field for investigation.  This development of risk disclosure 
literature has been pursued in three areas. The first area is about the debate between 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosures and what  motivates  companies  to  disclose  
more risk information  beyond  the  level  required  by  regulation.  The  second area 
concerns  the  factors affecting  the  level  and  type  of  risk information  disclosed. For 
example, managements must have motivations or factors to influence them to reveal 
risk information to the public (especially in the annual report). A  number  of  previous 
studies on the theoretical  perspectives  have  been  applied  by researchers  to  explain  
the  phenomena  of  risk disclosure.  The third area concerns the empirical consequences 
of risk disclosure on the company’s firm value based on stock prices. This is because 
incentives for managers to produce risk information within their firms also derive from 
capital market forces.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, Section 2.2 offers a 
discussion on the literature relating to the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in general, and risk disclosure in particular. The discussion will assess the 
arguments for and against regulating financial reporting and also address the effects of 
such regulations on voluntary corporate (risk) disclosure. Secondly, Section 2.3 reviews 
the disclosure principle, signalling theory and proprietary cost theory. Thirdly, prior 
studies relating to corporate risk disclosure are discussed, summarised and presented in 
Section 2.4. The theories and previous literatures on risk disclosure discussed in 
Sections 2.2 to 2.4 are reviewed in order to form the first research hypothesis for this 
study. Fourthly, the first group of factors affecting the level and type of risk information 
disclosed are discussed in Section 2.5 using upper echelons variables. All the variables 
represent the most common upper echelons characteristics tested in previous research 
based on the upper echelons theory in relation to corporate disclosure in general and 
corporate risk disclosure in particular. Fifthly, the second group of factors affecting the 
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level and type of risk information disclosed using the type of ownership structure is 
discussed in Section 2.6. These ownership structures comprise of family ownership, 
government ownership and foreign ownership. Then, Section 2.7 discusses the 
empirical consequences of corporate (risk) disclosure to the firm value. Finally, a 
summary and conclusion is presented in Section 2.8. 
 
2.2 MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE DEBATE: AN 
OVERVIEW OF RISK DISCLOSURE 
 
Disclosures in corporate reports are often distinguished based on whether they are 
mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory disclosure refers to information disclosure required 
by legislation. Voluntary  disclosure  refers to  the  level  of  information  disclosed  
beyond  what  is  imposed  by accounting  standards and  legal  regulations.  Companies 
must disclose corporate information to satisfy and to create investors’ confidence since  
they  are  regarded  as the  main  providers  of  capital  to  the company. In the fairness 
of the capital market, the information disclosed is also to help investors to achieve better 
investment decisions for their capital allocation. It has been argued that corporate 
provision of information needs to be regulated to ensure that external users receive 
some minimum amount of disclosure. This is because of information asymmetry. 
 
Managers of a company have a superior  understanding  of the  future  prospects of  the  
firm  since  they  have  access  to  private  information.  This private information is 
needed by investors and other users (e.g., creditors) for different purposes. However, 
such information is not freely attainable by all parties that have an interest in the 
transaction; therefore companies must disclose information to satisfy the variety needs 
of users. Since information disclosed may potentially affect an investor’s decisions and 
actions, disclosure is in fact a substantive issue. Proponents of regulation have doubted 
whether companies on their own could be trusted to report information fully and 
truthfully. This is because there is quite a tendency for companies to hold back the 
disclosure of unfavourable information (e.g. Verrecchia, 1983). As a result, they argue 
that accounting and other corporate information needs to be regulated to prevent 
companies from giving misleading reports and to safeguard the interest of the public. 
Since the market for information may not be efficient, the optimum amount of 
information may not be generated without regulatory intervention. Thus, regulating 
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corporate information could potentially benefit smaller investors and protect individuals 
who are at an information disadvantage (Brown et al., 2008).   
 
Wolk and Tearney (1997) summarize the merits in favour of regulating the provision of 
corporate financial information. The idea of mandating the standardized provision of 
financial information will rather lead to consistency of disclosure among companies, 
increasing comparability, and in turn financial reporting quality may also improve. 
Moreover, Wolk and Tearney (1997) argue that mandatory public reporting also 
enhances the perceived fairness of the capital market and may reduce the total cost to 
society of acquiring the information. Market failure is commonly viewed as a reason in 
the argument for regulation in accounting information.  
 
Since the firm is a monopoly supplier of information about itself, it may be cheaper for 
society to require mandatory free disclosure rather than to have individual investors 
privately contracting for the same information and paying monopolistic prices. (Wolk 
and Tearney, 1997, p. 98) 
 
Furthermore, Wolk and Tearney (1997) argue that market failure can be due to the 
failure of the accounting and auditing profession in preventing frauds and bankruptcies 
in companies. They argue that as a result, criticism of the profession arises. According 
to Wolk and Tearney (1997, p. 93): 
 
The criticisms generally have focused on the alleged low quality of financial reporting, 
even under regulation. The  reasons cited for this are poor accounting and auditing 
standards, too much management flexibility in the choice of accounting policies and 
occasional laxity by auditors. Corporate frauds undetected by auditors and corporate 
failures not signalled in advance by either financial statements or audit reports are cited 
as evidence that the financial reporting system is failing to protect the public interest. 
 
Another point is that, accounting information itself can lead to market failure. Wolk and 
Tearney (1997) argue that accounting information is a public good, whereby once the 
information is available, it can be consumed by many people without reducing the 
opportunity for consumption by others. According to them, public goods are under 
produced in a free market due to externalities. They argue that due to existence of 
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externalities, producers of a public good has a very limited incentive to produce it 
because all consumers cannot be charged for the good, as there are free riders to the 
goods. They argue that these free riders lead to under production of goods, and thus 
resulting in market failure because producers are not motivated to meet the actual 
demand for the goods.     
 
Proponents of regulation argue that regulatory intervention is therefore highly necessary 
in order to increase the production of accounting information. Previous studies have 
looked into the case of externality in relation to the accounting information disclosure 
by companies. For example, Foster (1981) suggests that if there are externalities of 
disclosure, that is, the disclosure of information by one firm which also express 
information about other firms, mandatory disclosure requirement is collectively 
desirable since the firms disclose too little information voluntarily. Additionally, 
Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) study a securities market with costly disclosure where 
there are positive disclosure externalities and they analyse a model in which someone 
might benefit from mandatory disclosure rules. Essentially, they show that mandatory 
disclosure might benefit securities issuers because of the externality.  
 
Proponents of regulation also argue that regulation should be imposed in order to 
achieve social goals that are not met by a free market even when there is no market 
failure. For the fairness of capital market, they argue that accounting information really 
needs to be regulated so that all potential investors have equal access to the same 
information. This has been agreed by Suijs (2007) who explains that mandatory 
disclosure regulations will improve the efficiency of the investor’s capital allocation by 
facilitating the investor to distinguish good investment opportunities from the bad ones.  
 
Opponents of regulation on the other hand, contend that a competitive capital market 
produces good voluntary reporting. They argue that managers have incentives to 
disclose the firms’ private information in order to distinguish their firms from weaker 
firms (Dye, 1990).  Moreover, due to the competitive pressure for capital, it is 
completely to the best interest of the company to voluntarily disclose more information 
than is required. This is because potential investors may perceive it as a responsible 
reporting firm and will increase confidence by investors since the information revealed 
has the potential to influence their decisions for their investment. 
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Jovanovic (1982) establishes a model on the basis that the free market offers enough 
incentives for businesses to disclose information about the quality of their product. 
From his model, he concludes that in a world where false claims or misrepresentation of 
quality disclosure is unfeasible, the free market offers great incentives for disclosure. He 
states that ‘...whether information is of purely private value or not, more than the 
socially-optimal amount of disclosures takes place’ (Jovanovic, 1982, p. 36). His model 
finds no support for business to have the policy of mandatory disclosure. 
 
Dye (1990) further compares mandatory and voluntary disclosure policies in the case of 
externalities. He argues that firms would voluntarily go for the policies that an 
accounting standard boards would mandate. Moreover, Dye (1990) points out that a 
disclosure made by one firm can create either real or financial externality. According to 
Dye (1990, p. 19), real externality is when disclosures by one firm can alter investors’ 
actual distribution of other firm’s cash flows. He argues that where real externalities are 
present, optimal mandatory and equilibrium voluntary disclosure be likely to swerve. In 
such situation, Dye (1990) asserts that mandatory disclosure is necessary. Financial 
externality on the other hand takes place if disclosures by one firm can only alter 
investors’ perceptions about the distributions of other firms’ cash flows (Dye, 1990). In 
this situation, optimal mandated disclosures simply coincide with firm’s voluntary 
disclosure decisions; therefore according to Dye (1990), mandated disclosures are 
unnecessary.  
 
Equally, Teoh and Hwang (1991) suggest that voluntary disclosure may ultimately 
provide more information to investors, and in consequence mandatory disclosure 
regulations can be detrimental. In their model, Teoh and Hwang (1991) explain that 
voluntary disclosure can be superior to mandatory disclosure because the latter only 
indicates whether the information is good or bad but not indicate whether the firm is of 
high-quality or low-quality. Given that zero informational asymmetry is not possible, 
they argue that mandatory disclosure leads to a similar possibility when there is 
informational asymmetry. Therefore, Teoh and Hwang (1991) conclude that aside from 
direct costs of disclosure, the policy to have legally mandated disclosure in securities 
markets is not necessary.  
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Prior studies have been undertaken by earlier researchers on the relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. However, their empirical and theoretical studies 
indicate mixed findings. There are two main issues revolving this area in the effect of 
mandatory requirements on voluntary disclosure. On the one hand, based on the general 
assumption, as mandatory reporting requirements become more detailed, voluntary 
disclosures may decline (Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996; Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1982; 
Gonedes, 1980).  On the other hand, mandatory and voluntary disclosures could 
complement each other (Dobler, 2005; Taylor and Redpath, 2000; Chow et al., 1996; 
Dye, 1986) or could be trade-off each other (Fishman and Hagerty, 2003).  
 
Dye (1985a) evaluates the effects of mandatory changes in accounting standards on 
firms’ voluntary decisions. He assumes that a firm’s choice among reporting 
requirements is influenced by how that choice alters the firm’s ability to protect its 
proprietary information. Proprietary information can be described as any valuable 
commercial information which is confidential to the business with an advantage over 
competitors who do not have that information. Non-proprietary information on the other 
hand can be described as any information that can be made public. In his analysis of the 
effects of mandatory changes in accounting standards on firms’ disclosure decisions, 
Dye (1985a, p. 546) concludes:  
 
... by imposing more detailed reporting requirements, accounting boards do not 
necessarily increase investors' knowledge of firms' future earnings prospects. This result 
can occur for either of two reasons: (1) mandatory and voluntary disclosures are 
sometimes substitutes, so the "amount" of information produced by "more detailed" 
mandatory reports may be offset by a reduction in voluntary disclosures; or (2) firms 
may be able to reveal information by their actual choice among accounting techniques 
(since accounting choice may be a signal of private information...), so the mandatory 
use of a "more detailed," but uniform, accounting procedure may remove this potential 
source of information. 
 
Nevertheless, an insight behind the mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
complementary concept has been illustrated in Dye (1986). His model consists of cases 
where managers are endowed with both proprietary and non-proprietary information. 
Dye (1986) concludes that mandatory and voluntary disclosures are complements when 
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mandatory disclosures encompass reports of a firm’s non-proprietary information. In his 
model, Dye (1986) assumes that a manager's private information comprise two signals, 
x and y, where the disclosure of x is assumed to not incur proprietary costs while the 
disclosure of y will incur proprietary costs. He also argues that mandating the disclosure 
of the non-proprietary information x will affect the voluntary disclosure of y. For the 
optimal disclosure, Dye (1986) argues that the increase in mandatory disclosure of non-
proprietary information will reduce the benefits of withholding correlated proprietary 
information. The effect is an increase in incentives to disclose voluntarily the correlated 
proprietary information.  
 
Chow et al. (1996) embark on a laboratory experiment to test the hypothesis based on 
Dye (1986) in which the mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information induces 
an increase in the disclosure of correlated proprietary information. In the setting of 
disclosure policies concerning the withholding of proprietary information, Chow et al. 
(1996) fail to confirm Dye’s (1986) model. In their discussion, they conclude that 
mandatory disclosure of information had no significant impact on the voluntary 
disclosure of correlated proprietary information. However, a study by Taylor and 
Redpath (2000) also test Dye’s (1986) model and examines the relationship between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure of financial instruments for mining companies in 
Australia. From their content analysis of financial reports, Taylor and Redpath (2000) 
support Dye’s (1986) hypothesis that an increase in mandatory disclosure is paralleled 
by an increase in voluntary disclosure of related information.  
 
In a different vein, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) conclude that there is a trade off 
between the role of mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. They conduct a 
study of a firm which discloses information about product quality to consumers. In their 
model, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) assume that there are both informed and 
uninformed customers. Informed customers who can understand the disclosure can use 
the disclosure effectively and value it more while uninformed customers who cannot 
understand the meaning of such disclosure will observe the disclosure differently. In 
this setting, they argue that there are a trade-off between the role of mandatory 
disclosure and voluntary disclosure. Fishman and Hagerty (2003) show that if there is 
too low fraction of customers who can understand a disclosure, voluntary disclosure 
may not be forthcoming. On the other hand, informed customers are at an advantage as 
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compared to uninformed customers if there is mandatory disclosure. Fishman and 
Hagerty (2003, p. 47) generalize that ‘...mandatory disclosure can make informed 
customers better off, leave uninformed customer welfare unchanged, make the seller 
worse off and either increase or decrease aggregate welfare.’ Therefore, they suggest 
that where product information is relatively difficult to understand, mandatory 
disclosure should be found necessary.  
Corporate risk disclosure in actual fact has not been without its share of the issue of 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Risk disclosure would be useful for investors 
when making informed decisions as it reduces uncertainty and reduces information 
asymmetries by raising confidence in the market. Following the pace of change in 
business nowadays, companies may choose to disclose additional risk information to 
gain benefit (such as trust) from the present and future investors. Earlier studies on risk 
disclosures have provided strong evidence that companies have not sufficiently 
disclosed risk-related information in their annual reports under a voluntary reporting 
regime (e.g. Oliveira et al., 2011; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006, 
2005; Lajili and Zegal, 2005; Solomon et al., 2000). A lack of adequate revelation of 
voluntary risk information by companies could entirely generate an investor’s demand 
for additional information about risk through compulsory risk disclosures. Thus, the 
results obtained under voluntary risk disclosure can offer a benchmark to establish 
whether imposing mandatory regulation will bring on more or less risk disclosures 
within a voluntary disclosure regime (Dobler, 2005). In a voluntary reporting regime, 
although some discretion is intrinsic to the nature of risk reporting; imposing regulation 
by mandating risk disclosure type and format may set a boundary to the levels of 
discretion as compared with voluntary reporting.  
 
Initial work by Solomon et al. (2000) uses a questionnaire survey of the UK 
institutional investors to ascertain their attitudes towards risk disclosure in relation to 
their portfolio investment decisions. Solomon et al. (2000) find that there is a need to 
provide more detailed risk disclosures rather than generalized statements of business 
risk management policy. However, they conclude that the results from the survey show 
that respondents did not generally favour a regulated environment for corporate risk 
disclosure and supported a voluntary framework. Hence, Solomon et al. (2000) 
conclude the need for legislation seems detrimental.  
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Linsley and Shrives (2000) review risk disclosure requirements and recommendations 
and examine the merits and demerits of disclosing such information in annual reports. 
They suggest that the most important potential benefit for enhanced risk disclosure by 
companies is reduction in the cost of capital. Linsley and Shrives (2000) conclude that 
the level of information disclosed voluntarily by companies is not adequate. They argue 
that if such disclosure is considered desirable then there is a strong argument for 
regulation.  
 
In another article, Linsley and Shrives (2005) discuss similar issues but within the 
context of the UK public companies annual reports. From their content analysis, Linsley 
and Shrives (2005) find that directors seem to disclose forward-looking information
7
. 
However, they argue that directors are not supplying a complete picture of risks they are 
facing. Linsley and Shrives (2005) argue that since directors are not convinced by the 
professional bodies regarding the benefits associated with greater voluntary risk 
disclosure, mandatory requirement is needed. They finally conclude that only by 
enforcing disclosure of risk information through legislation enacted by the UK 
government could increase the risk reporting by companies. 
 
Given a call for regulatory intervention, empirical evidence implies that by imposing 
mandatory requirement for firms to report on their risks, risk disclosures in the annual 
report seem to improve slightly. Earlier risk disclosure requirements focus mainly on 
the mandatory reporting of derivative financial instruments (e.g. Othman and Ameer, 
2009; Hassan et al., 2008; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004; Chalmers, 2001). Chalmers 
and Godfrey (2004) examine the derivative financial instruments disclosure practices of 
Australian firms during the voluntary disclosure period from 1992–1996. During this 
period, the exposure drafts on financial instrument disclosure and the ASCT Industry 
Statement ‘Derivative Disclosure’ had already been issued in Australia. By comparing 
the changes in the mean voluntary disclosure index for each reporting period, their 
evidence indicates that there was an increase in the disclosure of derivative information 
provided by firms during the voluntary disclosure period from 1992-1996. Chalmers 
and Godfrey (2004) thus conclude that it is necessary to impose mandatory disclosure 
requirements for derivative instruments disclosure, as companies have no tendency to 
                                               
7
 Forward-looking information is a type of risk information. 
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make such voluntary disclosures prior to such requirements being proposed by the 
professional organization or the accounting standard setters. 
 
In the Malaysian context, Hassan et al. (2008) argue that a lack of proper reporting 
guidelines on the reporting of the market financial instruments may lead to weak 
disclosure of the firms’ financial instruments. In their study, Hassan et al. (2008) 
measure disclosure quality of financial instruments of Malaysian firms listed in the 
Bursa Malaysia based on the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB) 24 
Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentations. They find that the disclosure 
quality among Malaysian firms is low prior to issuance of MASB 24 (year 1999 and 
2000) and increased after the issuance of MASB 24 (year 2002 and 2003). Hassan et al. 
(2008) suggest that effective enforcement mechanisms are helpful to ensure high quality 
reporting by companies. 
 
Othman and Ameer (2009) investigate the market risk disclosure practices among 
Malaysian listed firms for the year 2006. This is the first year in which all Malaysian 
public listed companies need to comply with Financial Reporting Standards instead of 
MASB. MASB has introduced FRS132 Financial Instruments – Disclosure and 
Presentation (to replace MASB 24) to be adopted by Malaysian firms in reporting the 
type of market risk being faced by those firms. Othman and Ameer (2009) observe that 
there are variations on the level of financial risk management policy disclosures across 
companies in their study. Therefore, to achieve greater financial transparency by 
companies, Othman and Ameer (2009) argue that there is a need for some standardized 
risk reporting format which comprise of qualitative and quantitative information to 
make investors aware of the market risks. 
 
Recent studies by Oliveira et al. (2011) assess the risk-related disclosure practices by 
Portuguese non-finance companies for the year 2005. This is the year in which 
Portuguese listed companies became obliged to comply with International Accounting 
Standards (IAS/IFRS) and the Modernisation Directive (Directive 2003/51/EC) of the 
European Parliament and Council. Though these two regulatory initiatives demanded 
extra risk-related disclosure, Oliveira et al. (2011) reveal that their adoption did not 
affect the quantity and quality of risk-related disclosure positively. They argue that, 
‘risk information disclosures were mainly vague, generic, qualitative, backward-
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looking, dispersed throughout the annual report, and inadequate for the information 
needs of stakeholders’ (p. 818). 
 
However, mandatory requirements of risk-related information to accounting rules and 
regulations do not attempt to tackle financial risk other than those stated in the financial 
reporting standards and any other risks related to non-financial risk (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004; Dobler, 2008). In this case, Germany can be given a prominent exclusion since it 
has a separate standard German Accounting Standard (GAS5) requiring a 
comprehensive and self-contained risk report located in the management report (e.g., 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Dobler, 2008). 
 
Overall, different views exist on the need for mandating risk disclosure. Accounting 
rules and regulations are needed in the incomplete and imperfect market whereas in a 
complete, perfect and ideal market situation, the regulations are not needed. Since the 
latter is not likely to be achievable, disclosure regulations could deal with the 
information gaps in the market. This is to ensure that investors can make informed 
decisions with quality information such as up-to-date risk information. Therefore, 
regulations to some extent favour increasing risk disclosures, hence, increasing 
investors’ confidence (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Although regulations are alleged to be 
efficient in increasing the level of information disclosure, mandatory risk disclosure 
does not necessarily work to change significantly the results obtained under voluntary 
disclosure (Dobler, 2005).  
 
2.3 DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLE, SIGNALLING THEORY, PROPRIETARY 
COST THEORY AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
 
In theory, a pure free-market economy is characterized as a perfect and complete market 
without information asymmetry or barriers that would prevent fair and efficient market 
process. However, such perfect free market conditions do not exist in practice in which 
the economy is characterized by information asymmetry where some parties to a 
transaction may have an information advantage over others. The disclosure principle, 
signalling theory and proprietary cost theory have been used by prior researchers as 
proposed solutions to address the information problem arise from the information 
asymmetry. 
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2.3.1 The Disclosure Principle 
 
The early analytic work on information economics attributed to Grossman (1981) and 
Milgrom (1981) suggests that managers of firms will release all information (full 
disclosure) they possess regardless of whether the information is good or bad. This is 
known as the disclosure principle. Early literature on disclosure also suggests that 
managers will voluntarily report all information to maximize the value of the company 
(Viscusi, 1978; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; 
Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985, 1986; Jung and Kwong, 1988). Based on the seminal 
results of Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) on corporate disclosure policy, Suijs 
(2007) summarizes the assumptions required for the disclosure principle to apply. 
According to Suijs (2007, p.394) there are five assumptions as follows: (i) the 
disclosure is costless, (ii) investors know that the firm has private information, (iii) the 
firm can credibly disclose its private information to investors, (iv) all investors will 
respond to disclosure decision in the same way and (v) the firms knows how investors 
will respond to disclosure of its private information.  
 
The disclosure principle introduced by Grossman (1981) arises from the so-called 
unravelling arguments (Suijs, 2007; Shin, 1994). In its simplest form, unravelling 
arguments suggest that if all those five assumptions above are satisfied, then a company 
will continue to unravel of its private information until it attains full disclosure results. 
However, the recent study by Suijs (2007) concludes that previous analytic research on 
the disclosure principle demonstrates that firms are not inclined to provide full 
disclosure.   
 
Earlier study about full disclosure by Milgrom (1981) focuses on the concept of the 
favourableness of news. He applies this concept into his security market model and 
moral hazard model. In each of the models, the analysis is driven by a strategy for full 
disclosure by a company. First, in the security market model Milgrom (1981) argues 
that the disclosure of favourable news about a security’s future returns will cause the 
security price to rise. Second, in the moral hazard model of principal-agent, Milgrom 
(1981) argues that when the agent’s effort are evidenced by high profits, the optimal 
incentive contracts entails a steeper fee schedule than does any efficient risk sharing 
contract.  
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Jung and Kwong (1988) introduce a study on the notion of uncertainty about the 
existence of private information by managers. They argue that when investors believe 
that managers have received information but there is a probability that they have not 
disclosed it, the investors will infer the content of such information to be unfavourable. 
Additionally, Jung and Kwong (1988) argue that the possibility that investors have 
acquired credible information from other independent sources such as financial press or 
financial analyst may result in the disclosure of information by managers rather than to 
withhold the information in the first place.  
 
Chow et al.’s (1996) laboratory experiment tests the validity of the disclosure principle. 
Their basic premise is that when disclosure costs are zero, managers will voluntarily 
disclose all news, good and bad. Their findings fail to support this disclosure principle 
or premise. Chow et. al. (1996) indicates that even when disclosure is costless, 
managers will not disclose all news. They argue that managers still withhold 
information even when disclosure cost is zero. In this circumstance, although investors 
do price-protect themselves by offering a lower price for the company, the price penalty 
that investors impose is not enough to cause full disclosure. Additionally, Chow et al. 
(1996) find that when there is positive disclosure cost, investors will reduce the price 
penalty that they impose for non-disclosure, resulting in managers disclosing 
proportionally less news. Chow et al. (1996, p. 149) concludes that ‘market incentives 
are not sufficient to induce full financial disclosure’. 
 
In another article, Teoh and Hwang (1991) in their model agree that not all information 
will be disclosed even though the disclosure is costless and credible. They argue that the 
non-disclosure of information will allow managers to communicate other valuable 
information more credibly to the market. 
 
Campbell et al. (2001) also apply the disclosure principle in their study to examine the 
purpose of voluntary disclosure of mission statements in corporate annual reports. In 
their study, Campbell et al. (2001) argue that the ‘revelation principle’ (that is, all 
managers have incentives to disclose information to ensure that their companies are not 
undervalued) does not lead to full disclosure because of disclosure costs. They argue 
that some proprietary information may not always be disclosed but non-proprietary 
information will normally be disclosed. Disclosure costs are undoubtedly non-zero and 
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Campbell et al. (2001) believe that the way the mission statements are written make the 
mission statements contain non-proprietary information. They conclude that companies 
should maximize their disclosures of non-proprietary information and to some extent 
this could generate some increase in shareholder value.  
 
Suijs (2007) in his study to test the soundness of the disclosure principle shows that if 
firms are uncertain about investors response to the disclosed information, full disclosure 
will not occur. In his model, Suijs (2007) finds that equilibrium with full disclosure 
exists with sceptical beliefs of the investor. This suggests that investor will infer non-
disclosure to be a signal of poor quality. He also finds that equilibrium with no 
disclosure exists if the risk of an unfavourable response by the investor is too high. In 
equilibrium, Suijs (2007) argues that disclosure takes place because firms want to attract 
investor capital away from the risk-free asset. In this setting, Suijs (2007) argues that 
the unravelling argument that yields full disclosure need not apply.  
 
2.3.2 Signalling Theory: Corporate Voluntary and Risk Disclosure 
 
The concept of signalling theory which was first studied by Akerlof (1970) and Spence 
(1973) in the context of product and job markets has explained the behaviour of 
information asymmetry in these markets where there are many sellers and many buyers. 
Accordingly, Spence (1973) has developed the concept of signalling into an equilibrium 
theory which outlines the model of signalling in the job market. Spence (1973) also 
argues that equilibrium exists when the potential employer can distinguish among 
individuals of varying productive capabilities based on their level of education as a 
credible signal. In another article, Spence (1974) discusses similar issues in a model of 
two types of workers: ‘good’ workers and ‘bad’ workers. Ross (1977) further 
established a signalling equilibrium in the financial market using managerial incentive 
structure where managers will signal their use of debt financing in their financial 
structure to signal that they are a high quality firm.  
 
Previous studies suggest that signalling theory can also be applied to the area of 
corporate disclosure (Campbell et al., 2001; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). According 
to Akerlof (1970), voluntary disclosure can be viewed as a form of signalling of the 
information asymmetry in the market. Generally, many researchers have explained 
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cross-sectional variation in corporate voluntary disclosure (Oliveira et al., 2006; Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Hossain et al., 1994). Discretionary models of disclosures 
which focus on a situation where there is asymmetric information assume that managers 
of firms possess more information (such as a firm’s risk exposure) than outsiders. The 
existence of information asymmetry between the firm and investors may produce the 
problem of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) leading to the withdrawal of uninformed 
investors from the market, resulting in lower trading volume or total market breakdown 
(Lev, 1988). However, this information asymmetry can be reduced if the party with 
more information signals to others (Celik et al., 2006; Morris, 1987). In this case, 
disclosure could be seen as one of the mechanisms to mitigate adverse selection by 
reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors. 
 
Signalling theory also explains managers’ incentives to disclose more information in the 
annual reports (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) since managers are always in the position to 
convey specific signals to current and potential investors about the company. According 
to Hughes (1986), in order for managers to effectively signal quality of their 
information, the signal must be credible. Hughes (1986) suggests that if managers 
fraudulently or falsely signal their situation (for example, they are signaling high 
quality, when in fact there is not), the company will be penalized.    
 
Skinner (1994) addresses voluntary disclosure information in regards to earnings-related 
disclosure. In his study, Skinner (1994) provides empirical evidence that firms disclose 
earnings forecasts regardless of whether it is good news or bad news. He finds that 
managers will disclose good news to signal the quality of their firm and to distinguish 
themselves from lower quality firms. On the other hand, he argues that managers 
voluntarily disclose bad news because of reputation-effects arguments. Skinner (1994, 
p.39) states that ‘managers may incur reputational costs if they fail to disclose bad news 
in a timely manner.’ Skinner (1994, p.40) also argues that ‘...to prevent large stock price 
declines on earnings announcement dates (and thereby reduce the potential costs of 
shareholder suits), managers have incentives to pre-empt the announcement of large 
earnings surprises.’ 
 
In essence, a manager of a firm may choose to reveal or to withhold the firm’s private 
information. There are two reasons of why firms voluntarily disclose information or 
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withhold it, according to Skinner (1994). First, a manager of a firm will disclose the 
information if all other firms in the same industry disclose the information for fear that 
‘no news is bad news’. Disclosing bad news could be a concerned by the manager, 
however investors possibly will make an estimation that the silence implies that the firm 
has very bad news to disclose. Second, a manager of a firm will only disclose the 
information if after publication the firm’s value does not fall below the level appearing 
in absence of disclosure.  
 
Most evidence from prior research suggests that a manager will only disclose most 
favourable news (e.g. Fishman and Hagerty, 1990; Dye, 1986, 1985; Verrecchia, 1983). 
However, in other circumstance, a manager will disclose unfavourable news and 
withhold favourable news (e.g. Teoh and Hwang, 1991). According to Teoh and Hwang 
(1991), the decision of whether to disclose or withhold information will ultimately 
depends on the type of disclosure and the choice of signal. Teoh and Hwang (1991, p. 
286) argue that: 
 
Firms will not necessarily disclose fully even if information is favourable. Our analysis 
also suggests that it may be socially worthwhile to allow some information to be 
withheld, if the fact of concealment itself allows managers to communicate other 
valuable information more credibly to the market at a later date. Thus, the firm's 
strategic timing of disclosure can be informative to investors. 
 
Of relevance to this study, the application of signalling theory is specifically considered 
in the area of corporate risk disclosure. Review of previous literature (Elzahar and 
Hussainey, 2012; Hemrit and Arab, 2011; Rajab and Handley-Schachler, 2009; Hassan, 
2009; Marshall and Weetman, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006, 2005) shows that 
signalling theory has been widely used to study corporate risk disclosure in either 
annual reports, interim reports or in prospectuses.  
 
Signalling theory may explain the motivation behind the disclosure of voluntary risk 
information since it is a reaction to information asymmetry in the markets. As 
companies’ managers have superior risk information, they could decide whether to 
disclose only important or also additional risk information to their investors. However, 
Linsley and Shrives (2000) argue that managers who believe that they are superior risk 
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managers tend to signal this to stakeholders through the statement of business risk. 
According to Hemrit and Arab (2011), such information could signal managers’ risk 
management skills, performances and experiences to convince the market that they can 
appropriately manage risk. In other words, companies with high quality risk 
management systems will continually have an incentive to provide and contribute their 
specific risk information to the market as a signal of their ability and competency as 
well as to reap the benefits from making these additional risk disclosures.  
 
Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) explore the determinants that may affect the extent of 
forward-looking information
8
 by 46 companies listed in either the Abu Dhabi securities 
market or the Dubai financial market. By performing backward regressions, they find 
that firms with high debt ratio and low profitability are more likely to disclose forward-
looking information. As evidenced by previous studies, Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) 
conclude that low profitability and high debt could be used as indicators of firms’ risks. 
Hence, they suggest that firms with high financial risks might be more motivated to 
increase their forward-looking information disclosure and this could be a positive signal 
by the market and may reduce cost of capital of the firms. 
 
In a comparative study of the US and the UK in the case of foreign exchange risk 
management disclosure, Marshall and Weetman (2007) model the degree of 
transparency observed when disclosures of foreign exchange risk management in 
financial statements are compared to managerial information on foreign exchange risk 
management policy. In their study, Marshall and Weetman (2007) use leverage and 
liquidity as proxies for perceived financial risk. They find that the disclosure of leverage 
is positively and significantly related to increase the level of disclosure relating to 
foreign exchange risk management in both countries. Supporting signalling theory, they 
suggest that firms with higher levels of perceived financial risk have an incentive to 
deliver more information about foreign exchange risk, to convince the users of financial 
statements that foreign exchange risk is not a significant setback for the firm when 
combined with financial risk. Marshall and Weetman (2007) also find that both 
                                               
8
 According to Aljifri and Hussainey (2007, p. 883), ‘forward-looking disclosure involves non-financial 
information such as risks and uncertainties that could significantly affect actual results and cause them to 
differ from projected results.’ 
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managers of the UK and the US firms give more information about foreign exchange 
risks when there is a higher level of financial risk whereas when there is higher liquidity 
only managers of the UK firms signal more information about foreign exchange risk.  
 
Corporate disclosure is very imperative and crucial for the functioning of capital 
markets as well as for the stability of the economy (Lev, 1988; Akerlof, 1970). 
Similarly, as risk disclosure will put companies in direct contact with the capital market, 
companies could highly reach the best price for their shares. This will be reflected in the 
companies’ stock price. Past research within disclosure area which examines the 
association between corporate information disclosure and the firm value (e.g., Lev and 
Penman, 1990) argue that corporate disclosure, as a signal to the market, may provide 
investors with appropriate corporate information and could increase firm value.  
 
In their study, Lev and Penman (1990) consider managerial earnings forecasts as 
voluntary information releases and compare their properties with predictions from a 
signalling scenario. In such a scenario, they suggest that earnings forecasts are used by 
managers of ‘good news’ firms to signal themselves out from other firms. Lev and 
Penman (1990) compare stock price changes of forecasting firms with those of firms 
which did not provide a forecast contemporaneously. They argue that the signalling 
motive by firms with earnings forecasts will separate them from similar firms (that is, 
firms in the same industry) and used by investors to adjust the price upwards. 
 
If information available to the market is unclear, then share prices will reflect general 
perceptions of risk and, hence, this may result in some mispricing together with the 
phenomenon of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). Beatty and Welch (1996) find a 
positive relationship between the number of risk warnings disclosed in flotation 
prospectuses and mispricing at the end of the first day of trading. In order to facilitate 
and influence external users when making decisions for different purposes, financial 
information may be used by managers to indicate the firm-specific information as well 
as to imply its underlying reality (Inchausiti, 1997). Through these disclosures in the 
financial reports, external users will have a better understanding of the true picture of 
the overall business economic environment. 
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In addition, the frequency and quality of voluntary risk disclosures will have an industry 
effect. Signalling theory suggests that firms operating within the same industry are more 
likely to adopt the same level of disclosure (Aly et al., 2010). If a firm does not follow 
similar disclosure practices as other firms within the same industry, then it may be 
interpreted as a signal of hiding bad news (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007). Dye and Sridhar (1995) argue that the voluntary disclosure made by 
some firms will ultimately persuade other firms in the industry to make similar 
disclosures. Dye and Sridhar (1995) suggest that under certain conditions, if several 
firms disclose the information under consideration, the other firms will follow. This is 
known as a so-called herd-effect. This herd-effect may apply to industry-wide practice 
of risk disclosure, but it cannot enforce the disclosure of risks arising from firm-specific 
factors. Dye and Sridhar (1995) also suggest that each firm is more likely to release (if 
any) its information if the availability of that information is perfectly correlated among 
all firms. This implies that small industries are more likely to remain secretive than 
larger industries. 
 
Hassan (2009) investigates the relationship between corporate risk disclosure level and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) corporations-specific characteristics. Based on a 
sample consisting of financial and non-financial UAE corporations listed in either 
Dubai Financial Market or Abu Dhabi Securities Market, he finds that industry 
membership is significantly related to the level of corporate risk disclosure. Hassan 
(2009) argues that corporate risk disclosure varies in line to the industry type and 
corporations in the same industry fairly replicate other corporations in order to signal to 
investors that they are implementing analogous disclosure practices as other firms in the 
same industry. 
 
Nonetheless, signalling is costly and the cost of signal is higher for ‘bad news’ type of 
information than it is for ‘good news’ information (Spence, 1973). The incentive to 
make disclosures in order to differentiate a company from its rivals will only continue 
for as long as the resulting increase in market capitalisation exceeds the signalling cost 
(Morris, 1987). It is argued that the market will punish the firms that send wrong signals 
because the quality of firms can later be observed without difficulty (Inchausiti, 1997; 
Morris, 1987).  
 
37 
 
2.3.3 Proprietary Costs: Corporate Voluntary and Risk Disclosure 
 
Existing literature on proprietary cost has been developed by previous researchers in the 
area of voluntary disclosure (Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; 
Verrecchia, 1983). Most of these studies examine the impact of proprietary costs on 
voluntary disclosure of proprietary information during periods of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry. Proprietary costs are imposed when managers perceive that 
some information is private and may be regarded as potentially costly because it may 
assist a company's competitors (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 1983). Proprietary 
costs arise when competitors observe the information available in the market and use it 
to detriment the disclosing company. Thus, the existence of proprietary costs will lead 
the manager to not disclose uncertain information if the competitive pressures and 
proprietary costs associated with such disclosure is significant.  
 
A firm's decision to make a public disclosure can damage its competitive position in the 
product market (Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Verrecchia, 1983) because competitors 
may make strategic use of information disclosed to their advantage (Tsakumis et al., 
2006; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Edwards and Smith, 1996). In a discretionary risk 
disclosure setting, the challenge of a manager is to decide whether to disclose risk 
information to the market or to withhold it. The existence of proprietary risk disclosure 
cost however, would create a trade-off between the positive and negative effects of 
voluntary risk disclosure. 
 
Earlier work by Verrecchia (1983) on the discretionary disclosure model lead to the 
argument that the decision to disclose or to withhold information depends on the 
expected size of the proprietary costs involved.  He assumed that the cost is constant 
and independent of the type of the information. Verrecchia (1983) argues that 
proprietary disclosure costs however will limit managerial incentives to voluntarily 
disclose information. According to Verrecchia (1983, p.179):  
 
The manager decides to either release or withhold this signal on the basis of the 
information’s effect on the asset’s market price. He exercises discretion by choosing the 
point, or the degree of the information quality, above which he discloses what he, 
observes, and below which he withholds his information. 
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Verrecchia (1983) refers to this point as a ‘threshold level of disclosure’. The threshold 
level of disclosure suggests that managers’ decision to withhold information depends on 
the investors’ expectation towards the concealment of that disclosure. In his model 
Verrecchia (1983) assumes that if the value of information is under the threshold level, 
the information is considered unfavorable and will be withheld whereas if the value of 
information is above the threshold level then the information will be disclosed.  
 
Verrecchia (1983) further explains that as the threshold level of disclosure increases, 
proprietary cost also increases and vice versa. Because of the difficulty of verifying 
whether information which is withheld and never disclosed is either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
news, managers may exercise certain discretion in choosing the timing and extent of 
disclosure of information, taking into account that no information may be interpreted as 
bad news. In this case, proprietary costs will be an important element in making this 
decision. In effect, according to Verrecchia (1983), a proprietary cost introduces noise 
into the model by extending the range of possible interpretations of withheld 
information, which is actually favorable. This finding also has been supported by Chow 
et al.’s (1996) laboratory experiment on the relationship between proprietary cost and a 
threshold level of disclosure.  
 
According to Scott (1994), proprietary costs theory can be divided into two general 
hypotheses: (1) the probability of a firm disclosing information is negatively associated 
with the proprietary costs attached to the disclosure, and (2) the probability firm 
disclosing information is positively associated with the favorableness of the news in the 
disclosure. In a further test of Verrecchia’s (1983) proprietary cost theory, Scott (1994) 
investigates the incentives and disincentives of voluntary disclosure for defined benefit 
pension schemes of Canadian firms. His findings support these general hypotheses. His 
results show that the proprietary costs and the type of news to be disclosed do influence 
firms’ disclosure level. The larger the proprietary cost, the greater is the incentives for 
firms not to voluntarily disclose information. However, if the news is favourable these 
firms have greater incentives to disclose the information. In another article, Teoh and 
Hwang (2001) also explain in their model that firms prefer to withhold information 
because of high disclosure costs involved when disclosing such information.  
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On the other hand, disclosure of favourable information could encourage competitors to 
enter the market while disclosing other information could be used by current 
competitors to increase their market share. Campbell et al. (2001) argue that companies 
might minimize their disclosure and choose to withhold information which is favourable 
to the company for some reasons. Campbell et al. (2001, p. 84) suggest that: 
 
…companies might choose to withhold positive information even where no proprietary 
costs are involved. This is because some companies may wish to differentiate 
themselves from companies with poor prospects that disclose every piece of positive 
news. 
 
Disclosure of proprietary information is necessary to increase the financial market 
valuation of the firm. Proprietary information costs however arise from the negative 
outcome of proprietary information disclosure. Richardson (2001) contends that the 
market is rational in the sense that it is able to associate non-disclosure with either low 
realization of the managers’ signal or a firm that committed to no disclosure.  He 
suggests that the rational decision to withhold or disclose information is a function of 
the capital market benefits from disclosing, the costs from not disclosing and the costs 
of disclosing information and it is well known by the managers.  
 
Scott (1994) suggests that in the absence of disclosure, proprietary costs prevent 
investors from fully discounting share price. This is because, investors are uncertain 
whether information withheld is to avoid the realization of the proprietary costs or the 
news itself is bad. Scott (1994) suggests that the more favorable the news, the greater 
incentive to disclose and the more positive influence on share price. On the other hand, 
the larger the proprietary costs, the greater the incentives not to disclose and the greater 
the decrease in firm values upon disclosure. Further, investors will react less negatively 
to withhold information as proprietary cost increase since the motive for non-disclosure 
becomes more uncertain. 
 
The models of proprietary costs developed by aforementioned studies are when the 
information is proprietary. When the information is non-proprietary, investors know 
that usually managers will release it. However, Dye (1985) argues that managers are 
40 
 
also reluctant to disclose such non-proprietary information. He concludes his arguments 
on the disclosure of non-proprietary information based on three reasons: 
 
The first one is based on the condition that investors' knowledge of management's 
information is incomplete, in which case managers may successfully suppress bad 
information. The second reason follows from the observation that managers possess a 
vast array of private information, some of which may be proprietary and that non-
proprietary information may not be disclosed if it is part of such an array (…). The third 
reason stems from the existence of a principal-agent problem between shareholders and 
managers, the best resolution of which requires management's reticence. (Dye, 1985, p. 
141) 
 
Penno (1997) examines the voluntary disclosure of non-proprietary information 
focusing on information quality held by managers. In his examination, he found that the 
frequency of voluntary disclosures is negatively related to the quality of information. 
This suggests that the quality of management’s private information will not affect 
managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions. His findings however contradict with the 
findings of Verrecchia (1990) and Jung and Kwong (1988) when the information is 
proprietary. Previously, Verrecchia (1990) and Jung and Kwong (1988) suggest that 
voluntary disclosure is greater when the quality of information held by managers is 
relatively high.  
 
In this study, the impact of proprietary costs will be investigated on the decision of 
management’s voluntary risk disclosure. Proprietary disclosure costs would limit 
managerial incentives to disclose risks in discretionary disclosure setting. However, 
disclosure of risk information could have a positive or negative impact on the firm 
value. Moreover, proprietary costs are imposed on a firm if competitors use the risk 
information in a manner that harms the firm’s prospect (Linsley and Shrives, 2005) 
even if the information is favourable. This imposition of a proprietary cost will place a 
company at a competitive disadvantage and will negatively affect the company. In the 
presence of proprietary costs, the extent of voluntary risk disclosures activity of a firm 
has to trade-off the positive and negative effects of disclosing such information.  
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2.4 CORPORATE REPORTING: AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE STANDARDS AND PRACTICES IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
With globalisation of economies, there is pressure for companies to make adequate and 
even voluntary disclosure. To increase transparency and high quality information by 
companies, the Malaysian regulatory and conceptual framework mandates disclosure 
and dissemination of timely, accurate and material information to investors 
(Thillainathan, 1999). Malaysia’s accounting, auditing, financial reporting and 
disclosure standards and practices by public listed companies are governed by the 
Companies Act 1965, Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia and Financial Reporting 
Act 1997. These regulatory authorities have leaded the development of new codes and 
regulations to strengthen corporate governance with the goal to eventually restore 
investor confidence. One of the key functions of annual reports is to provide 
information on the company’s financial performance, financial position as well as its 
cash flows. In Malaysia, the Companies Act 1965 requires all registered companies to 
submit their annual audited financial reports to the Companies Commission of Malaysia 
which is prepared in accordance with approved accounting standards (Lazar and Choo, 
2008). The Companies Act 1965 was the main provider of a form of reporting 
framework where the Schedule 9 of the Companies Act requires companies to disclose 
specific information in the financial statements
9
. However, the content and format of 
financial statements are not covered by the schedule (Lazar and Choo, 2008). 
 
The Securities Commission (SC) requirements focus on public companies. Based on 
Lazar and Choo (2008, p.2):  
There are three areas address by the SC which includes: 
(i) Corporate Disclosure Policy which requires companies to maintain a high level of 
disclosure; 
(ii) Post Listing Obligations which requires companies to submit reports such as 
annual reports, interim reports and related party transactions; and 
(iii) Accounting Standards and Valuation of Assets which addresses the issue of 
minimum compliance to accounting standards and other statutory requirements.   
                                               
9
 This was before Malaysia represented on the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 
1979. 
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Bursa Malaysia and Financial Reporting Act 1997 will be discussed in some length in 
the coming section, focusing on risk management and internal control disclosure. 
 
2.4.1 BURSA MALAYSIA 
 
Bursa Malaysia requires a public listed company to disclose its financial position, 
management and operations in order to enable shareholders and investors to assess its 
performance. There are 16 chapters altogether under the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements (BMLR), and the chapter that relates to disclosure standards is Chapter 9 
Continuing Disclosure. BMLR Paragraph 9.02 (1) states that:  
 
A listed issuer must, in accordance with these Requirements disclose to the public all 
material information necessary for informed investing and take reasonable steps to 
ensure that all who invest in its securities enjoy equal access to such information. 
 
According to Paragraph 9.03 (1) Disclosure of material information, public listed 
companies are required to make immediate public disclosure of any material 
information. Paragraph 9.03 (2) defines information is considered material, if it is 
reasonably expected to have a material effect on (a) the price, value or market activity 
of any of the listed issuer’s securities; or (b) the decision of a holder of securities of the 
listed issuer or an investor in determining his choice of action. With respect to public 
announcements made by public listed companies, the BMLR Paragraph 9.16 Content of 
press or other public announcement state that the public announcement must be, among 
others (a) is factual, clear, unambiguous, accurate, succinct and contains sufficient 
information to enable investors to make informed investment decisions;(b) is not false, 
misleading and/or deceptive; and (c) is balanced and fair. 
 
As a guidance and assistance to companies in complying with their disclosure 
obligations under the BMLR, Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure has been 
established by the Bursa Malaysia through its Task Force in July 2004. Although it is 
purely voluntary, the goal is to: 
 
...assist companies to move beyond making minimum disclosures so that they comply 
not only with the letter but the spirit of the disclosure obligations. On this premise, the 
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Best Practices enumerated herein will go further than what is already required by strict 
laws and regulations. (Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure, p. 4) 
 
With regard to companies’ reporting in the annual report, the BMLR in Appendix 9C 
Contents of annual report, paragraph 7 requires a brief description of industry trends 
and developments in the Chairman’s Statement and a discussion and analysis of the 
group’s performance during the year and the material factors (including non-financial 
information) underlying its results and financial position. The Chairman’s Statement 
should also emphasize trends and identify significant transactions or events during the 
year under review. These compulsory requirements do not state whether operational, 
strategic, or commercial risks; they only mention that the company must give 
information about the future developments, industry trends, material risks and 
uncertainties facing the company. Therefore, the specific disclosures are vague.  
 
2.4.1.1 Malaysian Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
The annual reports by public listed companies should report the company’s financial 
performance, financial position as well as its cash flows. In addition to that, the annual 
reports of public listed companies also required to disclose the extent of compliance 
with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (the Code) which has been 
approved by the high level Finance Committee of Corporate Governance. In March 
2000, the Code has been issued with an amendment to the BMLR (Chapter 15 
Corporate Governance) in maintaining market integrity and protecting investors’ 
interests and enhancing their confidence to the Malaysian capital market. The Code 
which describes the best practices for corporate governance principles has come into 
effect in early 2001.
 
Four parts were set out to describe the Code recommendations: 1) 
Principles of corporate governance; 2) Best practices in corporate governance; 3) 
Exhortations to other participants; and 4) Explanatory notes and ‘mere best practices’. 
Bursa Malaysia requires listed companies to comply with Parts 1 and 2 of the Code. 
Public listed companies are required to include a narrative statement of how they 
applied the principles set out in Part 1 and also state in their annual reports the level of 
compliance in their practice with the best practices set out in Part 2 and explanation 
should be provided in accordance to any non-compliance and/or any alternatives 
practices adopted. 
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Additionally, Bursa Malaysia requires public listed companies to make additional 
statements with regards of their state of internal control. According to the revised 
BMLR (2007), ‘a listed issuer must ensure that its board of directors includes in its 
annual report a statement about the state of internal control of the listed issuer as a 
group’ (Part E, Para 15.27 (b)). Public listed companies are required to address the 
Principle and Best Practices in the Code which relate to internal control in which the 
board of a public listed company should ‘maintain a sound system of internal control to 
safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company’s assets’. In making the internal 
control statement, public listed companies are guided by the Statement on Internal 
Control
10
  – Guidance for Directors of Public Listed Companies. This guideline which 
has been established by the Bursa Malaysia through its Task Force in the year 2000 is to 
assist public listed companies in making disclosures in their annual reports on the state 
of internal control in compliance with the BMLR. Moreover, the guideline gives 
emphasis to the need for proper risk management which is a critical aspect of a sound 
system of internal control. In making the internal control statement, a public listed firm 
is required to address issues related to internal controls as recommended by the 
Principle and Best Practices in the Code. This includes that the board of directors 
should: (i) identify principal risks and ensure the implementation of appropriate system 
to manage risk, and (ii) review adequacy and the integrity of the firm’s internal control 
systems. Overall, the internal control statement ‘requires directors to exercise judgement 
in reviewing how the company has implemented the requirements of the Code relating 
to internal control and reporting to shareholders thereon.’ 
 
Later, in the 2008 Budget speech, the Prime Minister
11
 announced that ‘the Code is 
being reviewed to improve the quality of the board of public listed companies by 
putting in place the criteria for qualification of directors and strengthening the audit 
committee, as well as the internal audit function of the public listed companies’. As a 
                                               
10
 This guidance has been derived from the Turnbull report prepared by the ICAEW (the guidance issued 
to directors of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange), COSO report, the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision and the International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as adopted by the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants 
(MACPA). 
11
 Tun Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi was in the position at that time who served as a Malaysian 
Prime Minister from 2003-2009. 
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result, the Revised Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007 (2007 Code) takes 
place showing greater clarity of the role of audit committee and internal audit function 
in dealing with the effectiveness of risk management policies within company. Other 
than the audit committee, the establishment of other committees such as Risk 
Management Committee and a Corporate Governance Committee is also recommended 
by the Code but these committees are not often set up by listed firms (Yatim, 2010). 
 
The objective of the 2007 Code is to further strengthen corporate governance practices 
in line with developments in the domestic and international capital markets. The 2007 
Code has mandated all public listed companies to have internal audit function. It 
typically evaluates the system of internal control of the whole management process of 
planning, organizing and directing to determine whether reasonable assurance exists so 
that objectives and goals of the company will be achieved (Haron et al., 2010). 
Otherwise, the board should review and briefly explain whether there are other ways of 
obtaining sufficient assurance of review of the effectiveness of the internal control 
system within the company. A head of internal audit will be responsible for the regular 
assessment of the effectiveness of the risk management and internal control within the 
company. On top of that, to safeguard the independence of the internal audit function, 
the head should report directly to the audit committee
12
. The 2007 Code has been 
implemented since 1 October 2007.  
 
 
2.4.2 FINANCIAL REPORTING ACT 1997  
 
In Malaysia, Financial Reporting Act (FRA) was passed in the year 1997. The FRA has 
created two independent bodies, namely the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF) and 
the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB). The FRF oversees the operating 
activities of MASB while MASB is the standard setting body for accounting standards 
for Malaysia (Lazar and Choo, 2008; Thillainathan, 1999). Under the FRA, all 
companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia are required to comply with the accounting 
                                               
12
 Turnbull report (1999) suggests that responsibility for risk management could be delegated to the audit 
committee and in many organizations internal audit reports directly to the audit committee on risk 
management. 
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standards approved by the MASB. Before the FRA came about, from 1979, Malaysia 
has been adopting, though not all accounting standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standard Committee (IASC)
13
 called International Accounting Standards 
(IASs) (Lazar and Choo, 2008). In the 1980’s Malaysia Institute of Accountant (MIA) 
and Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA)
14
 issued new 
standards to meet the local reporting requirements which are known as Malaysian 
Accounting Standards (MASs) (Lazar and Choo, 2008). Since April 2001, the rule of 
IASC has been taken over by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 
which issued accounting standards under the new label of ‘International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs)’ (Ball, 2006). The purpose of IFRS is to be a set of 
financial reporting rules that can be applied equally by public companies worldwide 
(Ball, 2006). The IASs and IFRSs rules are generally equivalent and most of MASs is 
based on the relevant IASs or IFRSs. In 2005, MASB has renamed the MASB standards 
to FRS to achieve the stated goal of ‘harmonization’ of accounting rules worldwide 
(Othman and Ameer, 2009). The FRF and MASB announced on 1 August 2008 their 
plan to bring Malaysia to IFRS full convergence by 1 January 2012
15
. 
 
2.4.2.1 Accounting Standards Related to Risk Disclosure 
Table 2.1 provides examples of approved financial reporting standard compliance with 
IFRS that tackled risk disclosure by companies. The Malaysian accounting standards 
presented in Table 2.1 represent the Malaysian risk-relevant reporting standards that 
Malaysian companies should comply. Malaysian listed companies are required to adopt 
the FRS issued by MASB from 2006 onwards. It means that there are implications for 
risk disclosure published in the annual reports which will reflect the year under study 
(i.e. 2009).  
 
Accounting standards have been developed in response to the increasing needs of users 
for relevant risk information. For example, FRS132 Financial Instruments – 
Presentation and Disclosure (IAS32) exposes the type of market risk being faced by 
                                               
13
 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) is a body established in 1973 by the 
professional accountancy bodies in the UK, US, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
Netherlands and Ireland (Ball, 2006). 
14
 MICPA is formerly known as MACPA (Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants). 
15
 Source: http://www.masb.org.my Retrieved on 21 February 2011.  
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listed companies in Malaysia. The standard prescribes that the disclosure may include a 
combination of narrative descriptions and quantified data, as appropriate to the 
characteristic of the instruments and their relative significance to a company.  
 
However, an important note is that the status of current regulation of risk reporting 
pursues a piecemeal approach
16
 instead of a comprehensive approach. It is argued that 
to have rules and regulations for disclosure of other types of risk is crucial since current 
accounting rules only engage in financial risk especially associated with the use of 
derivatives (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). Therefore, there 
appears to be a progress towards reasonable rules of a more comprehensive risk 
reporting (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). While reporting of most financial risk types in 
Malaysia is mandatory disclosure, other types of risk, which this study will examine 
more closely, are only voluntarily disclosed by companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16
Accounting rules target specific risk categories only not the comprehensive risk reporting (Cabedo and 
Tirado, 2004). 
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Table 2.1: 
Financial Reporting Standards Relating to Risk Disclosure
17
 
 
Malaysian 
standard / 
Relevant 
(IFRS/IAS) 
Title Effective 
date 
Purpose 
    
FRS 132
18
 
(IAS 32) 
Financial 
Instruments: 
Presentation And 
Disclosure 
1 /1/2006 FRS 132 helps to enhance understanding 
of the significance of financial 
instruments to the entity’s financial 
position, performance and cash flow. The 
disclosures should provide information to 
assist users of financial statements in 
assessing the extent of risk related to 
financial instruments.  
FRS 139 
(IAS 39) 
Financial 
Instruments: 
Recognition And 
Measurement 
1 /1/2010 All disclosure requirements are covered in 
FRS 132. 
FRS 7 
(IFRS 7) 
 
Financial 
Instruments: 
Disclosure 
1 /1/2010 
 
 
FRS 7 replaces the disclosures that were 
required in FRS 132. This include: (a) 
information about the significance of 
financial instruments, (b) information 
about the nature and extent of risk arising 
from financial instruments, (c) disclosing 
risk through the eyes of the management, 
(d) expanded quantitative disclosure of 
risk, (e) sensitivity analysis and (f) 
enhanced disclosure of an entity’s 
financial position and performance. 
 
                                               
17
 Source: http://www.masb.org.my Retrieved on 21 February 2011.  
18
 On 1 January 2010, FRS 132 has renamed as FRS 132 Financial instruments: Presentation after the 
introduction of FRS 7 Financial instrument: Disclosure. 
 
49 
 
2.5 CORPORATE RISK DISCLOSURE 
2.5.1 Corporate Risk and Risk Disclosure Definitions 
 
The definition of risk is the basis concern when conducting risk reporting disclosure 
study by corporations. In the past, the word ‘risk’ has been used to reflect adverse 
events that have occurred which cause unexpected or unintended outcomes. In pre-
modern society, adverse events such as natural events were more likely to be viewed as 
an ‘act of God’. This concept of risk is therefore solely considered to be bad and beyond 
the influence of human intervention. Lupton (1999, p. 5) points that: 
 
Risk was perceived to be a natural event such as storm, flood or epidemic rather than a 
human-made one. As such, humans could do little but attempt to estimate roughly the 
likelihood of such events happening and take steps to reduce their impact. 
   
Additionally, Lupton (1999) argues that the idea of ‘risk’ has changed over the 
centuries. This is following the industrial revolution which influenced largely by the 
emergence of the insurance industry, the development of probability calculations and 
with the influence of human intervention. As the nature of risk keeps on changing, she 
argues that as a result the notion of risk extends. According to Lupton (1999, p. 6):  
 
During the eighteenth century, the concept of risk had begun to be scientized, drawing 
upon new ideas in mathematics relating to probability...By the nineteenth century, the 
notion of risk was no longer located exclusively in nature, but was also in human 
beings, in their conduct, in their liberty, in the relations between them, in the fact of 
their association, in society (…). 
 
The magnitude of risk itself can lead to broader definitions. In modern businesses, the 
concept of risk management can be recognised as both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ aspects of risk 
which relates to the uncertainty of future outcomes (Lupton, 1999). Several researchers 
(Dobler, 2008; Schrand and Elliott, 1998) argue that risk refers to ‘uncertainty’ is no 
longer limited to one-sided definition such as the exposure to financial loss, whereas 
they claim that uncertainty refers to two-sided definition which clearly linked to 
opportunity or upside risk. As a result, different definitions have arisen in the literature. 
A well-cited definition of risk suggested by professional reports (e.g., ICAEW 1997) is:  
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...uncertainty as to the amount of benefits. The term includes both potential for gain and 
exposure to loss. (FRS 5, Reporting the substance of transactions, ASB 1994) 
 
In this definition, the full range of uncertainties that may affect the company’s future 
prospects is considered including both upside and downside risks, uncertainty risk and 
volatility risk and this definition is already being used in previous risk disclosure 
literature (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2005). Crouhy et al. (2006, p. 25) define risk as 
‘the volatility of returns leading to unexpected losses, with higher volatility indicating 
higher risk’. 
 
In finance, risk means ‘statistical uncertainty arising from the variability of a known 
population of returns’ (Coleman, 2006, p. 22). A company’s performance has only two 
dimensions which are risk and return. In this context, risk as uncertainty refers to the 
distribution of all possible outcomes, both positive and negative. The company’s risk 
profile is full of uncertainty about its future cash flows because it relates to the future. 
From a portfolio perspective, some of the risks come from the external environment are 
systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable), while others are non-systematic and diversifiable by 
measures of risk management. 
 
According to the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC, 1999), risk is also 
connected to business and economic performance; therefore risk can be understood 
within the broader context of a company strategy. The setting up of a business begins 
with deciding the corporate mission and vision (such as the expression of risk appetite) 
and later making decisions on a business strategy. Hence, the corporate objectives to 
achieve this on every opportunity are identified and pursued. As such, IFAC defines risk 
as: 
 
…uncertain  future events  which  could  influence  the  achievement  of  the  
organisation's strategic,  operational  and  financial  objectives. The dimensions of risk 
also include the impact on an organization’s reputation, even ‘loss of legitimacy’ from 
activities deemed unacceptable to the community. (IFAC, 1999, p. 6) 
 
The key to truly have a successful risk management is the main challenge for 
companies. To achieve this, managers should have the ability to identify, evaluate and 
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manage risks and ensure that risk information is effective. Even though there is no 
single brilliantly designed risk management system, it is important for managers to take 
action and prevent risks whenever or wherever they arise (Carrel, 2010). This is one of 
the ways to ensure successful recognition and accelerate innovation to create 
companies’ survival and long-term value (such as high-performing and insightful 
companies). Risk information, therefore, is defined as risk-related information on 
uncertainty of future outcomes (Dobler, 2008). Businesses’ activities entail a variety of 
risks driven by various external and internal sources of risk (risk factors). Generally, 
these sources comprise, for example, political, economic, market, finance, regulations, 
business process and personnel. According to Carrell (2010, p. 17): 
 
Two types of factors typically expose a firm to risks: the specific factors that derive 
from its very existence, history, culture and main customers, and the systematic risk 
factors associated with the sector, country or economic environment the firm operates 
within. Although less commonly highlighted, a third type of risk factors – systemic – 
have in recent months been a major source of concern. While systemic risks won’t be 
directly manageable by a firm individually, their fast evolution and potentially 
devastating impact requires special attention. 
 
Although there is boundless diversity of the sources of risk, the way to deal with it in an 
organization are closely connected with business strategy and have a potential effect on 
the entity’s performance (Carrell, 2010). 
 
Risk reporting would demonstrate that the board of directors understand, consider and 
manage risk well (Dobler, 2008). It is important to inform shareholders the effect of risk 
on company’s future financial position. Since capital is provided by shareholders for 
companies to deliver a return, shareholders are expecting managers to be accountable 
and responsible towards them.
19
 In this so-called manager-shareholder relationship, a 
manager has to act in the shareholders’ best interest and to assure shareholders that risk 
management strategies are adequately permitted. Managers’ may make more sense to 
manage uncertainties by showing their capabilities and accountability to transparently 
communicate risk profile and strategies to the external investors.  
                                               
19
 According to Carrell (2010, p.1), ‘The Chief Executive Officer is the guardian of that bond between the 
shareholders and the board of executive directors.’ 
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In an attempt to define risk disclosure in this study, previous literatures on risk 
disclosure are sought. From the review, not all previous researchers individually define 
the meaning of risk disclosure. This is because there is difficulty in identifying the 
meaning of risk disclosure since no single definition has been adopted by previous 
researchers. However, some of the definitions used in the previous literatures depend on 
the feature and focus of the study itself. Dobler et al. (2011) argue that risk disclosure 
covers a broad set of information on risk sources and means of risk management 
varying in location, scope and nature.  
 
A study by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, p. 269) define risk disclosure as: 
 
...the communication of information concerning firms’ strategies, characteristics, 
operations, and other external factors that have the potential to affect expected results. 
 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) incline to relate risk in accordance to Lupton’s (1999) 
discussions of how risk is most widely understood. The definition of risk disclosure in 
their study is: 
 
if the reader is informed of any opportunity or prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, 
threat or exposure, that has already impacted upon the company or may impact upon the 
company in the future or of the management of any such opportunity, prospect, hazard, 
harm, threat or exposure. (Linsley and Shrives, 2006, p. 389) 
 
Both of the definitions focus on the sources of uncertainties, however, the definition by 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) is more expansive in which they include the concept of a 
company’s upside and downside risks together with the elements of a company’s past 
and future economic and financial situations. Therefore this definition will be used in 
this thesis.  
 
 2.5.2 Corporate Risk Classification 
 
In the above section, risk is referred to as uncertainty associated with both a potential 
gain and potential loss. In other words, it refers to the volatility of future earnings or 
cash flows. Therefore, when examining risk disclosure, negative and positive outcomes 
53 
 
(potential losses and opportunities) are to be considered (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 
Lajili and Zegal, 2005). The increased attention on the current state of risk disclosure is 
also driven by the increasing relevance of some types of risks and uncertainties, 
especially in the process of making investment decision. Therefore, a clear 
identification of the different sources of uncertainty becomes necessary. In a business 
context, risks arise from various internal and external factors or sources.  
 
Businesses in different industries are facing different risks; therefore, it is difficult to 
establish a set of risk types that is commonly faced by corporations. One example of a 
more detailed listing of the specific risks by an organisation is highlighted in the 
ICAEW (1997) proposal which has been utilised by some of the prior studies (e.g., 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006, 2005). For  instance, Linsley  and  Shrives (2006)  classified  
risk disclosure  categories  into  six  categories: financial, operational, empowerment, 
information  processing  and  technology,  integrity,  and strategy, which further divided 
into 37  sub-categories  based  on ICAEW  (1997). Table 2.2 displays different 
examples of risk categorization. 
 
As noted in the aforementioned examples (Table 2.2), there are different perceptions of 
scope of the concept of risk, and risk disclosure categorizations are not uniform. 
Further, there is no right classification model of risk and almost all categorizations are 
based on whether it is financial risk or non-financial risk. Additionally, companies use 
different terminology when they refer to risk (Combes-Thuelin et al., 2006). According 
to Crouhy et al. (2006, p.14), categorization of risk is important so that ‘ill-defined risk 
measurable, manageable, and transferable’. Knowing different categories of risk 
information also helps to improve the knowledge of investors to detail a company’s 
assets as well as its financial position and risks (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). In the 
Malaysian context, Amran et al. (2009) has adopted the risk disclosure categorization 
based on Linsley and Shrives’s (2006) study. For the purpose of this thesis, a new 
classification of categories is developed to reflect local shareholders’ exposure to risk 
information in Malaysia. These categories have been synthesized from previous 
literature in the area, dividing risk disclosures into the following four categories: 
 
1. Operational risk 
2. Environmental risk 
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3. Financial risk 
4. Strategic risk 
 
1. Operational risk  
In a broad definition, operational risk is the risk of direct and indirect losses resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, personnel or systems errors or from 
external factors (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Specifically, operational risk can be defined  
as a risk of opportunity cost or an economic loss due to inadequate procedures and 
policies,  system  failure,  human  error, lack of basic internal control, liquidity problem, 
health and safety problem, non-compliance with the regulatory requirements, 
management failure, unauthorised activities and frauds. Operational risk is also the risk 
of potential loss due to failures or inadequacies of internal operating procedures 
resulting in inefficiency, reduction in productivity and increase in operating cost, risk of 
losses due to procedural errors and failures in internal control that impacts the delivery 
of the group's products and services.  
 
2. Environmental risk  
Environmental risk arises from the macroeconomic events that are factors essentially 
beyond the organisation’s control and comprises disclosures relating economic risk such 
as general economic condition and global financial crisis, weather condition, political 
risk, legal and regulation risk, and industry sources (suppliers and customers).   
 
3. Financial risk 
Financial risk refers to interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, price and 
commodity risk, credit risk, market risk as well as cash flow and liquidity risk. Apart 
from these areas, financial risk disclosure includes financial risk management objectives 
and policies. 
 
 Interest rate risk is the risk of loss through mismatching the interest bases of assets 
and liabilities. Interest rate risk includes exposure to interest rate risk and 
borrowings, risk on interest rate profile and swap.  
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Table 2.2:  
Examples of Risk Classifications 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Risk Categories 
ICAEW 
(1997) 
Reproduced the Business Risk Model developed by Arthur Andersen, one of the professional 
accountancy firms.  In the model, risk is grouped according to its causal factors, either 
internal or external factors. Three main components: environmental risk, process risk; and 
information for decision-making risk. Under environment risk, the risk factors are 
competitor, catastrophic loss, sensitivity, sovereign/political, shareholder relations, legal, 
regulatory, industry, capital availability and financial markets. Under process risk, the risk 
factors are divided into five main groups: operation risk, empowerment risk, information 
processing/technology risk and financial risk. Under information for decision making risk, 
the risk factors are divided into three main components: operational, financial and strategic. 
IFAC 
(1999) 
Risk arises from three different levels: Level 1 refers to systematic risk including political, 
economic and social risks over which an organisation has little control; Level 2 risks arise 
from factors that organisations cannot control but can influence including competitive, 
reputation and regulatory risk; and, Level 3 varies with each industry but an organisation can 
have a great deal of influence over it (e.g., financial and people risks). 
IRM 
(2002) 
Risk arises from external and internal factors. The IRM further categorises risk into different 
types include strategic, financial, operational and hazard. 
Beretta 
and 
Bozzolan 
(2004) 
Risk classified into three risk factors: (i) company strategy (organization objectives, mission, 
goals for performance), (ii) company characteristics (financial structure, corporate structure, 
technological structure, organization and business process) and (iii) the environment 
surrounding the company (regulation and legislation, political, social and economic factors). 
Cabedo 
and Tirado 
(2004) 
Risk classified into two groups: non-financial (business and strategic) and financial (market, 
credit, liquidity, operational and legal). 
Lajili and 
Zegal 
(2005) 
Risk grouped into eleven components: financial, political, technology, environmental, 
weather, government regulations, seasonality risk, operational, cyclicality, suppliers and 
natural resources. 
Abraham 
and Cox 
(2007) 
Risk disaggregated into three components: business, financial and internal control that 
corresponds to the three classes of risk-reporting guidance in the UK. 
Deumes 
(2008) 
Risk grouped into eight components: macro environmental sources, industry sources, internal 
sources, other sources, loss and probability of loss, variance, lack of information and lack of 
control. 
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 Foreign currency exchange rate risk is the risk of loss as a result of an unfavourable 
movement in exchange rates. Foreign currency exchange rate risk includes exposure 
of foreign  currency  exchange  rate  risk,  risk  of  foreign  currency  transaction  and   
translation as well as forward foreign exchange contract. 
 Price and commodity risk is the risk resulting from the price volatility and adverse 
price movements in the market. 
 Credit risk is the risk that a borrower or creditor will not able to meet its obligations 
(non-performance creditors). Credit risk includes credit risk concentrations, customer 
credit history, credit risk limit, and credit risk exposure.  
 Market risk is the risk of loss resulting from changes in the market value of 
negotiable instruments. 
 Cash flow and liquidity risk is the risk of loss resulting from the inability to meet 
financial obligations as they arise, due to a lack of liquid resources.  
 
4. Strategic risk 
Strategic risk is primarily a risk caused by events that are external to the company, but 
have a significant impact on its strategic decisions or activities. Strategic risk is often a 
risk that an organisation may have to take in order to expand as well as for the long-
term continuity (which is ability to survive) and sustainability of the organisation which 
affects the overall direction of business. 
 
2.5.3 Risk-Related Disclosure: Review of Previous Literature 
 
The research on corporate financial disclosure (Buzby, 1975; Firth, 1979; McNally et 
al., 1982; Raffournier, 1995; Oliveira et al., 2006; Aljifri, 2008) has grown dramatically 
in the last decades. To date, there have been numerous studies on financial risk 
management and disclosure. In the US setting, the issuance of Financial Reporting 
Release No.48 (FRR48) by the SEC has established compulsory requirements for 
disclosure on derivatives and market risks. These compulsory market disclosures 
according to FRR48 have attracted many previous researchers to review and determine 
the benefits of such disclosures to investors (e.g., Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003; 
Linsmeier et al., 2002; Roulstone, 1999; Rajgopal, 1999). In the Malaysian context, 
following the issuance of FRS132 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, 
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studies have been focusing on the market risk disclosure practices by Malaysian firms 
especially after 2006 (Othman and Ameer, 2009). Other studies in financial instruments 
has also been focused in the rest of the world such as (to name a few) Portugal (Lopes 
and Rodrigues, 2007) and Jordan (Al-Yaseen and Al-Khadash, 2011).  
 
There are also studies that focused on derivative-related information disclosure (e.g. 
Afza and Alam, 2011; Li and Gao, 2007; Dunne et al., 2007; Chalmers and Godfrey, 
2004; Seow and Tam, 2002). The studies reveal  that  these  disclosures would  be  
useful  for  investors  to  broaden their  knowledge of  the  company  derivative 
exposures as well as assets and risk situations.  For example, foreign exchange 
derivatives are used to enhance shareholder’s wealth by reducing ﬁrm’s foreign 
exchange exposure (Afza and Alam, 2011). Previous studies also reveal evidence 
consistent with an impact of risk disclosure on capital markets.  However, the distinct 
impact depends on the reporting format chosen (Dobler, 2008).   
 
The increase on corporate risk disclosure is revealed in a number of academic studies 
that have emerged to date. Some of these studies have responded to this issue by 
providing an analysis of a wide-ranging corporate risk disclosure and focusing on 
developing a framework for assessing risk disclosure (e.g. Solomon et al., 2000; 
Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Combes-Thuelin et al., 2006) 
and examining the merit and demerit of risk disclosure itself (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 
2000). In addition, some other studies examining the relationship between risk 
disclosure and its potential determinants such as company-specific factors, corporate 
governance mechanisms and ownership structures (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006, 2005; Lajili and Zhegal, 2005). Table 2.3 provides a 
synthesis of the contributions of a sample of academic studies. 
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
Solomon et al. 
(2000) 
Questionnaire survey. 552 UK institutional 
investors. 
To ascertain the attitudes 
of UK institutional 
investors towards risk 
disclosure and to assess 
whether they consider the 
current level of risk that 
is disclosed to be 
adequate. 
UK institutional investors do not generally 
favour a regulated environment for 
corporate risk disclosure or a general 
statement of business risk. There is a need 
to provide more detailed risk disclosures 
rather than a generalized statement of 
business risk management policy. 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2000) 
Proposals.  Examine the merit and 
demerit of voluntary risk 
disclosure. 
Few companies would disclose risk 
disclosure voluntarily and argued the need 
to mandatory requirements. 
Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) 
Content analysis of 
MDA section only 
(disclosure index); 
regressions. 
85 annual reports of 
Italian listed firms 
for 2001. 
Propose a framework for 
analysis of risk 
communication and 
applied it on a sample of 
quoted Italian firms. 
The index of disclosure quality is not 
influenced either by size or industry but 
regarding the quantity of risk disclosure, 
there is a positive relationship with firm 
size, but no relationship with industry. The 
voluntary risk reporting is mainly  
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
    qualitative and inclined to past and present 
risks. 
Lajili and Zhegal 
(2005) 
Content analysis of 
the whole annual 
reports. 
 
300 annual reports of 
Canadian companies 
for 1999.  
Examine risk disclosures 
in Canadian companies’ 
annual reports and 
describe and analyse the 
subject matter of risk 
information. 
Financial risk is the most frequently 
disclosed risk. A high degree of risk 
disclosure intensity reflecting both 
mandatory and voluntary risk management 
disclosures was observed. However, no 
relationship is found between the quantity 
of compulsory and voluntary risk reporting 
and firm size, profit, b, or leverage. There 
appears to be lack of uniformity, clarity 
and quantification in the information 
disclosed, hence, potentially limiting their 
usefulness. They conclude that more 
formalized and comprehensive risk 
disclosures might be desirable in the future 
to effectively reduce information  
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
    asymmetries between management and 
stakeholders. 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2005) 
Content analysis 
(sentence-based 
approach). 
79 non-financial UK 
companies for 2001. 
Examine risk disclosure 
practices in UK public 
companies.  
Financial risk is the most frequent type of 
disclosure followed by strategic risk and 
integrity risk. Most of risk disclosures are 
qualitative in nature. However, companies 
provide an incomplete picture on the risk 
that they are facing. 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) 
Content analysis of 
narrative sections in 
annual report 
(Disclosure index); 
Regression. 
79 UK companies’ 
annual reports. 
Examine risk disclosure 
practices within UK 
companies and the 
relationship between 
level of risk and 
company size and the 
total risk disclosure. 
A significant positive association between 
the number of risk disclosure and company 
size as well as the level of environmental 
risk but none is found between narrative 
risk reporting and measures of financial 
risk, including gearing, asset cover, b, and 
price to book value. However, the 
information disclosed was found to be 
incomplete and less detailed with limited 
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
    disclosure found on risk related to 
intellectual capital and reputation risks. 
The results showed that companies' 
directors are willing to disclose forward-
looking risk information disclosure. 
Combes-Thuelin et 
al. (2006) 
Qualitative 
methodology based on 
Huberman 
and Miles in order to 
explore the collected 
data (annual reports of 
companies, laws, 
accounting standards, 
professional sources).  
French listed 
companies. 
Facilitating the 
development of a 
framework in order to 
qualify risk. They used 
the “grounded theory” 
from Glaser and Strauss 
(1967). 
Establish an inventory of rules currently 
existing in order to identify the risk 
disclosure context faced by French 
companies. There is no consensus between 
the different pieces of legislation. It is 
demonstrated that the terminology referred 
to by companies tends to differ from one to 
another. 
Abraham and Cox 
(2007) 
Content analysis of 
narrative section. 
Largest UK 
companies for year   
Investigate the 
relationship between risk 
disclosure practices   
The results showed a negative relationship 
between corporate ownership by long-term 
institutions and a positive relationship   
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
  2002. within UK  annual 
reports and institutional 
ownership, board of 
directors and US dual-
listing characteristics. 
between corporate ownership by short-
term institutions and risk disclosure 
respectively. Correspond to the business 
risk, financial risk and internal control risk; 
they established that the pattern of risk 
information in the UK annual reports may 
be dependent upon the form that reporting 
regulation takes. 
Dobler (2008) Analytically-based 
framework. 
 Focuses on reviewing 
discretionary disclosure 
and cheap talk models to 
analyze risk reporting 
incentives and their 
relation to regulation. 
The results suggest that the 
informativeness of risk reporting should 
not be overestimated even in a regulated 
environment. 
Deumes (2008) Content analysis.  90 prospectuses of 
Dutch companies on 
the Amsterdam   
Examine whether 
companies report risk-
relevant information to  
The results reveal that a measure of risk 
extracted from the risk sections in 
prospectuses successfully predict the   
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
  Stock Exchange in 
the late 1990s. 
prospective investors. volatility of companies’ future stock  
prices, the sensitivity of future stock prices 
to market wide fluctuation, as well as 
severe declines in future stock prices. 
Amran et al. 
(2009) 
Content analysis of 
non-financial or 
narrative sections in 
annual reports. 
100 Malaysian 
Public Listed 
Companies for 2005 
(70 companies from 
Main Board; 30 
companies from 
Second Board). 
Look at the availability 
of risk disclosures in the 
Malaysian companies’ 
annual reports. 
The research findings discovered that the 
risks being disclosed by the companies are 
strategic risk and empowerment risk 
accordingly. By taking Linsley and 
Shrives’s (2006) paper as a comparison, 
they found that the total narratives 
discussing risk information in Malaysian 
companies are not as much as of the UK 
companies. The extent of risk disclosure 
was also found to be inclined by the 
industry environment. As seen within this 
study, infrastructure and technology 
industries influenced the companies to  
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
    disclose more risk information. 
Hassan (2009) Content analysis (risk 
disclosure index); 
Regressions 
41 annual reports of 
UAE companies for 
2005. 
Examine the relationship 
between corporations-
specific characteristics, 
namely, size, level of 
risk, industry type and 
reserves with the level of 
corporate risk disclosure. 
By relying on the positive accounting 
theory and institutional theory, the results 
showed that corporate industry type are 
significantly related with the level of 
corporate risk disclosure. This result is 
consistent with Amran et al (2009). 
Finally, in contrast with reserves-corporate 
risk disclosure hypothesized relationship, 
corporate reserve is insignificant and 
negatively associated with level of 
corporate risk disclosure. 
Hill and Short 
(2009) 
Content analysis (risk 
factor); Regressions 
(logit analysis). 
Over 400 IPO 
companies for 1991 
to 2003. 
 (i) Compare the risk 
disclosures of IPO 
companies with those of 
listed companies 
(reported in extent    
(i) Risk disclosures of IPO companies 
contain a greater proportion of forward-
looking information but a lower proportion 
of information on internal controls and risk 
management than the disclosures of listed  
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
   research).  
 (ii) Examine the extent 
of any changes in 
disclosure practices 
across time. 
(iii) Analyse the factors 
that drive the voluntary 
disclosure of risk by IPO 
companies. 
companies.   
(ii)Risk disclosure has increased across 
time  
 
 
(iii) Larger directors’ shareholdings are 
associated with a reduction in risk 
disclosure. 
Oliveira et al. 
(2011) 
Content analysis. 81 Portuguese 
companies (42 listed 
and 39 unlisted) in 
non-finance sector 
annual reports for 
2005. 
Assess the risk-related 
disclosure (RRD) 
practices in non-finance 
sector Portuguese 
companies. 
Implementation of IAS/IFRS and the 
European Union’s Modernisation Directive 
in 2005 did not affect the quantity and 
quality of RRD positively. Disclosures are 
generic, qualitative and backward-looking. 
Public visibility (as assessed by size and 
environmental sensitivity) is a crucial 
influence in explaining RRD: companies 
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
    appear to manage their reputation through 
disclosure of risk-related information. 
Agency costs associated with leverage are 
important influences also. 
Ismail and Abdul 
Rahman (2011) 
Content analysis 
(disclosure checklist). 
124 Malaysian 
public listed 
companies’ annual 
reports for 2006 to 
2008. 
Examine the potential 
effects of institutional 
investors’ and board’s 
monitoring role on risk 
management disclosure. 
Focus on the total risk 
management which 
includes mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures. 
Risk management disclosure level in 
Malaysia is relatively low denoting that 
there is room for improvement. The 
institutional investors (sensitive and 
insensitive) play a more effective role in 
monitoring the company’s risk 
management disclosure compared to the 
board of directors. The directors’ education 
is the only attribute associated with risk 
management disclosure.  
Dobler et al. 
(2011) 
Content analysis 
(detailed). 
160 annual reports of 
US, Canada, UK and 
German banks.  
Analyse the attributes 
and the quantity of risk 
disclosure and its 
A consistent pattern where risk disclosure 
is most prevalent in management reports, 
concentrates on financial risk categories,  
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
   association with the level 
of firm risk in the US, 
Canadian, UK, and 
German settings. 
and comprises little quantitative and 
forward-looking disclosure across sample 
countries. In terms of risk disclosure 
quantity, US firms generally dominate, 
followed by German firms. Cross-country 
variation in risk disclosure attributes can 
only partly be linked to domestic 
disclosure regulation, suggesting that risk 
disclosure incentives play an important 
role. While risk disclosure quantity appears 
to be positively associated with proxies of 
firm risk in the North American settings, 
there is negative association with leverage 
for Germany. This coincides with a 
“concealing motive” implied by an insider 
role of banks in German financial setting. 
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Table 2.3: 
Review of Academic Studies on Comprehensive Risk Disclosure 
Author (s) Method Sample Objectives and Focus Findings (Main Results) 
Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) 
Content analysis 
(manual). 
72 interim reports of 
UK non-financial 
companies. 
Examine the 
determinants of narrative 
risk information in the 
interim reports.  
Risk information in the interim reports 
(narrative sections) is more likely to be 
disclosed by large firms.  There is also a 
positive association between industry 
activity types with levels of narrative risk 
disclosure. Furthermore, there is an 
insignificant impact of other firm-specific 
characteristics (liquidity, gearing, 
profitability, and cross-listing) and 
corporate governance mechanisms on 
narrative risk disclosure. They suggest that 
in a way to keep investors satisfied, 
companies that are not performing well 
(with high levels of ﬁnancing and liquidity 
risks) are encouraged to look at investors’ 
demands for risk disclosure.  
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The studies selected for the annotated review in Table 2.3 are limited solely to those 
relating to comprehensive risk disclosures. The review of other corporate reporting 
disclosure (e.g., environmental disclosure, corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
intellectual capital disclosure) is beyond the scope of this study, and is, therefore, 
excluded in an attempt to keep the review of previous research studies within a 
controllable scope. Some of the academic articles displayed in Table 2.3 above are 
discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.5.4 The Relevance of Risk Disclosure in the Company Annual Report 
 
Corporate risk disclosures are relevance in the business world nowadays especially 
after the global financial crisis around the globe. Risk disclosure would be useful for 
investors when making informed decisions as it reduces uncertainty and reduces 
information asymmetries by raising confidence in the market. The communication of 
risk management and internal control can provide investors with information to validate 
management’s effectiveness in dealing with increased business and market uncertainty. 
As part of good corporate governance, the identification and prioritisation of sources of 
risks and the assessment of the potential impacts of the risk (risk exposure) is expected 
to be increasingly sought by investors. The increased focus and consideration applied 
by governments, regulators and accounting institutions around the world have resulted 
in a surge in corporate risk disclosure recently. The mounting demand from the public 
on the risk disclosure of corporate information also encourages positive feedback for 
firms to increase their corporate risk disclosure in annual report. 
 
A number of well-structured approaches to risk management have been developed over 
the recent years to facilitate managers to administer different type of risks (Linsley and 
Shrives, 2000). Deumes (2008, p.122) addressed this potential corporate risk disclosure 
stating confidently that, ‘studying risk disclosure is important because corporate 
transparency about risk is vital for the well functioning of capital markets.’  
 
In examining the risk disclosure in annual reports, the role of corporate risk disclosure 
has been associated with the significant association with company-specific factors (e.g., 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006), industry-specific factors (e.g., Hassan, 2009) and 
ownership structures (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007). Linsley and Shrives (2006) also 
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suggest that companies' directors are willing to disclose forward-looking risk 
information disclosures, however, the information disclosed was found to be 
incomplete and less detailed with limited disclosure found on risk related to intellectual 
capital and reputation risks. Abraham and Cox (2007) reveal that the pattern of risk 
information in the UK annual reports depends on its reporting regulation. Lajili and 
Zeghal (2005) find that voluntary risk disclosures in the Canadian annual reports are 
almost completely qualitative in nature and lack of depth and specificity. 
 
The above review reveals that previous studies that take a broad perspective of risk 
disclosure are still lacking in transparency about corporate risk information. This is due 
mainly to the absence of standards and uniform measures for different risk components. 
This in turn, could limit the enhancement of the overall understanding of risk disclosure 
studies in a complete sense. While some studies have investigated risk disclosure, the 
focus of these studies varies considerably. The empirical literature that has examined 
risk under its comprehensive perspectives is still limited (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). 
Therefore, with the aim of contributing to the literature on risk disclosure, this research 
examines different types of risk in the annual reports of an emerging economy, 
Malaysia. 
 
The year of the present study lends to its importance as it reflects the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 which reinforces the importance of the financial risk reporting. 
Moreover, it will be interesting to consider how risk disclosures may have been 
enhanced over the past period in response to the corporate governance reforms in 
Malaysia which includes the importance of risk management and internal control 
system by companies. It is expected that this study will shed further light on the impact 
of the global economic uncertainty which reinforced the importance of the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Standard on the extent of risk 
disclosure by Malaysian companies. This study also has its advantage as it offers 
investors an objective assessment of the current reporting practices. This research is 
therefore expecting to find evidence that companies are responding to the current 
financial reporting practices and the corporate governance framework in relation to the 
global financial crisis by enhancing the amount of risk disclosures in the year 2009.  
 
The theory and evidence reviewed so far suggest the following hypothesis: 
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H01: There is a significant difference in the extent of risk disclosure, in its different 
classifications, reported in annual reports of Malaysian listed companies for the year 
2009. 
 
2.6 UPPER ECHELONS THEORY, MANAGER-SPECIFIC FACTORS, RISK 
TAKING PROPENSITY AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
 
In this section, two areas of the literature that are relevant to the study are reviewed. 
Section 2.6.1 focuses on upper echelons theory in general and Section 2.6.2 focuses on 
manager-specific characteristics based on upper echelons theory, namely, age, 
functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity and their relations with risk taking 
propensity and, consequently, the tendency to make information disclosure.  
 
2.6.1 Upper Echelons Theory 
 
A theoretical perspective that was developed to address influences of top managements 
in corporations is that of the upper echelons theory. The basic concept of upper 
echelons theory which builds on the premises of earlier strategic choice literature (e.g., 
Child, 1972; Montanari, 1978) was first introduced in the strategic management 
literature by Hambrick and Mason (1984) in the context of top managers’ reflections in 
their organizations. According to Hambrick and Mason (1984) upper echelons theory is 
attributed to top managers’ bounded rationality (March and Simon, 1993; 1958) in 
which their choices are bounded and inﬂuenced by their idiosyncratic experiences and 
values. The central premise of upper echelons theory in which mainly built on the 
literature is that executive’s experiences, values and personalities as well as cognitive 
processes to a great extent influence their interpretations of the situations they face and, 
sequentially affect their judgment and decision making.  
 
In their seminal article, Hambrick and Mason (1984) have developed a conceptual 
model to portray upper echelons perspective in which top executives play a crucial role 
in shaping major organizational outcomes (Figure 2.1). This model suggests that the 
manager’s preferences on behalf of the organisations, to some extent, reflect the 
characteristics (psychological cognitive bases, values and observable background 
characteristics) of these managers.  This distinctive of cognitive styles and values of top  
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Figure 2.1: 
An Upper Echelons Perspective of Organizations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
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managers reflect variation as different individual has different way of managing 
problems. Hambrick and Mason (1984) further argue that such perceptible 
characteristics can in turn to some extent lead to a different firm’s strategy outcomes. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 193) emphasize that ‘…organizational outcomes both 
strategies and effectiveness are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases 
of powerful actors in the organization.’  
 
Thus it can be argued that, when confronted with the same situations that are complex, 
uncertain and involve high levels of ambiguity; different managers, will make different 
decisions based on their cognitive characteristics and values such as risk attitudes and 
confidence. Therefore, the idea that managerial characteristics could have an impact on 
corporate decisions on disclosure could be apparent. 
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) originally introduce two main ideas. Firstly, is the idea to 
link the ‘unit of analysis’ and strategic choices. This ‘unit of analysis’ involves the 
characteristics of either the individual top executive (i.e., CEO) or a group of a top 
management team. However, Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that firm strategies 
reflect the characteristics of its powerful actors, among whom the CEO is prominent. 
Ever since, many upper echelons studies have focused almost wholly on the importance 
of top managers, especially CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer, 1997). In addition, the CEO has been characterized as a firm’s chief cognisor 
and decision maker (Calori et al., 1994). Although the upper echelons  model  was  
originally  more focused  on  the  individual  level  since in most firms, the CEO has the 
most power, it is still of interest of some other researchers to focus on the entire top 
management team in terms of the unit of analysis (e.g. Zee and Swagerman, 2009; 
Carpenter et al., 2004; Finkelston and Hambrick, 1990).  Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
argue that a top management team can generate a multi-level impact across hierarchical 
echelons. Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 196) further argue that ‘at a more practical 
level, study of an entire team increases the potential strength of the theory to predict, 
because the chief executives shares tasks and, to some extent, power with other team 
members.’ 
 
Secondly, the idea of demographic characteristics or personal attributes of top 
managers can be used as valid, even though imperfect, proxies of managers’ cognitive 
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frames which in turn influence their strategic choices and actions. Upper echelons 
perspective suggests that past behaviour, experience and values are a function of 
observable characteristics of top management, which is managers’ demographic 
characteristic.  According to Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 196):  
 
an emphasis on background characteristics, rather than on psychological dimensions, 
seems essential at this point in the development of an upper echelons perspective. First, 
the cognitive bases, values and perceptions of upper level managers are not convenient 
to measure or even amenable to direct measurement. 
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that top managers’ demographic characteristics are 
the central reason in determining organizational outcomes which influence their 
decision making and therefore their actions taking in the organizations that they lead.  
Hambrick and Mason (1984) further argue that this arises as demographic 
characteristics are related to cognitive bases, values and perceptions that influence the 
decision making of managers. These observable manager’s demographic characteristics 
include age, tenure in the organization, education, socioeconomic roots, functional 
background, financial position and team homogeneity/heterogeneity (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984). Upper echelons theory even suggests that the more complex the 
decision, for example risk taking propensity, the more imperative the personal 
characteristics of the decision makers. There has been research that document overall 
managers’ effect which relies on observable manager demographic characteristics (e.g., 
age, education, functional background and tenure) as proxies for the unobservable 
cognitive frames of top executives which affect their preferences (e.g., Eze et al., 2011; 
Bamber et al., 2010; Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Pitcher and 
Smith, 2001; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hitt and Tyler, 1991).  
 
In strategic management literatures, upper echelons theory has been generally used in 
corporate strategy and structure (e.g., Hambrick et al., 1996; Cannella and Hambrick, 
1993; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Thomas et al., 1991; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 
1990; Miller and Toulouse,  1986),  strategic  persistence  (e.g., Finkelstein  and  
Hambrick, 1990), strategic choice (e.g., Zee and Swagerman, 2009; Rajagopalan and 
Spreitzer, 1997; Child, 1972), strategic leadership (e.g., Seaton and Boyd, 2007; 
Waldman et al., 2004; Waldman and Yammarino, 1999, Hambrick, 1997), strategic 
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decision processes or models (e.g., Peterson et al., 2003; Hitt and Tyler, 1991), 
strategic actions (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2001; Miller and Toulouse, 1986; Nadkarni and 
Narayanan, 2007) as well as strategic change (e.g., Boeker, 1997; Wiersema and 
Bantel, 1992). At its core, the upper echelons perspective argues that top management’s 
personal characteristics exercise strong influence on present strategic choice and 
decision processes.  
 
Various studies on performance also have drawn on upper echelons demography (both 
individual executive or entire top management team) in consequence of strategic 
choices to help resolve the influence of top management on corporate performance 
(Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010; Cheng et al., 2010; Simsek, 2007; Auden et al., 2006; 
Peterson et al., 2003; D’Aveni, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Gupta, 1984).  
Cheng et al. (2010) argue that various management demographic characteristics exert 
significant influences on corporate performance. Using Chinese corporate chairperson, 
they find that firms perform better when the chairperson possess university degrees and 
titles (academic and nationally certified title), are older in age and have short tenure 
periods. Cheng et al. (2010) further argue that within Chinese corporations, personal 
attributes of the chairperson are appropriate proxies of managerial networking 
competencies and critical human resources to conduct business, and are consequently 
related to superior corporate performance.  
 
Auden et al. (2006) indicate that there is a signiﬁcant correlation between top 
management team demographic characteristics and ﬁrm performance. Auden et al. 
(2006) conclude that three of the proposed four top management team demographic 
characteristics in their study, including age homogeneity, functional background 
heterogeneity, and team tenure heterogeneity inﬂuence ﬁrm performance. Additionally, 
they find that top management team performance was positively correlated to team 
tenure, suggesting that team performance improves as team tenure progresses. 
Regardless of the educational background of the top management team, Auden et al. 
(2006) find that the educational discipline heterogeneity was negatively related to the 
ﬁrm’s performance.  
 
Prior researchers have also applied upper echelons theory to the area of corporate social 
performance. Chen and Fan (2011) examine the relationship between demographic 
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characteristics of entrepreneurs and corporate social performance. By using a sample of 
listed companies of manufacturing in China, they find that the age and education of 
entrepreneurs has a weak explanatory power to corporate social performance. Chen and 
Fan (2011) also find that the functional background in the organization of entrepreneurs 
has a significant effect on corporate social performance, especially; entrepreneurs with 
output functions experience are connected with higher corporate social performance. 
They also find that the tenure in the organization of entrepreneurs has a significant 
effect on corporate social performance, especially; entrepreneurs with shorter tenure 
were more likely to perform higher corporate social performance.  
 
Manner (2010) also draws on the CEO characteristics’ effect on corporate social 
performance using the KLD Research Analytics CSP ratings. He shows that the 
differences in corporate social performance between ﬁrms are predicted by the different 
observable CEO characteristics. By controlling for ﬁrm and industry characteristics, 
Manner (2010) finds that strong corporate social performance in a sample of 650 public 
US firms, as measured by the strengths categories of KLD’s ratings, is positively 
related to the CEO having a bachelor’s degree in humanities, having various career 
experiences and being female. In addition, Manner (2010) discovers that the CEO with 
a bachelor’s degree in economics and having short-term compensation are negatively 
related to the corporate social performance. Manner (2010) finally suggests that the 
CEOs have more discretion in influencing strong and perfect social performance than in 
impacting poor performance to the firm. 
 
In his paper, Hambrick (2007) further updates the upper echelons theory by 
summarizing the notable refinements of the theory, the two vital moderators, namely, 
managerial discretion and executive job demands. First, managerial discretion which 
has been introduced by Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) is to reconcile two opposing 
views about the effects of top executives on organizational outcomes. Hambrick (2007) 
concludes:  
 
One view, coming out of the prevailing tradition of strategic management, was that top 
executives greatly influence what happens to their organizations. The competing view, 
coming out of population ecology (…) and new institutional theory (…), was that 
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executives have little effect because organizations are exceedingly inertial, swept along 
by external forces, and constrained by a host of conventions and norms.  
 
Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) define managerial discretion as the latitude of action 
in which it exists when there is a means of accounting for differing levels of constraints 
and multiple plausible alternatives faced by top management. Hence, top management 
matters in determining organizational actions and outcomes, but only to the extent that 
top management possesses sufficient discretion to make a variety of strategic choices. 
Hambrick (2007, p. 335) argue that:  
 
Upper echelons theory offers good predictions of organizational outcomes indirect 
proportion to how much managerial discretion exists. If a great deal of discretion is 
present, then managerial characteristics will become reflected in strategy and 
performance. If, however, discretion is lacking, executive characteristics do not much 
matter. 
 
Second, executive’s job demand which has been introduced by Hambrick et al. (2005) 
is to differentiate the degree of challenges or difficulties faces by top managers in 
dealing with their day-to-day task setting. Hambrick et al. (2005, p. 335) argue that 
executive job demands stem from three sets of factors; task challenges, performance 
challenges and executive aspirations. According to Hambrick (2007, p. 336): 
 
Executives who are under heavy job demands will be forced to take mental short cuts 
and fall back on what they have tried or seen work in the past; thus, their choices will 
reflect their backgrounds and dispositions. Conversely, executives who face minimal 
job demands can afford to be more comprehensive in their analyses and decision 
making; thus, their choices will more greatly match the objective conditions they 
confront. 
 
Ge et al. (2009) in their working paper, examine empirical investigation of the effect of 
individual Chief Financial Officer (CFO) on accounting practices. They analyse these 
two potential moderators predicted by upper echelons theory, CFO discretion and CFO 
job demand. Ge et al. (2009) find evidence that the effect of CFO fixed-effects on 
accounting choices is stronger when they work with non-expertise auditors and CFO’s 
job demands are likely to be greater when the firms that a CFO works for are more 
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complex. They conclude that their results are consistent with the predictions offered by 
upper echelons theory that CFO style being reflected more in accounting choices when 
CFO discretion and job demands are higher.  
 
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) ideas of upper echelons theory have been extended 
beyond the strategic management discipline to also shape research in main stream 
economics (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), accounting (e.g., Bamber et al., 2010; 
Dyreng et al., 2010; Ge et al., 2009), corporate finance (e.g., Chevalier and Ellison, 
1999) and information technology (e.g., Eze et al., 2011; Chuang et al., 2007). Of 
relevance to this study is the application of upper echelons theory to the area of 
corporate risk disclosure. According to Hambrick (2007), this theory plays a role in 
disclosure because top managers have an enormous influential power to lead the 
decision-making process in an organization. Since these managers have both superior 
access to and control over corporate information when compared to other corporate 
constituents, much of the decision rest on their discretion and strategic intent regarding 
the release of certain information, specifically voluntary risk disclosure information. 
Voluntary risk disclosure is such a complex, risk taking and ambiguous situation 
requiring trade-offs among multiple conﬂicting goals, such as protecting proprietary 
information that competitors could use against the ﬁrm (e.g., Dye, 1986).  
 
2.6.2 Manager-Specific Characteristics, Risk Taking Propensity and Corporate 
Disclosure 
 
In their original work, Hambrick and Mason (1984) construct 21 propositions regarding 
top management characteristics and company performance. These propositions are 
based on seven categories, namely, age, functional background, corporate influences, 
education, socio-economic roots, stockholding and group heterogeneity. In this 
particular study, five manager-specific characteristics are chosen to demonstrate the 
relationship with the corporate risk disclosure in Malaysian corporations. These include 
age, functional background, education, tenure and ethnicity. This study focuses on the 
observable demographic characteristics of top managers’ as recommended by upper 
echelons theory. Specifically, top managers in this study refer to Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs) and Chair of Audit Committees (CACs).  
 
79 
 
Nevertheless, it seems that there have not been any empirical studies published on the 
relationship between upper echelons and corporate risk disclosure (to the best 
knowledge of the researcher). Though prior literature suggests the importance of 
addressing the difference of top manager characteristics in corporate reporting 
disclosure (Bamber et al., 2010), there is no study yet that has addressed this issue by 
linking the influence of manager-specific factor to corporate risk disclosure. This will 
provide an interesting avenue for empirical examination in future research.  
 
This study conducts a comprehensive review but limited to the scope of strategic 
management, economics, finance and accounting to explore the relation between 
managers’ demographic characteristics and their risk-taking propensity and tendency to 
make information disclosure. Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) upper echelons theoretical 
perspective can provide the rationale for hypothesising associations between 
demographic characteristics of top managers and corporate risk disclose. This study 
suggests five demographic characteristics of top managers’ personal characteristics, 
namely, age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity to likely inﬂuence top 
managers in disclosing risk information. The following discussion reviews prior 
literature covering these different types of manager-specific characteristics to build up 
the empirical schema in this study. 
 
2.6.2.1 Age 
According to Palsson (1996), age is an essential determinant for risk taking behaviour. 
In considering age effect, risk taking propensity always relates to youthfulness (Child, 
1974). In relation to upper echelons theory, firms with younger managers will be more 
inclined to pursue risky strategies as opposed to firms with older managers which are 
more risk-averse (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and tend to make more conservative 
decisions.  
 
Taking into account age cohort, Ireland et al. (1987) suggest that individuals of similar 
age have similar life experiences and potentially similar values and beliefs stored as 
schemas.  As a result they suggest that younger managers may place greater value on 
participative management than do older managers.  Additionally, individual from older 
age cohort is more conservative as opposed to younger age cohorts (Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2003). In a similar vein, Schuman and Scott (1989) support the argument that 
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the generational  disposition  shaped  by  the  crucial events experienced  by a  cohort  
during its  youth exerts a main  influence  on  its attitudes afterwards. They found that 
memories of crucial events such as political and social changes were structured by age 
in which early adulthood was the main period for ‘generational imprinting’. Recently, 
Bamber et al. (2010) in their study of corporate voluntary financial disclosure find that 
managers who born before World War II as opposed to managers who born after the 
event, are more hesitant to anticipate financial forecast showing that older managers are 
more conservative in making risky disclosure.  
 
Disclosure on risk information of companies is risky, revealing situations under 
uncertainty and there is a chance that the disclosure is inaccurate. Given that older 
managers may have only few years before retirement, the fear for such disclosures 
could prove inaccuracy will disrupt their financial and career security. In contrast, 
younger managers can be more risk taking through increasing disclosure of risk 
information under uncertainty because their career and financial security affairs have a 
longer time horizon (Barker and Mueller, 2002). 
 
2.6.2.2 Functional Track 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) differentiate functional track between ‘output functions’ 
and ‘throughput functions’. These two categories align with the Miles and Snow’s 
(1978) ‘strategic typology’. Output functions relate to marketing, sales and research and 
development while throughput functions relate to production, accounting/finance, 
engineering, administration and legal. In this study, it is found that the CEO’s and the 
CAC’s functional background are beyond what has been categorised as output 
functions and throughput functions above. Therefore, to reflect this study and 
noteworthily the Malaysian corporate environment, this study will add several more 
categories to be classified as output functions and throughput functions.  
There are three matched-categories developed for the purpose of functional track of top 
managers in this study. There are Entrepreneurial versus Bureaucratic, Public/Client 
engagement versus Internal organization role and Industry-specific expertise versus 
Widely-based expertise (Figure 2.2). The categorisations in Figure 2.2 are still within 
the definition and understanding of what is the difference between output functions and 
throughput functions. Because output functions always relates to risky effort, output 
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functions of managers is associated with the managers’ propensity for risk taking. It is 
argued that additional output functions of managers (entrepreneurial, public/client 
engagement and industry-specific expertise) developed in this study is likely associated 
with the increasing of risk disclosure. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship of the 
categorisations of output functions and throughput functions that is used in this study. 
 
Figure 2.2: 
Functional Track Category 
 (Extended from Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) Original Categorization) 
 
 
 
Empirical research confirms that managers pursue strategies in line with their own 
functional expertise (e.g., Smith and White, 1987; Thomas et al., 1991; Jensen and 
Zajac, 2004). Prior research characterised individuals in technical financial function as 
conventional, orderly and inhibited (Holland, 1997) suggesting they may adopt 
conservative disclosure styles. In this study, fewer risk disclosure is considered a 
dimension of conservative risk disclosure. Managers from technical functions are also 
less tolerance of ambiguity (Holland, 1997, p. 27). Hambrick and Mason (1984) posit 
that managers from finance favour more budget detail and thoroughness, which 
suggests managers from finance or accounting, may develop more precise 
communication strategy on risk information. Executives with legal backgrounds are 
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more sensitive to litigation risk, and so likely favour disclosure that does not promise 
too much. Bamber et al. (2010) find that, on average, managers promoted from legal 
backgrounds tend to guide expectations down (reﬂecting greater sensitivity to litigation 
risk) and managers promoted from accounting and ﬁnance develop more precise 
disclosure styles that are conservative in underestimating upcoming earnings.  
 
2.6.2.3 Education 
According to upper echelons theory, education level is related to the capability of 
ambiguity-tolerance, capacity for information processing and ability to evaluate 
alternatives as well as more willing to consider new or different ideas (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984; Herrmann and Datta, 2002). Hitt and Tyler (1991) ﬁnd that more 
educated top managers have greater cognitive complexity and are less conservative to 
process information for making decisions. Upper echelons theory suggests that the 
amount of formal education of top managers will be positively associated with 
innovation or risk taking tendencies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). 
 
Focusing on the professional accounting qualifications, it is argued that managers with 
this qualification have better knowledge of professional ethics. This professional ethics 
include honesty, integrity and trustworthiness which enable a manager to act with virtue 
and apply the moral point of view (Mintz and Morris, 2011).  Therefore, managers with 
professional accounting qualifications are expected to disclose risk information 
appropriately than managers without professional accounting qualifications.   
 
Focusing on the MBA degree in particular, the evidence regarding their effects on risk 
attitudes is mixed. Specifically, upper echelons theory predicts managers holding MBA 
degrees developed different styles than those without such education backgrounds. On 
the one hand, MBA holder is found to be more risk-averse and conservative. For 
example, Bamber et al. (2010) ﬁnd that MBA holders tend to guide expectations 
upward, but their forecasts are more accurate. These arguments suggest that MBA 
holders may adopt more conservative risk disclosure. This findings conforms 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996, p. 104) suggestion that MBA qualification is part of 
the social and business elite who value conformity and conventionality. On the other 
hand, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) find that managers who hold an MBA degree seem to 
follow on average more aggressive strategies. In term of risk disclosure, this findings 
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show that managers with MBA degrees tend to disclose more risk information than 
their counterparts.  
 
2.6.2.4 Tenure 
Finkelstein  and  Hambrick  (1990)  noted  that the  organizational  tenure  of  top  
managers  has  received  the  most  extensive theoretical  and  empirical  attention  of  
all  top  managers  demographic characteristics as evidenced from prior researches 
(e.g., Musteen et al., 2010; Hambrick et al., 1993; Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991). Top 
managers with long organizational tenure are expected  to  have  great  social  cohesion,  
lessening  the  likelihood  that  individual  members  of a team will  challenge  the  
status  quo  (Michel  and Hambrick, 1992).  Likewise, Bantel and Jackson (1989) show 
that managers with longer tenures in an organization demonstrated a greater 
commitment to the organization’s current state of affairs. Thus, long-tenured CEOs can 
be expected to commit to the status quo because of inferior adaptive aspirations (Cyert 
and March, 1992).  
 
Moreover, upper echelons theory suggests that although lengthy tenure is associated 
with power, it has also been inferred to be associated with resistance to change. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that a better understanding of organizational 
procedures and policies can be achieved by having a long tenure in the organization and 
this in turn will make managers to refuse to change in their daily managerial processes. 
Empirical work supports the argument that increasing top managers’ tenure lowers the 
likelihood of organizational and strategic change. For example, Simsek (2007) finds 
that tenure shapes the risk attitudes of the CEOs in evaluating the task. Due to this 
view, longer-tenured CEOs are likely to be more risk-averse and conservative in 
dealing with disclosure under uncertainty which leads to lower risk disclosure level.  
 
2.6.2.5 Ethnicity 
Upper echelons theory suggests that socio-economic background of senior executives 
can affect their decisions. However, according to Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 201) 
‘...there has been almost no studies that attempt to relate socioeconomic background to 
organizational strategy or performance.’ Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that the 
reasons are mainly because there is a high degree of homogeneity among socio-
economic backgrounds of executives. Nonetheless, a study by Channon (1979) finds 
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some relationships between the socio-economic backgrounds of UK executives and the 
growth strategies of their firms. In her study, Channon (1979) argues that the 
entrepreneurs from the most widely diversified firms that have a high rate of 
acquisitions are likely to come from relatively humble origins. In this study however, 
socio-economic background is referring to the ethnic groups in Malaysia especially 
Malay and Chinese in which both ethnics play an important role in the socio-economics 
of the country (Abdullah, 2006). According to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), it is worth to 
acknowledge the norms and societal values in multiracial countries when each of the 
racial groups has chosen to maintain its own ethnic identity and value. Despite the fact 
that Malays form the largest population ethnic group in Malaysia, the Chinese have 
always been the most economically prominent (Mamman, 2002). The Chinese owned 
69 percent of the total share capital of Malaysian companies (in the mid-1990), which is 
argued to contribute to the intensifying racial tension in Malaysia (Ball et al., 2003). 
 
In Malaysia, studies of the effect of culture and the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2005) report a significant and 
positive association between Malay dominated boards and disclosure. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) suggest that Malay directors tend to disclose more compared to Chinese 
directors based on religious values that requires the Malay directors, who are Muslim, 
to perform business according to Islamic business ethics.  Additionally, further study by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) used the legitimacy theory to explain the significant 
relationship between a Malay dominated board and corporate social reporting.  They 
suggest that the Malaysian government policy that favours the Bumiputera by 
discriminating business opportunity based on ethnic group, influences the Malay 
directors to use corporate social disclosure as a reactive legitimating strategy.  The 
purpose is to divert attention from disputed business practices, nepotism, and cronyism 
as well as close affiliation with the government, so that a continued influential voice at 
both governmental and institutional levels can be ensured (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
 
Other previous studies using Malaysian settings have examined how ethnicity of 
managers influences their attitude to the role of government (e.g., Mamman, 2002), 
audit fees (e.g. Gul, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006), earnings management (e.g., Abdul 
Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006) and firm performance (e.g., Maran and Indraah, 
2009). Though many studies conducted use ethnicity as one of the variables, none of 
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the studies focus specifically on the relationship between ethnicity and corporate risk 
disclosure. Furthermore, prior studies do not apply upper echelons theory as a basis in 
their studies, rather used legitimacy and political costs theories. Therefore, this study 
will provide an interesting perceptual avenue about this relationship. 
 
2.7 AGENCY THEORY, OWNERSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND FIRMS’ 
REPORTING DISCLOSURE 
 
This section reviews the literature on a general underlying theoretical perspective 
(agency theory) and a specific aspect of that theory (ownership structure) that have 
relevance to the specification of factors affecting corporate risk disclosure. Section 
2.7.1 focuses on agency theory and Section 2.7.2 focuses on ownership structure, 
specifically, family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership and their 
relations with a firm’s reporting disclosure. Ownership structure in a company is 
expected to influence the company’s disclosure propensity, based on arguments about 
agency conflicts and information asymmetry between owners and managers of the 
company. To understand and address this agency problem and information asymmetry, 
the application of agency theory is used. 
 
2.7.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory was first introduced in the financial economics literature by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) based on the agency model of the principal-agent relationship. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308), an agency relationship is defined as 
‘a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some 
decision making authority to the agent.’  
 
One type of principal-agent relationship in the context of the ﬁrm is where the agent 
(manager) acts on behalf of the principal (shareholder). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out that the separation of ownership and management results in agency costs in 
which these costs do not exist when the owner and manager is the same person. They 
argue that where there is a separation of ownership and control of a firm, there is a 
potential for conflicts of interest to exist between these two contracting parties then 
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agency costs are created. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) define agency costs as the 
sum of: (i) the monitoring expenditures by the principal; (ii) the bonding expenditures 
by the agent; and (iii) the residual loss.  
 
Agency theory suggests that both parties (managers and shareholders) are utility 
maximizers. This behavior creates the incentives problems in a firm caused by the 
separation of ownership and control of resources between shareholders and managers. 
It is argued that managers may focus on their own personal interests, rather than 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Because of this situation, agency costs will always 
arise. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) argue that: 
 
In most agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring 
and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be 
some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would 
maximize the welfare of the principal. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) presents an overview of applications of agency theory in empirical 
research (Table 2.4) in which agency structure is applicable in a variety of setting. 
Where there are two differing goals between principal and agents, Eisenhardt (1989, p. 
58) argues that, ‘…the domain of agency theory is relationships that mirror the basic 
agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in cooperative behavior, 
but have differing goals and differing attitudes toward risk.’ 
 
In the context of the ﬁrm, a major issue is the information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders. In this agency relationship, a manager has an information 
advantage over shareholders. Given the comparative advantage of information 
possession, it is possible that managers may or may not specify information on a 
voluntary basis to reduce or increase agency costs. Thus, it is crucial for shareholders to 
create some mechanisms to alleviate agency problems by aligning the interests between 
principal-agent or by monitoring the agent’s opportunistic behavior.   
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Table 2.4: 
Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organization of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organizational 
assumptions 
Partial goal conflict among participants  
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information assumptions Information as a purchasable commodity 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and agent have partly 
differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., compensation, 
regulation, leadership, impression management, whistle-
blowing, vertical integration, transfer pricing) 
Source: Adapted from Eisenhardt (1989) 
 
Of relevance to this study is the application of agency theory to the firm’s reporting 
disclosure. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that agency theory has been widely used to 
explain theoretically a firm’s reporting disclosures. Agency theory posits that corporate 
disclosure can act as a mechanism which decreases the agency costs (Barako, 2007; 
Morris, 1987) because this information disclosure could signal to shareholders that 
managers work in their best interests (Rouf and Harun, 2011). In addition, agency 
theory suggests that some firms’ reporting disclosure may provide a mechanism for 
reducing shareholders’ monitoring costs and also reducing the problem of moral hazard 
(Schipper, 1981). Firms’ reporting disclosure also can be a mechanism to influence 
shareholders’ beliefs that the company is viable and being properly directed (Craswell 
and Taylor, 1992; McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993). Therefore, by increasing 
reporting disclosure, companies could increase shareholders’ confidence (Barako, 
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2007) and decrease shareholders’ uncertainty about the firm, hence, reducing 
information asymmetry.  
 
Agency theory has been employed by many researchers to analyse the existence of 
voluntary disclosure by firms. Empirical studies on corporate voluntary disclosure have 
extensively examined the determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure levels, 
especially in the firm-level factors such as firm size and firm profitability (e.g., 
Salamon and Dhaliwal, 1980; Leftwich et al., 1981; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Patel et al., 2002; Oliveira et al., 2006; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997).  
 
Focusing on corporate disclosure on risk information, agency theory claims that agency 
conflicts and information asymmetry between shareholders and managers will give rise 
to a demand for corporate risk disclosure in annual reports (Solomon et al., 2000; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Deumes and Knechel (2008) find that the extent of voluntary 
internal control reporting is positively associated with indications of information and 
agency problems. Their results reveal strong evidence that managers provide relatively 
more disclosure on internal control if information problems and agency conflicts are 
high. This argument is supported by Hill and Short (2009) that voluntary risk disclosure 
information on key risks could lessen information asymmetry. It is widely accepted that 
if the party with more information signals to others, asymmetries can be reduced. 
Furthermore, managers who have better access to a ﬁrm’s private information than 
external owners and investors can make credible and reliable communication to the 
market to enhance the value of the ﬁrm by reducing the costs of the agency 
relationship.  
 
From a different point of view, disclosure of risk information may decrease a firm’s 
perceived risk (Vandemele et al., 2009); therefore, investors may prefer to invest in 
companies with a higher degree of risk disclosure (Healy et al., 1999). Since investors 
have access to more risk information from management, they will be more tolerance 
and comfortable to take risk regardless of the company’s financial position. However, 
investors will perceive a higher level of risk of firm if such information was not 
disclosed, resulting in additional monitoring costs.  
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The effect of corporate risk disclosure on the value of the firm however can vary in 
relations to ownership structure. The disclosure of risk information that signals unique 
situations of the company may reveal valuable proprietary information. There may be 
situations when managers may not want to reveal all information relevant to 
shareholders because of the proprietary nature of information. The information on 
corporate risk disclosure might be affected by the composition of corporate ownership 
structure since different ownership structures will affect a firm’s different disclosure 
choice. In this study, corporate risk disclosure is investigated for Malaysian top listed 
companies which are a context that is characterized by different ownership 
concentrations in the hands of families and government investors as well as foreign 
investors. 
 
2.7.2 Ownership Structure  
 
Ownership structure, arguably, is one of the mechanisms that aligns the interest of 
shareholders and managers of the company (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Chau and Gray, 2002; Hossain et. al., 1994). Agency costs in relation to 
corporate risk disclosure for example, the costs of implementing control devices such as 
internal control and risk management system in the company, will vary with different 
corporate ownership structure. Agency theory proposes ownership structure as one of 
the main corporate governance mechanisms to resolve agency problems and suggests 
that concentrated ownership will result in more effective monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). However, different ownership structures will impact differently on 
the disclosure incentives by managers (Arshad et al., 2012). 
 
In developed countries where diffused ownership structures are more prevalent, the 
focus of researchers is on the conflict of interest between outside shareholders and 
managers, whereas in Asia where ownership concentration structures are more 
dominant the principal-agent problem changes to conflicts between the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2003; Claessens and Fan, 
2002). This ownership tension allows the controlling owners to increase effective 
control of a corporation by determining how the company runs and may expropriate the 
wealth of minority shareholders.  
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Various aspects of ownership structures have been studied in previous research (e.g. 
family ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership, institutional ownership 
and managerial ownership). In Malaysia, corporate ownership is normally characterized 
by concentrated shareholdings. Lim (1981) finds the ownership of shareholding among 
the 100 largest Malaysian firms in the 1960s to be highly concentrated. This finding is 
supported by Abdul Samad (2004) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who also find that 
more than half of the total equity in the corporate sector in Malaysia held by the five 
largest shareholders has been highly concentrated.  
 
Therefore, this study will examine three aspects of a firm’s ownership structure, 
namely, family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership. The first two 
types of ownership structures are chosen to reflect the identity of Malaysian 
corporations in which they are surrounded by a highly concentrated or large ownership 
environment in the hands of family and government (Arshad et al., 2012). The foreign 
ownership structure is included because it is expected to exert more of a monitoring 
mechanism provided by outsiders or foreigners within Malaysian corporations. The 
following discussion reviews prior literature covering these three different types of 
ownership structure and its relation to the firm’s reporting disclosure. 
 
2.7.2.1 Family Ownership 
A study of corporate ownership structure of 27 countries around the world by La Porta 
et al. (1999) reveals that Asian countries with poor shareholder protection are usually 
owned by families or the state as opposed to large corporations in developed countries 
with very good shareholder protection, such as the US and UK. The dissimilarity of 
Asian firms from firms in the developed countries is found in the existence of a more 
concentrated ownership rather than dispersed ownership structure where family control 
is common in both small and established firms (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005). The 
controlling shareholders in family-controlled business groups often control the firms 
through pyramidal structures which are common in a country with poor investor 
protection. Family-controlled business groups have considerable participation in the 
management process and have the power to expropriate minority shareholders. Unlike 
western economies, many companies in East Asian countries are family-owned and 
family-managed or directed, with the major shareholders often also directors and 
managers (Ng, 1998; Ball et al., 2003). Concentration of ownership in the hands of 
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family members through pyramidal and cross-holding structures affects the nature of 
contracting, creating agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside 
shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002). 
 
There are two contrary views regarding the relationship between family firms and 
agency costs. On the one hand, most of existing literatures (Arshad et al., 2012; Silva 
and Majluf, 2008; Martinez et al., 2007; Perez-Gonzalez 2006; Anderson and Reeb 
2003) draws attention to the likelihood that concentrated ownership by family firms 
creates agency costs. Family firms might use their concentrated shareholding to fulfil 
their own interest by expropriating the wealth of other shareholders through spending 
firm resources such as excessive compensation. The management of family firms is 
also usually less effective and has a lower level of professionalisms since its wealth is 
undiversified. In addition, family firms tend to manage their firms too closely and be 
risk avoidant where they might follow strategies that favour family objectives, for 
example nominate members on the board of directors in favour of a family-owner 
whose interests are not aligned with other shareholders’ interests. 
 
On the other hand, concentrated family shareholdings may have incentive to reduce or 
lessen agency costs. This has been agreed by several other researchers (Wan Mohamad 
and Sulong, 2010; Silva and Majluf, 2008; Bartholomeusz and Tanewski, 2006) 
through a better alignment of manager and shareholders’ interests. As noted by 
previous researchers, Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) highlight several reasons 
that favour the notion that family firms as agents will reduce agency costs. The reasons 
include (i) family firms have more motivation to keep their assets as the company’s 
well-being in terms of costs and benefits are tied directly to the company’s good; (ii) 
family firms also have greater expertise, for example in terms of technical knowledge 
that places them in a better position to excellently monitor their business; (iii) family 
firms make every effort to maximize their long-term assets in order to protect the 
family’s goodwill and reputation; and (iv) since family firms are administered by 
family members, this  unique and exceptional relationship between family members on 
the board develops faithfulness, devotion and effective communication and decision 
making, which in turn reduces the agency costs. 
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In the context of voluntary disclosure, arguably, the problem of information asymmetry 
and opportunistic behaviour should be lessened due to the fact that the controlling 
power still remain one and the same as the company being in charged by family 
owners. According to Arshad et al. (2012), this controlling power is likely to occur 
because family members generally sit on prominent positions whether on the board of 
directors or in the management teams. Therefore, controlling owners have more access 
to internal information of the firm, and may not have to rely, to a greater extent, on 
public disclosure to manage their investment. Thus, it leads to low agency costs and 
reduced information asymmetry. In the same way, they limit their information 
disclosure to the public in order to prevent leakage of proprietary information to 
competitors as well as to avoid unwanted political and social scrutiny, but at the 
expense of minority shareholders. This exceptional family ownership engenders little 
demand for disclosure in excess of mandatory requirements. 
 
Previous studies (e.g., Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Chau and Gray, 2002; Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Chen and Jaggi, 2000) provide evidence that the presence of family 
members on the board gives little motivation to disclose voluntary information. This is 
because the demand for public disclosure in these closely held firms is relatively weak 
in comparison with companies that have wider ownership. For example, Ho and Wong 
(2001) find that the percentage of family members on the board is negatively related to 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong. Additionally, Chau and Gray (2002) 
observe a similar finding regarding strategic, financial and non-financial disclosure 
using a sample of listed companies in Hong Kong and Singapore. Chau and Gray 
(2002) argue that ‘the prevalence of family companies on a stock exchange may result 
in less demand for corporate disclosure than found in Anglo-American countries 
because the major providers of financing already have that information’. This signifies 
that while concentrated ownership in general reduces disclosure, that effect is 
specifically pronounced when the firm is family-controlled. Gray’s (1988) secrecy 
hypothesis also argues that where a firm’s shares are held by family-controlled firms, 
there is a preference for confidentiality and restriction of disclosure of information 
about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and 
financing.  
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Using Malaysian companies as a sample, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a significantly 
negative relationship between the proportion of family members on the board and the 
voluntary disclosure level. The demand for voluntary disclosure is less when there are 
many family members on the board as they have superior inside information. 
Moreover, similar findings between family-controlled firms and the voluntary 
disclosure level after the 1997 financial crisis is reported by Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006). Even after the crisis and the reformation of corporate governance, 
they argue that family-controlled companies still remain secretive which suggests they 
resist attempts to change their attitudes and preserve a tradition inherited from the past 
in relation to greater voluntary disclosure at the point of regulatory change. Arshad et 
al. (2012) conduct a similar study in Malaysia focusing on risk reporting disclosure. 
Their study was for the years 2008 and 2010, after the revision of the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance in 2007. Similarly, their findings imply that in the absence of 
mandatory risk reporting requirements, family owners still acknowledge the importance 
of risk management, which improves their decision-making.  
 
As reported in The World Bank Report (2005)
20
, an analysis of a sample of the ten 
largest companies by market capitalisation, shows that the five largest shareholders in 
these companies owned 60.4 percent of the outstanding shares and more than half of the 
voting shares. Additionally, the report provides evidence that 67.2 percent of shares 
were in family hands, 37.4 percent had only one dominant shareholder and 13.4 percent 
were state-controlled. Similarly, prior empirical studies also show that the amount of 
family shareholdings within Malaysian companies is large. Recently, a study by 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) showed that family ownership constitutes over 43 percent of 
the main board companies of Bursa Malaysia from 1999 through 2005. These statistics 
confirm that the amount of shares held by family members in Malaysia is significant. 
Such high ownership has led the dominant shareholding - family to make key decisions 
on their own like deciding risk information disclosure in annual reports. As a result, the 
agency problem in family-owned firms stems from the conflict of interest between 
owners/managers and minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
 
                                               
20
  See also Thillainathan (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000).  
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2.7.2.2 Government Ownership 
As mentioned before, concentrated ownership in the hands of government is a 
particular characteristic of companies in Malaysia (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). 
To date, government participation has emerged as an important force in corporate 
monitoring, serving as a mechanism to protect minority shareholders’ interests. 
Government ownership in this study is representing by the ownership of government 
instititutions
21
.  
 
Proponents of the active monitoring hypothesis believe that government has a greater 
incentive to actively monitor corporate disclosure practices due to the large ownership 
stake they have invested in firms. Government ownership is seen as a mechanism for 
limiting the costs and minimizing the information asymmetric arises from agency 
problem within corporations. Eng and Mak (2003) argue that government, in general, 
can utilize their resources for attaining information about the particular company from 
other sources. This sophisticated power of government could give advantage for them 
to gain easier access to different channels of financing than non-government ownership 
firms. Therefore, the presence of government as a major shareholder in a company 
could align information asymmetries, such as the imperfect information given to the 
investors about the value of the firm. 
 
Government ownership may also mitigate agency problems between shareholders and 
managers by creating some kind of pressure for companies. The pressure from 
government can help companies to disclose additional information (Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006) and reduce the expected costs and the negative impact on ﬁrm value 
(Said et al., 2009). This is because the government is accountable to the public at large 
and it is government’s task to restore corporate integrity and market confidence. 
Therefore, through additional disclosures the companies are showing to their 
shareholders that they are doing their part to solve the agency problems.  
 
                                               
21
 The government institutions include the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Khazanah Holding Berhad, 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), 
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pekerja (KWAP), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Kumpulan 
Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP), Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial (PERKESO) and state agencies which 
include agencies under the control of state. 
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In relation to firm’s reporting disclosure, prior empirical studies on the relationship 
between government ownership and firms’ reporting disclosure provide inconclusive 
evidences. In Singapore, a study by Eng and Mak (2003) examined the impact of 
ownership structure, namely government ownership on voluntary disclosure. In their 
study, Eng and Mak (2003) use two proxies for government ownership which are i) 
Singapore Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) and ii) the proportion of ordinary 
shares owned by the government. Using 158 firms listed on the Stock Exchange of 
Singapore, they conclude that both proxies of government ownership in their study are 
associated with increased firm disclosure. Eng and Mak (2003) argue that this 
positively significant association is consistent with the argument that disclosure could 
mitigate agency problems since the presence of government ownership increases moral 
hazards and agency problems. This positive association between government ownership 
and more extensive disclosure has been supported by a study done by Makhija and 
Patton (2004). They argued that the comprehensive disclosures allowed companies to 
signal the government’s commitment to achieve various objectives of minority 
shareholders and to gain society’s confidence.    
 
Several other studies have been within the Malaysian environment. Amran (2007) finds 
that companies with high a percentage of government shareholding tend to disclose 
more corporate social reporting disclosure compared to companies with low 
government shareholdings. Said et al. (2009) find that government ownership is the 
most significant variable that influences the extent of corporate social disclosure from 
annual reports and companies’ websites in Malaysian public listed companies. 
However, in terms of the effect of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, there are two 
different findings regarding the influence of government ownership in firms’ reporting 
disclosure. First, Mohd Nasir and Abdullah (2004), who examine the influence of 
financially-distressed firms in a post economic downturn period, support the 
government’s initiatives in promoting transparency. Using the matched healthy firms, 
they examine the annual reports for financial years 2000 and 2001.  Mohd Nasir and 
Abdullah (2004) further explain that voluntary disclosures levels in Malaysia are 
greater with the influence of the extent of government-linked companies’ 
shareholdings. On the other hand, a study by Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) 
looked at the Malaysian environment after the 1997 financial crisis in evaluating 
whether the regulatory reaction to the crisis increased the awareness of voluntary 
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disclosure. They concluded that, regardless of the disturbance of the economic crisis, 
the ownership by government is less influential and does not promote greater 
disclosure. Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) further argue that companies with 
major government shareholders are politically connected and in order to protect their 
political linkages they tend to disclose less information. 
 
In parallel to this study, Arshad et al. (2012) have undertaken a study regarding the 
influence of ownership structure on risk reporting practices in Malaysia. They examine 
the disclosure practices of 242 Malaysian listed companies relating to both the quantity 
and quality of risk reporting practices in the years 2008 and 2010. Their findings 
indicate that the amount of both quantity and quality of risk reporting made by 
Malaysian firms increased with the increase in government ownership within 
companies in both years. They thus conclude that it is necessary to have government as 
an owner, as companies have more incentives to make risk reporting disclosure.  
 
All in all, the presence of government ownership in companies is expected to establish 
a climate of greater public accountability and transparency. In order to maximize 
companies’ transparency, it is likely that the government prefers companies to make 
greater public disclosure. Beside the likelihood that ownership by government would 
increase firm’s share value, the government would choose to hold on to large stakes in 
firms that are perceived to have strategic value. Because of the public interest in these 
firms, it is expected that greater government ownership would result in more corporate 
risk disclosure.  
 
2.7.2.3 Foreign Ownership  
For decades, Malaysia has been receiving a lot of foreign direct investment to spur its 
economic growth (Athukorala, 2001). Once under the British rule of colonization, some 
Malaysian public listed companies continue to have foreign investors that remain 
dominant in their corporate ownership structure. Foreign equity ownership continues to 
play a crucial role in stimulating the economic growth of companies and the country. 
Moreover, foreign investors could enhance corporate governance practices, which taken 
together impacts significantly on the level of firms’ reporting disclosure.  
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Various theoretical and empirical studies have been undertaken by prior researchers in 
an attempt to study the relationship between foreign ownership and disclosure practices 
especially in developing countries, such as Zimbabwe (Mangena and Tauringana, 
2007), Kenya (Barako, 2007; Barako et al., 2006), India (Singhvi, 1968), China (Wang 
et al., 2008) and Malaysia (Ho, 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; 2002). These studies 
have indicated that the determination of corporate disclosure strategy of a firm is 
influenced by the presence of foreign ownership.   
 
An earlier study on this relationship by Singhvi (1968) reported that foreign ownership 
influences companies’ reporting practices in India. Later, Barako et al. (2006) also find 
that the levels of foreign ownership have a positive and significant influence on 
voluntary disclosure in Kenyan companies. Still using the Kenyan companies annual 
reports as a sample, Barako (2007) extends his previous studies by looking at the 
determinants of voluntary disclosures in four categories of disclosures, namely, general 
and strategic disclosure, financial disclosure, forward-looking disclosure and social and 
board disclosure. He examines the voluntary disclosure practices of listed companies in 
Kenya over a ten-year period from 1992 to 2001. From his longitudinal analysis, 
Barako (2007) finds that foreign ownership has a strong positive relationship to all the 
four categories. 
 
Mangena and Tauringana (2007) examine the association of foreign share ownership 
with ﬁrm-level disclosure and corporate governance structures in companies on the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. By using 118 annual reports of non-financial listed 
companies for years 2002 and 2003, they find that foreign ownership is positively and 
significantly related to all the determinants of disclosure and corporate governance 
tested in their study. Mangena and Tauringana (2007) argue that good corporate 
governance relates to high disclosure and high disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry. As high disclosure by companies will reduce the risk of trading loss by 
investors, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) conclude that foreign investors prefer to 
invest in companies with less information asymmetry, as well as companies with 
eﬀective corporate governance structures.  
 
Focusing on the Malaysian firms’ reporting disclosure perspective, two well-structured 
studies by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2005) documented strong 
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support for the fact that foreign ownership has a significantly positive association with 
the voluntary disclosure level and corporate social disclosure, respectively. Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) argue that there is a greater need for disclosure as a means by foreign 
owners to monitor the actions of management. Moreover, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) 
argue that corporate social disclosure within Malaysian companies can be a tool for a 
pre-emptive legitimating strategy focusing the effort to obtain continued capital inflow 
while delighting ethical investors. Ho (2008) finds that firms with a majority of foreign 
ownership have motivation to disclose in excess of mandatory requirements. Her 
findings indicate that the presence of foreign investors in a firm pushes firms to 
voluntarily disclose more information in annual reports in order to attract funds from 
foreign country investors. Consistent with previous research findings, it is possible that 
this group of investors can influence corporate risk disclosure practices of Malaysian 
listed companies.  
 
In developing countries such as Malaysia, foreign ownership plays an important role. 
According to Yudaeva et al. (2000), foreign ownership is appreciated by local firms as 
one of the ways of technologically upgrading. They argue that this upgrading can take a 
different form, such as, via direct import of new capital, or by replicating technologies 
of foreign-owned firms rather than producing their own ones.  Yudaeva et al. (2000) 
also argue that foreign ownership in developing capital market can help to increase the 
level of competition between local firms. At the same time, local firms might therefore 
compete with each other and be forced to quick restructure. In addition, Yudaeva et al. 
(2000) argue that in relation to the growth of developing economies, western 
managerial techniques can be the major sources and good prospect to be followed by 
local firms. One of these management techniques that could come from western 
ownership is higher corporate transparency including insights from providing corporate 
disclosure of various types of risk information. 
 
Abdul Samad (2004) finds that foreign shareholdings comprise of 5.01 percent in 
Malaysian public listed companies. However, the Malaysian government’s restriction 
on foreign ownership dictates that foreign investors can only hold up to 30 percent of a 
company’s shareholding. While the 30 percent foreign ownership cap still maintains, 
there has been an increase in foreigners’ stake in some business sectors following the 
liberalization rule. This economic liberalization of Malaysian stock markets allows for 
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greater foreign investment under the Securities Commission’s Capital Market Master 
Plan
22
 to participate in domestic stock markets.  
 
Many of the multinational companies incorporated in Malaysia, for example, Shell 
Refining Co. (Malaysia) and Nestle (Malaysia) Berhad are subsidiaries of huge 
corporations in foreign countries. The presence of foreigners as shareholders will 
increase monitoring of managers behaviour which could reduce the agency problem 
and information asymmetry. This is possible because of monitoring by foreign 
shareholders could influence the extent of information disclosure in order to meet 
foreign reporting requirements. Hence, foreign ownership can be a determinant in 
explaining the variability in risk information disclosure in the annual reports of 
Malaysian companies.  
 
2.8 VALUE RELEVANCE STUDIES: THE MODEL AND ITS RELATIONS TO 
CORPORATE REPORTING DISCLOSURE  
 
In this section, two areas of the literature of relevance to this study are reviewed. 
Section 2.8.1 focuses on the nature of the value relevance model and Section 2.8.2 
focuses on value relevance research that is specific to company disclosures. Reported 
disclosures, to some extent, are expected to influence investors’ perception of the value 
of a company.  
 
2.8.1 Value Relevance Model  
 
Since the major focus of ﬁnancial reporting is information for equity investment, value 
relevance models assess how well accounting numbers reﬂect accounting information 
used by equity investors (Barth et al., 2001). An ‘accounting number’ is defined as 
value relevant if it has a predicted association, whether positively or negatively, with 
stock prices (Barth et al., 2001). The objective of value relevance research is to relate 
annual financial statement figures to a measure of firm value, and to assess the relation 
of such information to the determination of value (Dahmash and Qabajeh, 2012). 
                                               
22
 The introduction of the Capital Market Master Plan (CMP) by the Securities Commissions (SC) in 
February 2001 is to chart the direction of the Malaysian capital market for the next ten years (2001 to 
2010).  
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Traditionally, earnings and book values are said to contribute to value relevance as 
these two accounting information items form the basis for Ohlson’s (1995) ‘clean 
surplus’ model. According to Collins et al. (1997), book values and earnings have been 
successfully shown as significant independent variables in explaining stock prices. In 
the ‘clean surplus’ relations between accounting numbers and market value of a firm, 
Ohlson (1995) argues that changes in the equity statement include the items in the 
balance sheet and income statement which are book value and earnings. Its formula 
requires a change in book value to equal earnings minus dividends (net of capital 
contribution).  
 
Accordingly, the relation between book value of equity, earnings and dividends can be 
expressed as follows:  
 
bvt = bvt-1 + xt – dt 
 
Where; 
 
bvt = book value of equity at date t 
xt = earnings for period t 
dt = dividends paid at date t 
 
 
Book value of equity at date t-1 multiplied by the risk free rate is considered as the 
normal earnings of the firm. Then the actual reported earnings for the period t minus 
the normal earnings can be defined as abnormal earnings (Ohlson, 1995; Dahmash and 
Qabajeh, 2012). 
 
X
a
t = xt - rbt 
 
Where; 
 
X
a
t = abnormal earnings for period t 
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Ohlson (1995) develops and analyses a model of a firm’s market value as it relates to 
contemporaneous and future earnings, book values and dividends. Ohlson’s (1995) 
appealing model of the relation between the firm’s market value and accounting 
numbers is based on the simple premise that the present market value of a firm equals 
the net present value of expected future dividends. Clean surplus accounting implies 
that the market value of the firm is equivalent to book value plus the net present value 
of future abnormal earnings and also that a linear model can be used to capture the 
market value influences of accounting information (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 
1999). Ohlson’s (1995) value relevance model satisfies many appealing properties and 
this model is used as a benchmark in conceptualising how market value relates to 
accounting data and other information. 
 
Ohlson’s (1995) Value Relevance Model 
 
Pt = α0 + α1bvt + α2x
a
t + α3Vt 
 
Where; 
 
α0 = Intercept 
Pt = market value of the firm’s share price at the end of the financial year t 
bvt = book value of the firm’s share equity at the end of the financial year t 
x
a
t = abnormal firm’s earnings per share at the end of the financial year t 
Vt = other information at the end of the financial year t 
 
The above model has a particular significance for this study, since objective four of this 
study applies the model with a certain modification. Details of the model are discussed 
in the next chapter (Chapter 3).  
 
The major purpose for conducting tests of value relevance is to assess the relevance of 
accounting numbers, rather than to assess the usefulness of the accounting numbers. 
According to Barth et al. (2001, p. 78): 
 
...value relevance studies are designed to assess whether particular accounting amounts 
reflect information that is used by investors in valuing firms’ equity. Because 
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‘‘usefulnes’’ is not a well-defined concept in accounting research, value relevance 
studies typically do not and are not designed to assess the usefulness of accounting 
amounts. 
  
2.8.2 Value Relevance of Firms’ Reporting Disclosure  
 
The nature of financial reporting and corporate information disclosure itself is critical 
for the functioning of an efficient capital market (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Wang et al. 
(2005) suggest that increases in firm value resulting from the increase in stock prices 
are a consequence of the informativeness of additional disclosure by firms. In business, 
increases in share prices are an obvious benefit of share ownership. The separation of 
companies' ownership from their control would result in a demand for corporate 
disclosure in order to reduce information asymmetry. Comprehensive and informative 
corporate disclosure also will enhance investors’ perception about the incremental 
value of information disclosed when comparing with others who do less disclosure in 
practice (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). In Malaysia where the 
level of ownership concentration is high, corporate disclosures could be a potentially 
important means of communication between management and large controlling 
shareholders. To the extent that large controlling shareholders focus on the objective of 
maximizing share prices, their interests are aligned with those of minority shareholders 
and at the same time will discipline the management to produce value-relevant 
information (Banghoj and Plenborg, 2008). 
 
An increase in public information disclosure usually leads to direct capital market 
benefits by increasing stock prices (Orens et al., 2009; Botosan 1997) or through 
indirect capital market benefits, such as improved analysts forecasts (e.g. Healy et al., 
1999) due to a reduction in informational asymmetry. Studies have shown improved 
quality of a firm’s reported disclosure enhances firm value by reducing the firm's cost 
of capital (Makhija and Patton, 2004; Botosan, 1997), increasing the actual cash flows 
that shareholders receive as a result of a reduction in agency problems (Lambert et al., 
2007) due to lower costs of monitoring (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
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On the other hand, an increase in information disclosure might also have a negative 
value, even if its production is costless to the company. This is because; according to 
Hassan et al. (2009, p. 81):  
 
investors may perceive themselves to be worse off if they consider that the company is 
disclosing information which might be exploited to their detriment. Investors might 
suspect or misinterpret the intentions of the company in providing more information to 
the market without an obligation to do so. 
 
In terms of value relevance of a firm’s financial information disclosure, there is a body 
of accounting research that examines the value relevance of information presented 
under financial reporting standards. The empirical evidence from this literature suggests 
that some financial reporting standards generate value relevance of accounting 
information. In particular, substantial studies have looked into the value relevance of 
financial instruments and derivatives disclosure in financial firms (e.g., Ahmed et al., 
2006; Wang et al., 2005; Barth et al., 1996; Eccher et al., 1996) as well as in non-
financial firms such as in Taiwan (e.g., Chen and Fu, 2012) and Malaysia (Hassan and 
Mohd Saleh, 2010). Another substantial body of research investigates the value 
relevance of capitalisation versus non-financial disclosure in presenting intangible 
assets such as research and development in corporate reports. However, the financial 
statements number are affected only by capitalisation and as such, markets may react 
differently for capitalisation compared to non-financial disclosure. Studies on this 
matter include among others, Aboody and Lev (1998), Barth and Clinch (1998), 
Espahbodi et al. (2002), Kallapur and Kwan (2004) and Ritter and Wells (2006). 
Another branch of accounting research examines the value relevance of value-at-risk 
disclosure (e.g., Lim and Tan, 2007). 
 
With regard of value relevance of non-financial information disclosure, some prior 
empirical studies have taken place in developed economies. These studies which 
examine the impact of the extent of non-financial information disclosure in general 
namely, voluntary disclosure, mandatory disclosure or both on the market value of 
companies, report a significant relationship (Botosan, 1997; Lang and Lundholm, 
2000). Studies related to value relevance of voluntary disclosures further contribute to 
the literature by examining whether companies in a setting with a modest level of 
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accounting regulation, fill out the information asymmetry through voluntary disclosure 
thereby improving investor protection. On the other hand, in emerging economies some 
empirical studies on this relationship have been developed such as in Taiwan (Sheu et 
al., 2010); Turkey (Uyar and Kilic, 2012); Jordan (Al-Akra and Ali, 2010) and Egypt 
(Hassan et al., 2009) that show the effect of general disclosure on market valuation. 
This indicates that when information is relevance, it is valued by the market (Hassan et 
al., 2011). 
 
Al-Akra and Ali (2010) in their study investigate the value relevance of voluntary 
disclosure in Jordan. They employ panel data for 243 firm-year annual reports to show 
the relationship between voluntary disclosures and firm value. They argue that 
enhanced voluntary disclosure levels of Jordanian listed companies are rewarded with 
higher valuations by the market over a nine year period, from 1996 to 2004.  
 
Uyar and Kilic (2012) further support the findings in Al-Akra and Ali (2010). In their 
study, they examine whether listed Turkish companies’ voluntary disclosure practices 
are value relevant in the capital market. Their model focus on a sample consisting of 
129 manufacturing companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange for the year 2010. 
They find that voluntary disclosure is value-relevant in its impact on firm value. This 
implies that market participants place value on voluntary disclosure. According to Uyar 
and Kilic (2012), by this result, it should be like a signal for companies to disclose 
more information to investors.  
 
Banghoj and Plenborg (2008) on the other hand, conduct a study in Denmark focusing 
on the voluntary disclosure by Danish companies. The study was for the year 1996 to 
2000 which documented that the level of disclosure increased by approximately 40 
percent during these periods. Despite an increased level of voluntary disclosure, 
Banghoj and Plenborg (2008) find that the higher level of voluntary disclosure from 
annual reports reduces the association between current stock returns and future 
earnings. Similarly, their findings indicate that voluntary information in the annual 
report may not contain value-relevant information about future earnings or 
alternatively, investors are not capable of incorporating information in the firm value 
estimates.  
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Hassan et al. (2009) make a comparative analysis of the value relevance of voluntary 
and mandatory disclosures, in a market that applies International Financial Reporting 
Standards with limited penalties for non-compliance. Their findings indicate that 
mandatory disclosures have a highly significant negative relationship with firm value. 
Hassan et al. (2009) argue that investors may interpret the high levels of risk 
disclosures as an adverse signal about the future value of the company based on insider 
information known by management which emphasizes the complex interplay of factors 
determining disclosure effects. Further, their results show that voluntary disclosures 
have a positive but insignificant association with firm value. They thus conclude that 
risk disclosure can increase or decrease firm value depending on the complex interplay 
of a number of possibly conflicting factors.  
 
Specifically, in an attempt to evaluate the value relevance of non-financial information 
of corporate disclosure, other studies utilize specific non-financial information as 
variables. This includes among others, non-financial performance information such as 
population size, market penetration, customer satisfaction and balanced score card 
(Amir and Lev, 1996; Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Banker et al., 2000; Riley Jr. et al., 
2003; Coram and Monroe, 2004), intellectual capital information (Anam et al., 2011; 
Orens et al., 2009), patent quality information (Hirschey et al., 2001), compensation 
information (Sheu et al., 2010), corporate social responsibility information (Richardson 
et al., 1999) as well as information security (Gordon et al., 2010). 
 
In addition, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) suggest however that the type of disclosure is 
crucial to any analysis as the market responds differently to different types of 
disclosure. Of relevance to this study is the focus on value relevance of corporate risk 
disclosure. Similar to other types of disclosure, incentives for managers to produce 
corporate risk information within their firms also derive from capital market forces. 
Solomon et al. (2000) added that most of the investors agree that increased risk 
disclosure would help them in making rational future investment decisions. Their study 
also notes that share prices are potentially important in measuring investors’ evaluation 
on both mandatory and voluntary risk information disclosure in annual reports. 
 
Uddin and Hassan (2011) examine the degree of the effect of corporate risk disclosure 
on the level of stock volatility (AEVOL) and investors' market risk (BETA). Drawn on 
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49 UAE corporations listed on Dubai financial market and Abu Dhabi stock market for 
the year 2005, Uddin and Hassan (2011) suggest that more disclosure of corporate risk 
information may increase investment uncertainty. Hence, stock volatility increases. 
Additional risk information disclosure may attract investors and help them to manage 
risk in their portfolio as well as minimize the market risk. However, Uddin and Hassan 
(2011) argue that with the additional risk information, disclosure will deteriorate the 
beta. They further argue that excess and unnecessary information is not useful for 
reducing stock volatility and market risk.  
 
Similarly, Ismail et al. (2012) test the relationship between quantity and quality of 
voluntary risk disclosure and firm value in Malaysia for 2006 and 2009. As proxies by 
share price and Tobin’s Q, they find that quantity of voluntary risk disclosure and 
quality of voluntary risk disclosure are positively significant and negatively significant 
to firm market value in both years, respectively. With support of prior studies, Ismail et 
al. (2012) argue that qualitative voluntary risk disclosure might not give benefits to 
firms. In addition, they conclude that proprietary information contained in voluntary 
risk information might be inappropriate to publicly disclosed in annual reports although 
it would help to enhance investors’ confidence and mitigate agency problems.  
 
In summary, prior empirical studies on the relationship between corporate disclosures 
of non-financial information and firm value indicate mixed findings. Managers are 
motivated by reputation and contracting considerations to increase firm value. This 
creates an incentive to release information to the market. The reason is that more risk 
information increases investor confidence in the firm, with the result that the market 
price of its shares will raise. Therefore, most prior studies argue that revealing more 
public information could safeguard investors’ confidence in the firm. However, several 
other studies contend that more enlightening reporting disclosure due to additional 
information will create uncertainty about the future prospects of a company, thus firm 
value will decrease. According to Uyar and Kilic (2012), there is still a scarcity of 
studies regarding how the market perceives voluntary disclosure. Hence, the effect of 
corporate disclosures upon firm value is still an open empirical issue. In this study, the 
relationship of regulated and non-regulated risk disclosure to firm value will be further 
investigated. 
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2.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In closing, this chapter provides a comprehensive review of the key corporate 
disclosure literature. This chapter has covered different areas including the debate on 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure, the disclosure principle, signalling theory, the 
proprietary cost theory, overview of corporate risk disclosure, upper echelons theory 
and manager-specific characteristics, agency theory and ownership characteristics and 
the impact of disclosure on the company’s value. The prior research highlighted in this 
chapter suggests that managers have incentives whether or not to disclose enough 
information to serve the necessity for various user groups (especially investors). The 
gap in reporting between companies and investors is a cause of real interest on the 
ground that disclosure is critical for the success of capital markets. Companies are put 
under pressure to disclose reliable and relevant information in order to reduce investor 
uncertainties hence improving the transparency of reporting. On top of that, mandatory 
and voluntary disclosures, the disclosure principle, signalling theory, proprietary cost 
theory were discussed primarily in order to generate the first hypothesis in this study. 
 
Moreover, there has been an increasing demand for company information by investors. 
After reviewing the literature, it can be inferred that there are several internal 
(management characteristics, ownership structures) and external (market perception, 
economic environment, competition) factors affecting a firm’s activities and reporting. 
The rapid transformations in economic activities, competition and technologies as well 
as the growing globalisation of financial markets have certainly exposed companies to a 
greater attention of information by investors. To survive and compete, companies are 
adjusting many things and one of them is the way they managed their risks, which will 
include not only risk management strategies and policies but also risk disclosure 
decisions. In terms of this latter point, the relevant previous studies that examined the 
relationship between disclosure and firm value have been discussed and presented in 
this chapter. This literature provides mixed results and suggests the need for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two main objectives of this chapter. The first objective is to explain the 
empirical schema of the study and develop testable hypotheses in relation to corporate 
risk disclosure, based on arguments and findings identified in the preceding chapter.  
The second objective is to explain the process of how the sample is gathered and the 
data is measured and analysed in the study to test the hypotheses developed.  To meet 
this second objective, the study uses a content analysis approach to extracting and 
categorizing secondary data available from corporate annual reports.  
 
Based on the review of prior literature in the preceding chapter, Section 3.2 presents 
and discusses the conceptual framework of the study. Following the conceptual 
framework, the relevant hypotheses are then developed. Section 3.3 discusses the 
arguments behind the development of each specific hypothesis. This section is divided 
into two parts, namely determinants of corporate risk disclosure and value relevance of 
corporate risk disclosure. Section 3.4 presents how samples are selected in the study. 
Section 3.5 provides an explanation of the measures used for the dependent variable 
followed by an explanation of the measures used for independent variables and control 
variables in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 provides an explanation of the statistical analysis 
used in order to test the hypotheses proposed in the study. The chapter ends in Section 
3.8 with a summary and conclusions. 
 
3.2 EMPIRICAL SCHEMA 
 
To recap, the objective of this study is to determine whether upper echelons’ cognitive 
characteristics underlying observable characteristics of top management and external 
agency features of ownership structures,  have an influence on corporate risk disclosure 
and, in turn, whether this disclosure has value-relevance in the share market in 
Malaysia. Figure 3.1 gives a diagrammatic representation of the empirical schema on 
which this empirical study is designed. This schema depicts the relationships between 
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the theories, variables, research questions and hypotheses of this study. It presents a 
picture of the influence of management and shareholders on the extent of corporate 
disclosure of various categories of risk. It categorizes factors influencing the level of 
risk disclosures into three perspectives: upper echelons perspective, agency (ownership) 
perspective and other (context-specific) perspectives. Under these respective 
perspectives, this study examines the relationship between the manager-specific 
characteristics (age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity), ownership 
structures (family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership), other 
factors (company size, leverage, auditor size and industry classifications) and corporate 
risk disclosure.  
 
Figure 3.1:  
Empirical Schema of Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first box in column 3 invokes the upper echelons theoretical perspective. This 
perspective uses manager-specific characteristics to provide evidence of cognitive 
characteristics underlying observable demographic measures of powerful management 
players. These cognitive characteristics could affect the company’s decisions on risk 
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reporting disclosure. Two of the most powerful management players in risk reporting 
decision-making are expected to be the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chair of 
Audit Committee (CAC). In this study, two possible dimensions of cognitive 
characteristics that underlie the risk disclosure thinking of the CEO and CAC, as noted 
in psychology and behavioural decision making literatures, are risk attitudes and 
confidence. Risk attitudes and confidence clearly matter in corporate risk disclosure 
choices involving decisions about whether or not to disclose risk information in times 
of greater uncertainty. Such greater uncertainty is built into the context of this study by 
sampling 2009 data – a time of heightened volatility in capital markets due to the global 
financial crisis. Therefore, it is expected that a risk-averse management, led by the CEO 
and CAC, will seek to make less corporate risk disclosure than a risk-seeking 
management. Risk-averse managers can be defined in terms of the extent to which 
managers dislike risk and are willing to avoid it. Confidence on the other hand, refers to 
a person’s ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘assuredness’ about his/her own ability and knowledge 
(Reber et al., 2009). Though in psychology, people are relatively overconfident when 
they overestimate the accuracy and believing their own knowledge to be more effective 
than it is in reality (Reber et al., 2009); there is still considerable logical variation 
across individuals in the level of overconfidence. An overconfident or aggressive CEO 
and CAC may make more risk disclosure because he/she overestimates his/her aptitude 
to confront potential future reversals reflected in the disclosure of risk information of 
the company. Thus, it is expected that a more overconfident or aggressive CEO or CAC 
is likely to make more risk disclosure than a less overconfident or conservative CEO or 
CAC. 
 
The second box in column 3 invokes agency theory in terms of the relationship between 
owners and managers. As corporate disclosure varies across institutional environments 
and reflects differences in ownership patterns, this study also includes the ownership 
structure of companies in its empirical schema. Ownership structure can reflect 
institutional characteristics of governance and provide evidence of the strength of the 
principal’s (controlling shareholders) influence on the monitoring role of agents 
(management and auditors) in corporate governance systems which could affect the 
company’s reporting of risk. The motives and traditions of the controlling shareholders 
can differ depending on whether they are family-based shareholders, government-based 
shareholders or foreign shareholders.  
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The third box in column 3 depicts context-specific variables and that will be treated as 
control variables in this study. Based on prior studies, context-specific factors are 
included as they have been shown to have an impact on corporate risk disclosure 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 2006). These factors can include company 
size and leverage, auditor size and industry classification. 
 
Finally, the third box in column 2 refers to the impact of risk disclosure on the firm’s 
value. Corporate disclosure generally involves benefits and costs. However, the extent 
to which increased disclosure benefits companies (e.g. reduced information asymmetry, 
can improve company value to shareholders) depends on the degree of relevance of this 
external disclosure. Since managers have incentives to make self-serving voluntary 
disclosure, it is unclear whether capital markets treat such additional disclosure as 
having value relevance (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Ismail et al. (2012) find partial 
support for the relationship between corporate risk disclosure and the firm’s market 
value using pre global financial crisis data. Therefore, this study will examine the 
impact of corporate risk disclosure on the company’s market value as a test of the value 
relevance of the risk information disclosed to investors and securities analysts.  
 
3.3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.3.1 Determinants of Corporate Risk Disclosure 
 
3.3.1.1 Manager-Specific Characteristics 
3.3.1.1.1 Age  
Upper echelons theory suggests that a manager’s age can affect his/her values, 
cognitive styles and thus his/her decisions (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Psychology 
and finance research has found that risk aversion (regarding investment in risky assets) 
appears to increase with age (e.g., Palsson, 1996). In other words, older managers are 
expected to be less aggressive in their accounting choices relative to younger managers. 
There are three likely explanations. First, older managers are already established and 
obtain their place in society and this advantage will therefore make them continue to 
choose a strategy that helps them maintain this position. Younger managers on the 
other hand, it is contended, prefer risky strategies that will induce more benefits in 
terms of making their mark with the public. Second, older managers have greater 
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psychological commitment to the organizational status quo (Child, 1974). Third, older 
managers ‘may be at a point in their lives at which financial security and career security 
are important’ (Hambrick and Mason, 1984, p. 198). Therefore, any risky actions that 
might disrupt their positions are generally avoided (Carlsson and Karlsson, 1970).  
 
The association between the age of top executives and organizational characteristics has 
yielded consistent results: managerial youth is associated with corporate growth (Child, 
1974) and with the volatility of profitability (Hart and Mellons, 1970). An empirical 
study by Palsson (1996) finds that age is associated with greater risk aversion in 
portfolio holdings. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) reported that older managers choose 
lower levels of corporate expenditures, lower leverage and larger cash holdings, 
consistent with conservatism. Since risk disclosure is a costly undertaking, these 
arguments suggest that older CEOs and CACs may develop more conservative and risk 
averse disclosure for fear such disclosures may prove inaccuracy.  
 
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H02A: There is an inverse relationship between the age of CEO and corporate risk 
disclosure. 
H02B: There is an inverse relationship between the age of CAC and corporate risk 
disclosure. 
 
3.3.1.1.2 Functional Track  
Hambrick and Mason’s (1984, p. 200) upper echelons theory suggests a manager’s 
primary functional track affects his/her choices because ‘career experiences partially 
shape the lenses through which they view current strategic opportunities and problems.’ 
In other words, managers adopt strategies that fit their personal and hands-on 
experience. Hambrick and Mason (1984) classified functional track into ‘output 
functions’ and ‘throughput functions’. Output functions are functions such as 
marketing, sales and research and development (R&D). Throughput functions are 
functions such as production, process engineering and accounting. In this study, the 
categorisations of each function are broader with the inclusion of other related items as 
explained in the preceding chapter (refer to Chapter 2).  
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As the output function is often associated with risk and uncertainty, it may be 
concluded that output managers are more aggressive risk-takers than throughput 
managers. Gupta (1984) argue that entrepreneur with output functions are likely better 
to deal with an uncontrolled environment and uncertainty than those with other types of 
functions. In relation to this study, these output types of managers are expected to 
disclose more risk information. Managers with a throughput background and work 
function may adopt a conservative disclosure stance as they are considered less tolerant 
of ambiguity (Holland, 1997). In a similar vein, Bamber et al. (2010) who studied 
voluntary earnings-related disclosure found that disclosure styles of managers promote 
from accounting and finance disciplines are associated with fewer but more precise 
disclosures. This is deemed to reflect the element of conservatism. Since corporate risk 
disclosure is a complex task which has an impact on the entire organization, throughput 
function-experienced CEOs and CACs are not expected to disclose more risk 
information.  
 
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H03A: There is an inverse relationship between the CEO background in 
throughput functions and corporate risk disclosure. 
H03B: There is an inverse relationship between the CAC background in 
throughput functions and corporate risk disclosure. 
 
3.3.1.1.3 Education 
Another key demographic determinant of disclosure practice is educational 
background. To some degree, education indicates a person’s knowledge and skill base. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) find that a manager is likely to adopt innovative activities 
and lean more towards risk-taking tendencies if he/she is more educated. With respect 
to educational background, this study will examine whether managers have a 
professional accounting qualification and/or Master of Business Administration 
(MBA). One of these two particular educational achievements is likely common during 
the career path of a top management position and is potentially associated with risk 
attitudes. In this study, the two career paths that have been envisage are: i) those who 
have professional qualifications in accounting for example (to name a few) member of 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), member of Association of Chartered 
Accountants, member of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountant (ACCA) 
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and member of the Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) that 
eventually hold the CEO or CAC position; and ii) those who obtain an MBA 
qualifications that eventually leads to the CEO or CAC position. It is expected that top 
management with professional accounting qualifications or MBA qualifications will 
have better knowledge of professional ethics (Ge et al., 2009) therefore will 
appropriately be mattered with transparency and be inclined  to support more disclosure 
of corporate  risk information.  
 
Empirical studies using managers education (i.e. MBA qualification) as a determinant 
have found that mutual fund managers who have an MBA take more risk through 
holding portfolios with higher systematic risk (Chevalier and Ellison, 1999) and 
managers with MBAs make more aggressive resource allocation decisions (Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003). Assuming the disclosure of risk information may bring uncertainties 
to the firm, the CEO and CAC of a firm would have capabilities to evaluate prospective 
risk disclosure and to assume varying degrees of uncertainties depending on their 
educational background.  
 
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H04A: There is a positive relationship between the CEO holding a professional 
accounting qualification and/or a Master of Business Administration (MBA) and 
corporate risk disclosure. 
H04B: There is a positive relationship between the CAC holding a professional 
accounting qualification and/or a Master of Business Administration (MBA) and 
corporate risk disclosure. 
 
3.3.1.1.4 Tenure 
According to Simsek (2007), long-tenured CEO is considered as an expert and is 
observed to have deeper knowledge of the firm’s environment which depends on the 
extent to which the CEO has been integrated into the contacts of key stakeholders’ 
network. Moreover, with a long tenure, it helps and enables the CEO to support risky 
initiatives, therefore, better influence the disclosure of risk information. Shorter-tenured 
CEOs on the other hand are noted to evaluate risk disclosure ineffectively because of 
lack of sufficient firm-specific knowledge (Simsek, 2007).  
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Hambrick and Fukutomi’s (1991) integrative model suggests that long-tenured CEOs 
become devoted to their paradigm and avoid information that disconfirms this 
paradigm. Because of reluctance to change behaviour, long-tenured CEOs can be 
expected to commit to the status quo. Based on Miller and Shamsie (2001), Simsek 
(2007) additionally suggests that long tenures may give rise to risk avoidance and 
aversion. As a result, long-tenured CEOs and CACs will disclose less risk information. 
Short-tenured managers on the other hand may choose a more risky strategy in order to 
build up the relationship with shareholders.  
 
Although there are counter arguments about the direction of the relationship between 
length of tenure and risk disclosure, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H05A: There is an inverse relationship between the tenure of CEO and corporate 
risk disclosure.  
H05B: There is an inverse relationship between the tenure of CAC and corporate 
risk disclosure.  
 
3.3.1.1.5 Ethnicity 
Upper echelons theory suggests that socio-economic background of senior executives 
can affect their decisions. In multiracial countries like Malaysia, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002) argue that it is important to acknowledge the social values when each of the 
racial groups has chosen to maintain its own ethnic identity and value.  A multiracial 
society in Malaysia comprises of two main groups, i.e. Malay and Chinese.  While 
Malays form the majority ethnic group, the Chinese have always been the most 
economically prominent in Malaysia (which is in the higher socio-economic group). 
Beside these two main ethnic groups, there are other minority ethnic group in Malaysia 
i.e. Indian.  
 
Therefore, socio-economic background in this study is referring to the ethnic group i.e. 
Malay (Bumiputera), Chinese and Indian. In addition, this study also includes non-
Malaysians to reflect the position of a CEO and CAC in which they are sometimes 
being held by foreigners especially in the foreign-owned companies. Studies by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002, 2005) reported that Malay-dominated boards are positively related to 
voluntary disclosure and corporate social disclosure in Malaysia. They suggest that 
Bumiputera firms use voluntary and corporate social disclosures as legitimating 
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strategy to compel various interest groups, including ensuring a continued influential 
voice at both institutional and government levels. Yatim et al. (2006) document 
evidence that Bumiputera-controlled firms practice favourable corporate governance 
practices relative to their non-Bumiputera counterparts. In relation to this study, no 
other study in the Malaysian context has tested the influence of ethnic domination on 
corporate risk disclosure. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H06A: There is a positive relationship between the Bumiputera ethnicity of CEO 
and corporate risk disclosure.  
H06B: There is a positive relationship between the Bumiputera ethnicity of CAC 
and corporate risk disclosure.  
 
3.3.1.2 Ownership Characteristic 
3.3.1.2.1 Family Ownership 
In a study on ownership around the world, La Porta et al. (1999) document that family 
shareholdings are rather rare in the US and the UK, nonetheless family-controlled firms 
are often form part in Asian region. For both small and established firms in Asia in 
which mostly controlled by family members are known as family firms (Mak and 
Kusnadi, 2005). A high proportion of family members on the board may indicate the 
existence of a dominant group that could strongly influence the board’s decision (Mohd 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). They also suggest that with substantial ownership, these 
family-controlled firms are able to nominate family members to sit on the board so as to 
protect their interests.  
 
Over the long-term period, family owners may obtain several advantages as compared 
to other type of shareholders. First, Chen et al. (2008) argue that family owners may 
have a longer investment horizon. After considering existing studies (e.g. Kasznik, 
1999; McNichols and Trueman, 1994), Chen et al. (2008, p.505) conclude that 
‘...founding families, with longer investment horizons, likely face more potential costs 
than benefits from disclosure of timely information...’, therefore, they prefer less 
disclosure. This view has also been supported by Choi et al. (2007, p.953) who argue 
that ‘...despite initial entrepreneurial contributions of the founders, it appears that 
continuing to keep the firm ownership and management as family affairs has more costs 
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than benefits’. They find a negative and significant effect of family holdings on firm 
performance. Second, Chen et al. (2008) also argue that family owners are usually 
more actively involved in firm management by serving as executives and/or directors. 
Thus, family owners have better monitoring of management since they have better 
access to information, which lead to lower disclosure to public. Similarly, a study by 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) suggest that family firms create agency costs in 
corporate governance structures in a manner that the structures are inconsistent with 
maximizing the company’s value. While Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) suggest 
that family firms reduce agency costs to the owners through less separation from 
management, they also create agency costs to the equity market by expropriating from 
the firm for private benefit. 
 
Studies by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) report a 
negative significant coefficient between the proportion of family members on the board 
and the extent of voluntary disclosures in the annual report of Malaysian companies. 
Ho and Wong (2001) also find the same results for Hong Kong listed companies. In 
relation to risk reporting practices, a recent study by Arshad et al (2012) concludes an 
insignificant influence of family ownership companies in Malaysia. Up till now, there 
are relatively limited studies from Malaysia that examine the relationship between 
family ownership and corporate risk disclosure. Earlier studies (e.g. Chau and Gray, 
2002; Wallace and Naser, 1995) advocate that closely held and controlled companies 
are less likely to provide extensive information in annual reports. In comparison to 
companies with diffused ownership, family-controlled firms are likely to be less 
motivated or have less incentive to voluntarily disclose proprietary information. Given 
the lower degree of conflict of interest with the fact that many family members sit on 
the board, there would be less prerequisite for voluntary disclosure as they have high 
access to inside information. Hence, this would be a stepping stone to study their 
influence in relation to corporate risk disclosure.  
 
Accordingly, the study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H07: There is an inverse relationship between the degree of family ownership and 
corporate risk disclosure.  
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3.3.1.2.2 Government Ownership 
Government ownership of shares is a particular feature of Malaysian companies, 
largely where the government retains shares in privatized companies. Given 
government is relatively influential in nature; it has considerable power to monitor the 
managers of government-owned companies more closely than shareholders of diffusely 
held private corporations (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001).  Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman (2006) and Mohd Ghazali (2007) explain that ownership by government 
institutions or government-controlled bodies may create some kind of pressure for 
companies to disclose additional information because the government is accountable to 
the public at large. In other words, this government ownership might provide a control 
mechanism that can actually perform as a substitute for effective corporate governance 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004).  
 
The control mechanism by government again, could help in disciplining management’s 
self-interest behavior to be more in line with their company’s objectives. Eng and Mak 
(2003) argued that agency costs are higher in government-linked companies (GLCs) 
because of conflicting objectives between the goals of pure profit and the interests of 
the state. They find that, because of these conflicting objectives and the government’s 
vested interests in these companies, the must for disclosure to mitigate these problems 
is greater. In a similar vein, studies by Mohd Ghazali (2007) and Said et al (2009) show 
that Malaysian companies disclose more corporate social responsibility in their annual 
reports when shares are owned by government agencies. In other words, the presence of 
government may force management's tendency to disclose information. Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) suggest that government-owned corporations may disclose more to 
reflect the state's commitment to transparency and corporate governance reform. Hence, 
there may be greater disclosure for the government-owned companies than non-
government-owned companies. 
 
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H08: There is a positive relationship between the degree of government ownership 
and corporate risk disclosure. 
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3.3.1.2.3 Foreign Ownership  
Agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983) suggests that as the number of shareholders 
increases and ownership becomes more dispersed, monitoring costs will increase.  
Additionally, foreign ownership could mitigate agency problems through incentives 
that align the interests of managers and investors (Hingorani et al., 1997).  
 
Prior studies show that there is a positive association between foreign listing status and 
the extent of voluntary disclosure. For example, Meek and Gray (1989) find that 
continental European multinational corporations listed on the London Stock Exchange 
voluntarily disclose information in excess of what was required under London Stock 
Exchange rules. Likewise, Hossain et al. (1994) documented the evidence that 
Malaysian multinationals listed on London Stock Exchange voluntarily disclose more 
information in their annual reports than companies listed only on local stock exchanges. 
Ferguson et al. (2002) report that Chinese firms quoted on several stock exchanges 
make more information disclosure. Equally, previous studies by Singhvi (1968) and 
Xiao et al. (2004) find that majority ownership by foreigners encourages information 
disclosure in India and China, respectively.  In the Malaysian setting, Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002) find a significant positive relationship between the proportion of foreign 
ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure.  
 
Given the geographical separation of owners and management, company management 
may be inclined to voluntarily provide more information in annual reports (Barako et 
al., 2006). Besides, the presence of foreign ownership as part of the control mechanism 
hopefully can add value to firm risk disclosure as evidenced by previous researchers in 
related disclosure studies (Schipper, 1981; Bradbury, 1992; Craswell and Taylor. 
1992). This is because the high proportion of shares held by foreign-owned firms will 
increase pressure on local firms to have good corporate disclosure. Higher disclosure 
should also be expected as substantial funding in the Malaysian capital market comes 
from foreign investors. Thus, ownership by foreigners can be a significant determinant 
of the level of corporate risk disclosure. 
 
Therefore, the study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H09: There is a positive relationship between the degree of foreign ownership and 
the corporate risk disclosure.  
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3.3.2 Value Relevance of Total Risk Disclosure 
 
Ball and Brown (1968) evaluated the informativeness of accounting numbers by 
looking at stock market reaction to the release of accounting data. As explained in the 
previous chapter, there has been a plethora of studies examining the association of 
financial reporting disclosure with equity values that either enhance or detract from this 
association which is referred to in the literature as value relevance.  
 
This study particularly focuses on the value relevance of information contained in 
corporate risk disclosure on a firm’s value in the Malaysian capital market. In the 
context of broader corporate disclosure, a study by Hassan et al. (2009) found that 
mandatory disclosure has a highly significant but negative relationship with firm value 
while voluntary disclosure has a positive but insignificant association with firm value. 
Focusing on the corporate risk disclosure only, a study by Ismail et al. (2012) found 
that the quantity of voluntary risk disclosure is positively significant to the firm’s 
market value, while quality of voluntary risk disclosure is negatively significant in its 
relation to firm market value. However, there is still a limited understanding of whether 
the types of corporate risk disclosure, namely regulated risk disclosure and non-
regulated risk disclosure affect the market value of the firm. It is considered that, if the 
market (i.e. investors) places value on the types of corporate risk disclosure of a firm, 
then the value of the firm will increase. Hence, corporate risk disclosure should be 
significantly and positively related to the firm’s market value.  
 
Therefore, the hypotheses of this study are that: 
H10A:  Total risk disclosure is positively related to the firm’s market value. 
H10B:  Regulated risk disclosure is positively related to the firm’s market value. 
H10C: Non-regulated risk disclosure is positively related to the firm’s market 
value. 
 
3.4 SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
The initial sample of the study consists of the 200 top listed companies based on market 
capitalization listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia for the year 2009. This year 
has been chosen for the following reasons. First, 2009 follows an episode of significant 
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stock market decline and economic instability, therefore may coincide with listed firms 
placing greater importance on their decisions about risk disclosure. Second, a sample 
drawn in 2009 provides an update for comparison with prior findings on risk disclosure 
by Malaysian public listed companies from studies undertaken in the Malaysian context 
for the years 2005 till 2008 (Amran et al., 2009; Ismail and Abdul Rahman, 2011). As 
evidenced by previous literature, this study chooses large companies because they are 
more likely to disclose risk information (e.g., Deumes and Knechel, 2008; Abraham 
and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004). These 
literatures have observed a positive association between risk disclosure level and firm 
size. In Malaysia, licensed institutions such as commercial banks, finance companies, 
merchant banks and money brokers are regulated under the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act (BAFIA), 1989. Due to different statutory requirements and materially 
different types of operations, all banks, insurance and unit trust companies were 
excluded from the population of interest (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Hanniffa 
and Cooke, 2002).  After eliminating 21 financial companies, the sample size was 
reduced to 179 non-financial companies (Table 3.1). 
 
The data collected for this study comprises two categories:  dependent and independent 
variables. The first dependent variable is corporate risk disclosure
23
 measured using the 
content analysis method. This corporate risk disclosure will be used as an independent 
variable later to measure its value relevance to investors. The second dependent 
variable is share prices
24
 measured based on the share price of companies for the year 
ended 2009. The independent variables consist of manager-specific characteristics, 
ownership characteristics, book value of net assets and earnings per share. Corporate 
risk disclosure data has been collected from the sampled companies’ annual reports. 
Information pertaining to manager-specific characteristics and ownership 
characteristics has been manually-collected by examining the disclosures made in 
annual reports available on the Bursa Malaysia website (www.bursamalaysia.com). 
Information pertaining to financial data has been collected from the OSIRIS database 
and annual reports. 
 
 
                                               
23
 This dependent variable (risk disclosure) will be used for hypotheses one until nine  in this study. 
24
 This dependent variable (share price) will be used for hypothesis ten in this study. 
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Table 3.1:  
Derivation of Sample 
 TOTAL 
Bursa Malaysia Top Public Listed Companies by Market Capitalization, 2009 200 
Less:  
Banks, insurance and unit trust 21 
 179 
Less:  
Companies with incomplete data (unavailable 2009 annual report and    
unavailable manager-specific and financial data) 
51 
Final sample 128 
 
Further, 51 companies have been excluded as the required manager-specific and 
financial data was not available, resulting in a final sample of 128 non-financial 
companies listed on seven sectors
25
 of Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board in 2009.  
Therefore, the final sample with complete data for corporate risk disclosure, manager-
specific characteristics and ownership characteristics was 128 firm observations. The 
total sample of 128 in this study is considered reasonable as a similar study of this 
nature was conducted with a sample of 87 (Mohd Ghazali and Weetman, 2006) and 100 
(Amran et al., 2009).  
 
Besides, disclosure is also industry-specific (e.g., Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). 
Manufacturing companies disclose more information than non-manufacturing firms 
(e.g., Cooke, 1992; Raffournier, 1995). The sample in this study (Table 3.2) will cover 
different industries, thus this will lessen the negative effect of the size on the sample 
selection. Different industries are likely to display different pattern of disclosure. 
Therefore this would allow for comparison between industries (Amran et al., 2009). 
 
 
 
                                               
25
 There are 13 sectors quoted on the main board of Bursa Malaysia (i.e. industrial sector, consumer 
sector, trading/services sector, construction sector, plantations sector, finance sector, infrastructure 
project companies (IPC) sector, hotels sector, properties sector, mining sector, technology sector, closed 
end fund sector, reits sector). 
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Table 3.2: 
 Industry Representation of the Sample Companies 
 NUMBER OF 
COMPANIES 
% 
Trading/Services 42 32.8 
Industrial product  34 26.6 
Consumer product 26 20.3 
Construction 9 7.0 
Properties 7 5.5 
Plantations 6 4.7 
Infrastructure and Technology 4 3.1 
Total 128 100.0 
 
In the social science research, there are two different approaches that can be undertaken 
to resolving empirical research problems – the qualitative approach and the quantitative 
approach. As far as this study is concerned, the latter approach (which is under the 
mainstream research model for accounting disclosure) is used with regards of the 
research questions being addressed to achieve the findings. In this thesis, the subject of 
the research is the determinants of company annual report disclosure content; hence, 
this is ‘primary data’ research in that it directly employs the materials from company 
annual reports. Companies’ annual reports are sourced and analysed to measure 
corporate risk disclosure. Other than corporate risk disclosure, data in this study is 
secondary in nature collected from corporate annual reports and financial databases. In 
the mainstream accounting research, the data collection will be highly structured and 
will be analyzed by mathematical and statistical technique (Chua, 1986). 
 
3.5 MEASUREMENT OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
This section gives a measurement of dependent variables used in both of the regression 
models (i.e. determinants of risk disclosure and value relevance of risk disclosure). 
First, risk disclosure is used as dependent variables to test hypotheses one to nine. 
Second, share price is used as a dependent variable to test hypothesis ten.  
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3.5.1 Risk Disclosure 
 
Empirical  research on disclosure chooses between  two  alternatives  paths,  namely  
disclosure  indices  and frequency  of  risk  items'  occurrence.  This is more widely and 
popularly known as content analysis approach. Some prior studies that have used 
disclosure  indices  to measure  the  extent  and  quality  of  information  disclosed  by  
firms are, to name a few, Branco and Rodrigues (2008), Kent  and  Ung (2003), 
Botosan (1997) and Meek et al. (1995). Two procedures basically involves in the 
construction of a disclosure index: (i) the selection of a number of information items, 
and (ii) to choose between different approaches available in the literature, in which the 
most commonly used method to score items are weighted  or  an  unweighted approach. 
The weighted approach applies a weighted disclosure index rated by a researcher using 
a pre-determined disclosure items based on their degree of importance. The unweighted 
approach, on the other hand, uses a dichotomous  procedure  in which  an item  scores 1 
if  it  is disclosed and 0 if  it  is not. Though weighted approach is more systematic than 
unweighted approach, both approaches have limitations. The  weighted approach,  for 
example, requires  subjective  judgment  by a researcher in  its construction, in which it 
cannot  be totally removed  (Marston  and Shrives, 1991) while the  unweighted  
approach clearly assumes  that  all disclosure information  items are useful to all users 
of annual reports, therefore, all information are considered equally  important. 
However, the relevance of disclosure information is harder to define, as different 
potential users of annual reports may have enormously different interests.  
 
Instead of using indices, this study will use the other approach which is frequency of 
risk items’ occurrence. This approach has been widely used in accounting disclosure 
literature (e.g., Milne and Adler, 1999; Beretta and Bozolan, 2004; Lajili and Zegal, 
2005; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Deumes, 2008). 
Generally, this approach is suitable in this study as a means to collect observed data to 
test research questions and objectives so as to capture the volume of risk disclosures in 
corporate annual reports (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). Moreover, the application of 
contents analysis in this study is a tool that supports the understanding of the type of 
risk disclosure information that Malaysian companies are disclosing in their annual 
reports.   
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Content analysis is a method where documents  and  texts (printed  or  visual)  are 
collected and gathered to seek their contents and reduced the information collected to 
the pre-defined or pre-determined categories  with  a  systematic  and  replicable 
manner (Bryman, 2012; Bryman  and  Bell,  2011). Probably a well-known definition is 
the one provided by Holsti (1969) as ‘a research technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of message’. Weber  
(1990)  describes  content analysis as ‘a method  of  codifying  and categorising  the  
qualitative and quantitative information (text or content)  of a piece of writing  into 
various  groups or  categories  depending  on  selected  criteria.’ Guthrie et al. (2004) 
describe it as a method that aims to capture and organize assorted empirical data which 
is important so as to develop the patterns in the presentation and reporting of 
information. In other words, content analysis seeks to analyse published information 
objectively, reliably and systematically (Guthrie et al., 2004). Content  analysis  codes  
the text  (which  is  measured  by  word  or  sentences  or  any  other  units  of 
measurement) and assumes that frequency indicates importance of the subject matter 
(Krippendorff, 2013; Weber, 1990).  
 
It is striking that the above definitions contain some qualities including objectivity and 
being systematic. Objectivity is attained when certain rules are clearly specified before 
assigning the content (text) to categories. This measure allows transparency in the 
procedures; hence it is more likely to reduce the analyst's personal biases to as little as 
possible. The quality of being systematic means that the application of the rules is 
undertaken in a consistent manner so that bias is curbed (Bryman, 2012). As a result of 
these two qualities, anyone else repeating the analysis (following certain rules) would 
categorize the text in the same way.  
 
A further fundamental component of content analysis is the selection of a ‘unit of 
analysis’.  This selection needs to be carefully and thoroughly considered as it will 
ascertain ‘how’ to capture the data (i.e. risk disclosure) in the annual report.  In the 
accounting literature, there is a debate about the unit of analysis (i.e. the amount of 
disclosure) that should be used in content analysis (Gray et al., 1995).  A  number  of  
units  of  analysis  are  employed  in  the  accounting disclosure literature  including:  
words  (e.g.,  Deegan  and  Gordon, 1996);  sentences (Milne  and Adler,  1999; Beretta 
and Bozzolan, 2004;  Linsley  and Shrives,  2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007);  pages and  
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proportions  of  a page (Guthrie  and Parker,  1990;  Unerman, 2000; Dunne et al., 
2007);  frequency  (e.g., Cowen et al., 1987) and high/low  disclosure  (Patten,  1991).  
 
According to Gray et al. (1995), words, sentences as well as pages are likely to be the 
most favoured and common unit of analysis in the literature. These measures are able to 
generate volumetric measure of disclosure volume. Gray et al. (1995) argue that words 
are basically have the advantage of lending themselves to more exclusive analysis (i.e. 
easily categorized), sentences are to be preferred if the researcher is seeking to infer 
meaning while pages tend to reflect the amount of total space given to a topic and, by 
inference, the importance of that topic. Milne and Adler (1999) and Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), on the other hand, chose sentences because these are far more reliable than any 
other unit of analysis. They argue that, a single word has no meaning to provide a basis 
for coding disclosures, rather, to look at an individual word within a sentence which 
provides a proper context in order to achieve reliable results.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the amount of disclosure chosen to analyse the content of 
risk disclosure in annual reports is sentence count. This is in line with previous related 
risk disclosure studies (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; 
Abraham and Cox, 2007). Moreover, this approach is chosen based on its objective 
measure and perceived high degree of accuracy in the underlying quantification of the 
risk items provided in annual reports. Since this study does not intend to determine the 
quality of risk disclosure, using sentences as coding scheme is likely to provide 
complete, reliable and meaningful data for further analysis (Milne and Adler, 1999; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2006).  
 
In addition, to minimize subjective judgement and inconsistency effect in computing 
the text of risk disclosure, specific keywords are pre-defined. Annual reports are 
viewed through a portable document format (PDF) and details of keywords which are 
listed in Table 3.3 are searched.  
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Table 3.3: 
List of keywords 
BASIC KEYWORD: RISK 
Other Risk Keywords 
Firm’s Expected Future Impacts Firm’s Current Vulnerability To Impact 
Outlook 
Prospect 
Opportunity 
Uncertainty 
Hazard 
Danger 
Harm 
Threat 
Exposure 
Loss 
Uncertainty 
 
A worksheet based on the risk category is developed to capture what risk information 
has been disclosed and the volume of the risk information disclosed are reviewed and 
classified according to the types of risks (operational, environmental, financial and 
strategic risks) for each firm. In particular, sentences in which the keywords appeared 
are read and marked on the worksheet based on the number of sentences in the relevant 
risk category. The researcher independently coded an initial sample of ten largest 
annual reports and the results of this pre-testing were used to create decision rules 
(appendix A). The number of sentences was then added together to compute the 
disclosure scores for a firm and the industry. This study is focusing on all narrative 
sections (e.g., chairman statement, statement on corporate governance, statement on 
internal control and operations review) including the notes to the accounts. 
 
Risk has both downside and upside (opportunities) components. Therefore, in addition 
to controlling the firm’s current vulnerability to the effects of downside risks, firms 
should be able to take advantage of the potential upside risk in the future. In examining 
Malaysian risk disclosures in this study, the evidence (if any) of the existence of upside 
and downside risk disclosures that are most commonly reported by firms using the 
keywords are drawn from the definition of risk disclosure by Linsley and Shrives 
(2006) (refer to Chapter 2). However, there are three additional keywords that have 
been added. First, a keyword ‘uncertainty’ is added because risk relates to the 
uncertainty of future outcomes (Lupton, 1999). Risk is also referring to the two-sided 
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definition which linked to the exposure to financial loss or opportunity (Dobler, 2008). 
Second, a keyword ‘outlook’ is added because it is the close synonym of the keyword 
‘prospect’ that is used by companies particularly connected to environmental risk 
disclosure. Third, a keyword ‘loss’ is added because it is a close synonym to the 
keyword ‘harm’ and since ‘harm’ is not an accounting term, the use of ‘loss’ can be a 
substitute particularly in the area of financial risk. Other risk-related words such as 
jeopardy, peril, menace, endangerment and damage are not included in the lists because 
they were rarely appearing in the annual reports. The searches of these words which 
have been done in a small sample of the ten largest companies reveal that these words 
are hardly appeared. Therefore, by adding more words do not materially change the 
disclosure measures. Further, all pictures and images such as charts, diagrams and their 
captions are also excluded from the analysis to minimise the amount of subjectivity 
involved (Frost and Wilmshurst, 2000).  
 
3.5.2 Share Price 
 
Share price is the dependent variable in the value relevance regression model to test 
hypothesis ten. The share price is measured as the market price, obtained from OSIRIS 
database. The share price in this study is for the year 2009, calculated 180 days after the 
end of companies’ accounting year.   
 
3.6 MEASUREMENT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
This section gives an operational definition of each independent variable identified in 
the hypotheses (i.e., determinants of corporate risk disclosure and value-relevance of 
corporate risk disclosure). The independent variables for the determinants of corporate 
risk disclosure are segregated into two major components: manager-specific 
characteristics and ownership characteristics. The summary of all the operational 
variables in this study is shown in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4:  
Summary of the Operationalization of the Research Variables 
Variables Acronym Operationalization 
Dependent variables:   
Risk disclosure RD Total corporate risk disclosure sentences in 
the year 2009  
Share price SP Market price (180 days after the end of a 
company’s accounting year) 
Independent variables:   
Age AGE Overall number of age (in years) 
Functional track FUNCTR Dichotomous of 1 if managers rise from 
throughput function and 0 in output 
function  
Education EDU Dichotomous of 1 if managers posses CPA 
and/or MBA, 0 otherwise 
Tenure TEN Number of years the firm’s current managers 
have held the position or the number of 
years the firm’s current managers in the 
positions since their first appointment. 
Ethnicity ETHN Dichotomous of 1 if the company has a Malay 
(Bumiputera) manager; 0 otherwise  
Family ownership FAMCTRL The ratio of family members on the board to 
the total number of directors on the board 
of company 
Government ownership GOVOWN The percentage of shares owned by the 
government institution listed in the top 
30 shareholdings to total number of 
shares issued 
Foreign ownership FOROWN The percentage of shares owned by the 
foreign investors listed in the top 30 
shareholdings to total number of shares 
issued 
Earnings per share EPS Earnings per share 
Book value of net asset per share BVNAS Book Value of net assets divided by numbers 
of shares outstanding 
Family-controlled firm FAMCTRL_20 Family ownership of 20% or more 
Government-controlled firm GOVCTRL_20 Government ownership of 20% or more 
Foreign-controlled firm FORCTRL_20 Foreign ownership of 20% or more 
   
Control variables:   
Company size LNSIZE Natural log of total assets 
Leverage LEV The ratio of long-term debt to equity 
Auditor size BIG4 Dichotomous of 1 for firm that audited by Big 
4, 0 otherwise 
Industry classification: 
1. Trading / Services 
2. Construction 
3. Consumer product 
4. Industrial product 
5. Plantation 
6. Properties 
7. Infrastructure and 
Technology 
DUMMY 
INDUSTRY 
Dichotomous of 1 if the firm is in trading and 
services sector, 0 otherwise; 2 if the firm 
is in the construction sector, 0 otherwise; 
3 if the firm is in consumer product 
sector, 0 otherwise; 4 if the firm is in the 
industrial product sector, 0 otherwise; 5 
if the firm is in plantation sector, 0 
otherwise; 6 if the firm is in the 
properties sector, 0 otherwise; 7 if the 
firm is in infrastructure and technology 
sector, 0 otherwise. 
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3.6.1 Determinants of Corporate Risk Disclosure 
 
3.6.1.1 Manager-Specific Characteristics 
 
Age (AGE) is measured by the actual ages of CEO and CAC, expressed in years. This 
measurement is similar to the study by Ng and Sears (2012) and Barker and Mueller 
(2002).  
 
Functional track (FUNCTR) is measured by distinguishing between a throughput 
function (accounting, finance, production, process engineering) and output function 
(sales, marketing, research and development) in the experiential background of the 
CEO and CAC of the firm (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). There are other items 
developed under each of the functional track in this study. The throughput function 
includes bureaucratic, internal organization role and widely-based enterprise while 
output functions include entrepreneurial, public/client engagement and industry-
specific expertise. In this study, the variable takes a value of one if the CEO or CAC is 
from throughput functions; otherwise it takes a value of zero if the CEO or CAC is 
from output functions.  
 
Education (EDU) is measured by the education level of CEO and CAC of the firm 
holding professional accounting qualifications (CPA) and/or Master of Business 
Administration (MBA). In this study, the variable takes a value of one if the CEO or 
CAC holds CPA and/or MBA; otherwise it takes a value of zero.  
 
Tenure (TEN) is measured by the number of years the firm’s current CEO and CAC 
have held the position or the number of years the firm’s current CEO and CAC have 
been in the positions since their first appointment. This measurement is similar to the 
prior study by Barker and Mueller (2002) and Boeker (1997).  
 
Ethnicity (ETHN) is measured by Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera CEO and CAC on 
the board. In this study, the variable takes a value of one if the CEO or CAC on the 
board is Malay (Bumiputera), otherwise it takes a value of zero. 
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3.6.1.2 Ownership Characteristics  
 
Family ownership (FAMCTRL) is measured using the ratio of family members on the 
board to the total number of directors (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002 and Mohd Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006; Arshad et al., 2012). Family members are defined in accordance to 
Section 122A of the Malaysian Companies Act (1965). Each listed company in 
Malaysia is required to disclose the director’s information in the annual report, 
including any family relationship with any directors and/or substantial shareholders of 
the company. 
 
Government ownership (GOVOWN) is measured using percentages of shares owned by 
government ministries/agencies in the top 30 largest shareholdings to total number of 
shares issued (Arshad et al., 2012; Najid and Abdul Rahman, 2011). While this 
definition has been used in other studies, it is not as broad as the definition of 
government ownership used in the study by Chu and Cheah (2004). They defined 
government-linked companies as (a) shares held by the Ministry of Finance’s 
investment arm, which is Khazanah Holdings Berhad and State Agency, and (b) the 
government has a direct control for that particular company, that is the government has 
the ability to appoint board members, senior management and make major decisions 
(e.g., contract awards, strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisitions and 
divestments, etc).   
 
Foreign ownership (FOROWN) is measured using percentages of shares owned by 
foreign shareholders in the top 30 largest shareholdings to total number of shares issued 
(Che Haat et al., 2008 and Barako et al., 2006). Foreign share ownership is defined as 
the percentages of shareholding owned by foreign portfolio equity investors as 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Jiang and Kim, 2004; Lin and Shiu, 2003 and 
Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). 
 
3.6.2 Value Relevance of Corporate Risk Disclosure 
 
Earnings per share (EPS) are measured using annual income before extraordinary items 
divided by the number of outstanding ordinary shares.  
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Book value of net assets per share (BVNAS) is measured using (i) the book value of net 
assets (BVNA) by measuring the difference between total assets and total liabilities at 
the end of accounting year (ii) the BVNA which will be divided by number of issued 
ordinary shares outstanding at the end of accounting year.  
 
Total Risk Disclosure (TRD) is measured by the total corporate risk disclosure 
sentences in the year 2009. 
 
Regulated Risk Disclosure (RRD) is measured by the information of risk that has been 
mandated or regulated by the Financial Reporting Standards. Therefore, all Malaysian 
listed companies have to follow the standards and disclose the information accordingly.  
 
Non-regulated risk disclosure (NRRD) is measured by the information of risk in which 
the management of the companies have some discretion in disclosing such information. 
There is no mandatory regulation for this type of disclosure; however, there are some 
guidelines for the Malaysian listed companies to follow in order to make the disclosure. 
 
Family-Controlled Firms (FAMCTRL_20) is measured by the family members on board 
who hold 20 percent or more shares in the company. 
 
Government-Controlled Firms (GOVCTRL_20) is measured by the government 
agencies which hold 20 percent or more shares in the company. 
 
Foreign-Controlled Firms (FORCTRL_20) is measured by the foreigners who hold 20 
percent or more shares in the company. 
 
3.6.3 Control Variables 
 
As with prior studies, this study includes company size, leverage, auditor size and 
industry classification as control variables in the regression model given the evidence 
of the association between these variables and corporate disclosure. Based on prior 
studies, these variables are shown to have an impact on corporate risk disclosure 
(Aljifri, 2008; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Oliveira et al., 
2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005; Raffournier, 1995; Hossain et al., 1994). 
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The natural log of total assets is included in the regression to control for the firm size 
effect (Hassan et al., 2008; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004). Company size (LNSIZE) 
denotes the size of the company in terms of total assets. A larger firm size is expected 
to have better corporate disclosure as they are closely monitored by the external capital 
markets. A positive relationship between company size and corporate risk disclosure is 
predicted. 
 
Leverage (LEV) is measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total equity and is used to 
control for the liquidity of the firm. Agency theory predicts that corporate disclosure is 
expected to increase with leverage. Also, highly geared  firms  have a wider  obligation  
to necessarily satisfy  the  needs of  their  long-term  creditors  for  information  
compared  to lower  geared  firms. A study by Malone et al. (1993), Hossain et al. 
(1994) and Hossain et al. (1995) reports a positive significant association between 
leverage and disclosure. 
 
Auditor size (BIG4) is measured by the Big Four audit firms. These large audit firms 
are expected to have a positive impact on risk disclosure as they have more expertise 
and resources as well as specialists and brand name (Balsam et al., 2003) compared to 
smaller audit firms.  BIG4 is a dichotomous variable Big Four and non-Big Four. In this 
study, the variable takes a value of one if the company is audited by a Big4 firm; 
otherwise it takes a value of 0. This measurement is similar to the studies by Hassan et 
al. (2008), Deumes and Knechel (2008), Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), Oliveira et al. 
(2006), Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002). 
 
Industry classification is measured as per Bursa Malaysia sector classifications: trading 
and services, construction, consumer product, industrial product, plantation, properties 
as well as infrastructure and technology. Each industry has its representatives in the 
sample to ensure the results represent overall industries practices in Malaysia. Thus, the 
final sample constitutes seven industries. 
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3.7 REGRESSION MODEL 
 
3.7.1 Determinants of Risk Disclosure 
 
This study uses a linear multiple regression analysis to deal with dependence of one 
variable (corporate risk disclosure) on other variables (manager-specific characteristics 
and ownership characteristics). It is to be noted that linear multiple regression is 
analysis that deals with dependence of one variable on other variables not strictly 
association and causation. Association between variables is inferred from reasoning 
underlying the hypotheses to be tested. Moreover, a common limitation of multiple 
regression models is lack of strict exogeneity of the predictor variables, or the right-
hand side variables, from the dependent variable. All the data is analysed using the 
Statistical Package for Social Science (formerly SPSS and now known as PASW) 
version 18.0. The following multiple regression model is utilised to determine the 
extent of the influence of each of the variables in the study on the corporate risk 
disclosure: 
 
RDjt = β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + 
β5EDU_CEOjt + β6EDU_CACjt + β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + 
β10ETHN_CACjt + β11FAMCTRLjt + β12GOVOWNjt + β13FOROWNjt + β14LNSIZEjt 
+ β15LEVjt + β16BIG4jt + β17DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt                                      (3.1)                                                                               
 
Where:  
 
RD     = Measured by total numbers of corporate risk disclosure 
sentences using content analysis 
 
AGE_CEO  = Overall number of CEOs age (in years) 
 
AGE_CAC  = Overall number of CACs age (in years) 
 
FUNCT_CEO = Dummy variable, 1 if the CEOs are in throughput function, 0 if 
in output function. 
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FUNCT_CAC = Dummy variable, 1 if the CACs are in throughput function, 0 if 
in output function. 
 
EDU_CEO = Dummy variable, 1 if the CEOs holding professional 
accounting qualifications (CPA) and/or Master of Business 
Administration (MBA), 0 otherwise. 
 
EDU_CAC = Dummy variable, 1 if the CACs holding professional 
accounting qualifications (CPA) and/or Master of Business 
Administration (MBA), 0 otherwise. 
 
TEN_CEO = Number of years the firm’s current CEOs have held the 
position or the number of years the firm’s current CEOs in the 
position since their first appointment. 
 
TEN_CAC = Number of years the firm’s current CACs have held the 
position or the number of years the firm’s current CACs in the 
position since their first appointment. 
 
ETHN_CEO = Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a Bumiputera CEOs; 0 
otherwise.
 26
  
 
ETHN_CAC = Dummy variable, 1 if the company has a Bumiputera CACs, 0 
otherwise. 
 
FAMCTRL = Proportion of family members on the board to the total number 
of directors on the   board of the company. 
                                               
26
 The measures of ethnicity used in this study is a dichotomous variable set as 1 if a CEO or CAC is 
Bumiputeras, 0 if otherwise. The ethnicity of the CEO and CAC is determined by examining the names 
of the person. If the names are of Chinese origin, for example, having surnamed of Lee, Tan or Chan and 
the nationality is Malaysian, the criterion is satisfied, that is, the CEO or CAC is assumed to be 
Malaysian Chinese. A similar approach is also used for other Malaysian CEO and CAC who are non-
Malay (i.e. Indian) and other ethnicities (i.e., foreign CEO and CAC). For Bumiputera (Malay) names, 
the same procedure is used.  
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GOVOWN = Percentage of shares held by government to total number of 
shares issued. 
 
FOROWN = Percentage of shares held by foreign investors to total number 
of shares issued. 
 
LNSIZE  = Natural log of total assets. 
 
LEV   = Ratio of long-term debt to total equity. 
 
BIG4 = Dummy variable, 1 if audited by Big 4 audit firms, 0 if 
otherwise. 
 
INDUSTRY = Dummy variables of 1 if the firm is in trading /services sector, 
0 otherwise; 2 if the firm is in the construction sector, 0 
otherwise; 3 if the firm is in consumer product sector, 0 
otherwise; 4 if the firm is in the industrial product sector, 0 
otherwise; 5 if the firm is in plantation sector, 0 otherwise; 6 if 
the firm is in the properties sector, 0 otherwise; 7 if the firm is in 
infrastructure and technology sector, 0 otherwise. 
 
ε   = Error term 
 
To test the hypotheses, multivariate regressions for each model are conducted for each 
type of risk disclosures as well as for the total risk disclosure.  At first, the baseline 
model as proposed in equation 3.1 is regressed.  Subsequently, a modified regression 
model, which is developed by amending the methodology of measuring certain 
variables, is tested.  The reason for modifying the baseline model is to determine 
whether the earlier findings are significantly different when the methodology of 
measuring certain variables is altered, thus helping to determine the constancy of the 
findings. 
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3.7.2 Value Relevance of Risk Disclosure 
 
Ohlson (1995) develops and analyses a model of a firm’s market value as it relates to 
contemporaneous and future earnings, book values and dividends. Ohlson’s (1995) 
value relevance model satisfies many appealing properties and this model is used as a 
benchmark in conceptualising how market value relates to accounting data and other 
information (i.e. corporate risk disclosure). Value relevance in this study, measured in 
terms of stock prices, refers to increases in ﬁrm value resulting from added risk 
disclosure by ﬁrms. Value relevance is an empirical operationalization of an accounting 
amount is considered value relevant, i.e., have a predicted signiﬁcant relation with 
share prices, only if the amount reﬂects information relevant to investors in valuing the 
ﬁrm and is measured reliably enough to be reﬂected in share prices (Barth et al., 2001). 
Therefore, a model is developed to test the value relevance of total risk disclosure in the 
share market. It depicts the results of the multiple regression analysis of total risk 
disclosure and firm value. The model tests whether investors perceive corporate risk 
disclosure as an important variable in the determination of the value of a company. In 
addition, β1, β2 and β3 are the slope coefficients for earnings per share (EPS), book 
value of net assets per share (BVNAS) and total risk disclosure (TRD), respectively. If 
the investor places value on the EPS and BVNAS, then β1 and β2 should be positively 
related to a firm’s share price. Likewise, if the investor places value on the corporate 
risk disclosure of a firm, then β3 should be positively related to a firm’s share price.  
 
In addition, the model includes interaction of ownership control because the nature of 
ownership could affect the share price of a company (Lu et al., 2007; Lins, 2003; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Hence, the difference in the market value of the test sample 
(ownership control) is captured by β4, β5 and Β6. If the total risk disclosures of the test 
sample firms are perceived as value relevance, the market value will be higher for those 
firms, which implies that the coefficient β4, β5 and β6 will be positive. The test sample 
includes family-controlled firms, government-controlled firms and foreign-controlled 
firms when the equity ownership by those owners is 20 percent or more (see: La Porta 
et al., 1999). Therefore, the following model is developed: 
 
SPjt = β0 + β1 EPSjt + β2 BVNASjt + β3 TRDjt + β4 TRD*FAMCTRL_20jt + β5 
TRD*GOVCTRL_20jt + β6 TRD*FORCTRL_20jt + εjt                                        (3.2) 
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Where:  
 
SP  = Measured by the share prices, 180 days after the firm’s 
financial year end. 
 
EPS  = Earnings per share (sen). 
 
BVNAS  = Ratio of book value of net assets per total shares outstanding. 
 
TRD = Firm total risk disclosure score for the year 2009.  
 
FAMCTRL_20 = Dummy variable, 1 if at least 20% ownership controlled by 
family, 0 otherwise. 
 
GOVCTRL_20 = Dummy variable, 1 if at least 20% ownership controlled by 
government, 0 otherwise.  
 
FORCTRL_20 = Dummy variable, 1 if at least 20% ownership controlled by 
foreigner, 0 otherwise. 
 
ε   = Error term 
 
The analysis is based on data from 117 firms out of 128 firms because of missing data 
i.e., share prices and earnings per share. In addition, only total risk disclosure level is 
used in the regression since the individual risk disclosure types represent to some extent 
similar results. However, to reflect more robust results, this model will be segregated 
into two additional model which will examine the value relevance of regulated risk 
disclosure (RRD) and non-regulated risk disclosure (NRRD). Therefore, the equation in 
model 3.2 for the value relevance of total risk disclosure will then be segregated into 
the value relevance of regulated risk disclosure (RRD) (model 3.3) and non-regulated 
risk disclosure (NRRD) (model 3.4). The following models are then developed:  
 
SPjt = β0 + β1 EPSjt + β2 BVNASjt + β3 RRDjt + β4 RRD*FAMCTRL_20jt + β5 
RRD*GOVCTRL_20jt + β6 RRD*FORCTRL_20jt + εjt                                    (3.3) 
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SPjt = β0 + β1 EPSjt + β2 BVNASjt + β3 NRRDjt + β4 NRRD*FAMCTRL_20jt + β5 
NRRD*GOVCTRL_20jt + β6 NRRD*FORCTRL_20jt + εjt                       (3.4) 
 
 
3.7.3 Adequacy of Sample Size for the Regression Models 
 
The sample size used in a multiple regression has a direct effect on the appropriateness 
and determines the statistical power (R
2
) of the model and the generalizability of the 
results. Since the sample size of this study is relatively small (a total of 128 annual 
reports collected from the Bursa Malaysia), the findings might be a concern when 
testing the variables using multiple regressions. According to Hair Jr. et al. (2010, p. 
174), ‘small sample usually characterized as having fewer than 30 observations, are 
appropriate only for analysis by simple regression with a single independent variable’. 
To test whether the sample size in this study has a direct and sizable impact on the 
statistical power (R
2
), Table 3.5 is used. 
 
Table 3.5: 
Minimum R
2 
that can be Found Statistically Significant with a Power of 0.80 for 
Varying Numbers of Independent Variables and Sample Sizes 
 SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL (Α) = 0.01 
NO. OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL (Α) = 0.05 
NO. OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Sample 
Size 
2 5 10 20 2 5 10 20 
20 45 56 71 NA 39 48 64 NA 
50 23 29 36 49 19 23 29 42 
100 13 16 20 26 10 12 15 21 
250 5 7 8 11 4 5 6 8 
500 3 3 4 6 3 4 5 9 
1,000 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 
Note: Values represent percentage of variance explained, NA = not applicable 
Source: Hair Jr. et al. (2010) 
 
Table 3.5 shows the interplay among the sample size, the significance level (α) and the 
number of independent variables in detecting a significant R
2
. The values provided in 
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the table are the minimum R
2
 that the given sample size will detect as statistically 
significant at significance level (α) with a power (probability) of 0.80.  
 
This study employs 13 independent variables and 4 control variables. Based on the 
initial linear regression analysis performed, the statistical power (R
2
) for model 3.1 is 
31.8% and for model 3.2 is 65.3% (refer to Table 5.7 and Table 5.12 in Chapter 5). 
With sample size of 128 (more than 100), the result satisfy the sample size statistical 
power test as both models have R
2
 more than 30% (minimum R
2
 that specified sample 
size will detect as statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels are 
11% and 8%, respectively). 
 
3.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
The first part of this chapter discusses the empirical schema of the study. Four main 
research questions are identified. The first research question is to identify patterns in 
the risk disclosure levels in Malaysian listed companies. The second and third research 
questions are to determine the influence of the upper echelons characteristics and 
ownership characteristics on broad categories of disclosure of risk information, 
respectively. The fourth and final research question is to determine the impact of risk 
disclosure on the firm’s value. There are ten main hypotheses developed with some of 
these hypotheses further segregated to reflect individual independent variables.  
 
The second part of this chapter discusses the research method applied in this study. In 
order to meet the overall research objectives, this study adopts a quantitative research 
approach based on the content analysis technique. A sample of 128 firms listed on the 
Main Board of Bursa Malaysia in the year 2009 has been selected in the study to see the 
influence of the upper echelons characteristics and ownership characteristics on risk 
disclosure level. With respect to independent variables, age, functional track, education, 
tenure and ethnicity are chosen to represent the upper echelons characteristics; family 
ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership are chosen to represent the 
ownership characteristics. With respect to the financial statement data for the study, 
including the data on earnings per share, total assets, total liabilities, long-term debt and 
total numbers of shares issued, these data are collected from the financial statement 
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section of annual reports as well as Osiris database. Share price data is obtained from 
the Osiris database. 
 
To test the hypotheses, this study uses linear multiple regression analysis conducted for 
each type of risk disclosure (operational risk, environmental risk, financial risk and 
strategic risk) as well as for the aggregate of the four risk disclosures. Since 
multivariate analysis is used to test the hypotheses, assumptions of multicollinearity, 
normality, homoscedasticity and linearity are also tested.  To test the multicollinearity 
assumption, the Pearson correlation matrix is computed to examine the correlation 
between the independent variables.  An analysis of residuals is conducted to test for 
homocedasticity, linearity and normality.  The next two chapters present and discuss 
the findings of the study. 
 
A test of both homoscedasticity (constant variance) of the errors and violation of the 
linearity assumption is undertaken by plotting the residuals versus predicted values, 
which are part of the standard output  for multiple regression analysis in SPSS. The 
points in this plot are found to be reasonably symmetrically distributed around a 
horizontal line. This suggests that linearity is not violated. Also points in the plot are 
not becoming spread-out as a function of predicted values, suggesting that the 
homoscedasticity assumption is not violated.  Finally, a test of normality of the 
distribution of errors is undertaken by a normal probability plot of the residuals. It is 
found that the points on the plot fall reasonably close to the diagonal line and do not 
display a ‘bow’shape or S-shape. This indicates that there is not excessive skewness or 
kurtosis in the data. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS OF RISK DISCLOSURE CONTENT ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this chapter is to report the results of risk disclosure content analysis 
made in the annual reports of Malaysia’s largest listed companies (excluding banking/ 
finance/insurance industry companies). Specifically this chapter will answer research 
question one in this study. In this chapter, the results of content analysis are 
summarised and analysed. The sample examined comprises 128 companies and is 
extracted from the Bursa Malaysia based on the top 200 by market capitalization. The 
purpose is to examine the extent and nature of corporate risk disclosure in the year 
2009.  
 
This chapter presents the way companies report on different types of risks, and hence 
identifies current risk disclosure practices. The disclosure score obtained from the 
content analysis will be used to build a disclosure measure for the level of annual report 
risk disclosure. This measure will be used in the next chapter, namely Chapter 5, to 
empirically test the relationship between risk disclosure level and its determining 
factors as well as between risk disclosure level and the firm value. 
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the results of risk 
disclosure practices in terms of categories (operational risk, environmental risk, 
financial risk and strategic risk) by Malaysian top listed companies in the year 2009. 
Then, Section 4.3 presents the disaggregated risk disclosures in terms of items 
disclosed. Next, risk disclosures by types of companies and types of industries are 
presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, respectively. The results are discussed in 
Section 4.6. A summary and conclusion for the chapter is given in Section 4.7.    
 
4.2 RISK DISCLOSURES BY CATEGORIES  
 
The results of total disclosures for the four broad risk categories are given in Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 as well as in Table 4.1. Figure 4.1 displays the frequencies of sentences 
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disclosed for each category of risk. Table 4.1 presents their descriptive statistics. For 
each company’s 2009 annual report, all the sentences containing a key risk-related 
word are categorized into one of four risk categories and totalled as recorded in Figures 
4.1 and 4.2, and their mean and standard deviation are computed as shown in Table 4.1.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Sentences Disclosed for Each Types of Risk 
 
Figure 4.2 depicts the frequency analysis of Figure 4.1 in terms of the proportion of 
total risk disclosure attributed to each category. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Proportion of Total Risk Disclosure 
 
Of the risk categories being disclosed by Malaysian listed companies, the most reported 
are financial risk and operational risk where the total number of sentences disclosed in 
the annual reports is 5143 and 4950 sentences, respectively. Much less disclosure is 
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found for the strategic risk and environmental risk categories at 767 and 747 sentences, 
respectively.  The highest disclosure category, financial risk, is heavily mandated under 
the prescriptive disclosure requirements of the Financial Reporting Standard as 
prescribed in Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure (FRS 132). The other 
high disclosure category, operational risk, is not as prescriptively mandated as financial 
risk, but is strongly encouraged under the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
and guidelines of Bursa Malaysia of the requirement to publish an annual internal 
control statement. The less disclosed categories, strategic and environmental risk 
disclosures, are not specified by any regulatory body in Malaysia, so would clearly 
represent voluntary corporate disclosures.   
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Company’s Risk Disclosure 
Year 
Risk 
Disclosure 
N 
 
Sum Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
2009 Operational 
Risk Disclosure 
128 4950 9 144 38.67 23.386 
Environmental 
Risk Disclosure 
128 747 0 24 5.84 3.956 
Financial Risk 
Disclosure 
128 5143 14 86 40.18 11.962 
Strategic Risk 
Disclosure 
128 767 0 25 5.99 4.713 
Total Risk 
Disclosure 
128 11607 41 244 90.68 36.623 
 
 
Table 4.1 reinforces the findings in Figure 4.1. Perusal of Table 4.1 indicates that the 
highest mean of corporate risk disclosure is financial risk and operational risk with 
40.18 and 38.67 sentences, respectively. This is quite different to strategic risk with an 
average of 5.99 sentences and environmental risk with an average of 5.84 sentences. 
However, the standard deviation of operational risk (23.386) is larger than the standard 
deviation of financial risk (11.962). These standard deviations suggest that the extent of 
financial risk disclosure, which is heavily prescribed, is more consistent across 
companies than the extent of operational risk disclosures, which is guided. For the 
environmental and strategic risk disclosures, the minimum value of zero indicates that 
there is at least one company not disclosing any information about those two risk 
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categories. However, the minimum number of total risk disclosures is 41 sentences, 
which indicates that all sample firms publish some risk information.  
 
4.3 RISK DISCLOSURES BY ITEMS 
 
4.3.1 Operational Risk Disclosure 
 
Based on its broad definition as explained in Chapter 2, the category of operational risk 
encompasses the risk of opportunity cost or economic loss due to inadequate 
procedures and policies, risk of operational disruption caused by failure of systems and 
facilities, human error, failure in internal control, non-compliance with the regulatory 
requirements, management failure, unauthorised activities, frauds, health and safety. 
Moreover, in this study, operational risk disclosure is divided into two sub-categories: 
operational risk threat and operational risk management. Operational risk threat deals 
with the risk of safety and health, operational problems within the company, and 
litigation and legal suites. Operational risk management deals with corporate assurance 
plans, internal controls, risk management as well as policy and procedure.  
 
Table 4.2 shows the distributional parameters of operational risk disclosure and its sub-
categories of operational risk threat and operational risk management.  
 
Table 4.2: Operational Risk Disclosure 
 
N (Item) Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Operational risk threat 27 1 140 31.37 44.37 
Operational risk 
management 
66 1 363 62.17 78.32 
Total operational risk 
disclosure 
93 1 363 53.23 71.33 
 
From the overall total of 93 items, 66 items are in the operational risk management sub-
category while only 27 items falls under operational risk threat sub-category. The mean 
of operational risk management sub-category disclosure is 62.17 sentences as compared 
to the mean of operational risk threat disclosure of 31.37 sentences.  
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Figure 4.3: Proportion of Operational Risk Disclosure Locations in the Annual 
Report 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of operational risk disclosure location (or section) 
where operational risk disclosures are made in the annual reports. Inspection of Figure 
4.3 indicates that the bulk of operational risk disclosure can be found in the internal 
control statement and audit committee report. Companies disclosed more than fifty per 
cent of operational risk information in these two particular sections. Some operational 
risk disclosure can be found in the risk management report, chairman’s 
statement/president or CEO review/operation review, corporate governance statement 
and notes to the account. Closer inspection of the figure reveals that most of this is due 
to the companies’ orientation which relates to their responsibility towards internal 
control processes and risk management policies than actual performance risk 
information. Nevertheless, while the emphasis is found to be on the items directed by 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (i.e. the statement on internal control and audit 
committee report as well as statement on corporate governance), there is evidence of 
some items of voluntary disclosure, particularly the operational risk information in the 
chairman statement/president or CEO review/operation review, that go beyond the 
Bursa Malaysia guideline. As far as the operational risk disclosure is concerned, all 
companies made use of all the narrative sections in the annual reports. 
 
Turning to the specific items of information disclosed in sentences about operational 
risk, this is presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.  
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Table 4.3: Operational Risk Threat, by Item 
 Operational Risk 
Threat (Sentence) 
     (1) Risk of safety 97 
     (2) Risk of accident 21 
     (3) Risk of injuries 27 
     (4) Health threat / hazard  72 
     (5) Exposure to safety and health 23 
(A) Risk of Health And Safety 240 
  
     (6) Material litigation 112 
     (7) Risk of provision / contingent liabilities / legal suit 94 
     (8) Risk of old litigation 3 
(B) Risk of Litigations 209 
  
(9) High-risk customer on potential fraud 7 
(10) Business risk 135 
(11) Assessment of risk and profitability 2 
(12) Uncertainty over occurrence of undesirable events 9 
(13) Dangerous or illegal activities within company 7 
(C) Business Interruptions 153 
  
     (14) Non-technical losses 7 
(15) Operating losses 140 
(D) Losses in Operations 147 
  
     (16) Operation problem - threat to asset 24 
     (17) Operation problem - threat to infrastructure 1 
     (18) Operation problem - threat to cyber attack 3 
     (19) Operation problem - threat to sources 3 
     (20) Operation problem - occupational hazard 7 
     (21)Operation problem - increase security threat 7 
     (22) Operational risk 36 
(E) Operations Problem 81 
  
     (23) Ergonomic risk factor and noise hazard 3 
     (24) Project risk exposure 3 
     (25) Risk of being disinter mediated  1 
     (26) Maritime risk 2 
     (27) Maritime risk exposure 1 
(F) Others 10 
Total Operational Risk Threat Disclosure 847 
 
First, Table 4.3 shows the distribution of operational risk threat on an item-by-item 
basis. From the 27 items identified through content analysis under this sub-category, 
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they are further grouped into six sub-categories which are (a) risk of health and safety, 
(b) risk of litigations, (c) business interruptions, (d) losses in operations, (e) operations 
problem, and (f) others.  From the table, risk of health and safety category is the most 
disclosed (240 sentences) which comprises of risk of safety (97 sentences), risk of 
accident (21 sentences), risk of injuries (27 sentences), health threat/hazard (72 
sentences) and exposure to safety and health (23 sentences). This is followed by the risk 
of litigations category (209 sentences) which comprises of material litigations (112 
sentences), risk of provision/contingent liabilities/legal suits (94 sentences) and risk of 
old litigations (3 sentences). 
 
Table 4.4: Operational Risk Management, by Item 
  Operational Risk 
Management 
(Sentence) 
(1) Risk assessment and methodology 363 
(2) Risk evaluation 64 
(3) Audit risks (effective coverage) 1 
(4) Assurance against the risk of material errors, fraud or lossess 97 
(5) Risk Advisory Group  11 
(6) Report on risks 45 
(7) Risk related issues 71 
(8) Risk tolerance 17 
(9) Opportunity for fraud 7 
(10) Risk-based auditing approach 82 
(A) Corporate Assurance  758 
  
     (11) Risk management function 24 
     (12) Risk management committee 360 
(13) Risk management process 76 
(14) Risk management guidelines 7 
     (15) Risk management programme 23 
(16) Risk management training 168 
(17) Foreign currency risk management 10 
(18) Interest rate risk management 4 
(19) Operational risk management 2 
(20) Credit and liquidity risk management 10 
(21) Risk management process 116 
(22) Risk management policy / philosophy 118 
(23) Risk management procedure 41 
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(24) Risk management guideline 10 
(25) Risk management principles 8 
(26) Risk management services 1 
(27) Risk management review 47 
(28) Risk management monitoring 57 
(29) Risk management and compliance audit / control 25 
(30) Project risk management 14 
(31) Risk management system 31 
(32) Risk management issues 6 
(33) Risk management strategy 30 
(34) Risk management performance 2 
(35) Risk management knowledge 3 
(36) Risk management framework 219 
(37) Enterprise-Wide Risk Management (EWRM) 35 
(38) EWRM structure 11 
(39) EWRM framework 29 
(B) Risk Management 1487 
  
(40) Identification of principal / key risks 171 
(41) Achieve balance of risks and return of shareholders 8 
(42) Risk of failure to achieve business objective 139 
(43) Internal control procedures, process, system of management 
risk 
75 
(44) Assurance against material misstatement or loss 167 
(45) Weaknesses in internal control that results in material lossess 51 
(46) Changing risk, legal and regulatory compliance 8 
(47) Changing risk or resolve operational deficiencies 8 
(48) Changes in business and external environment 11 
(49) Risk mitigation / risk mitigation action plans 169 
(50) Risk parameters and standards 6 
(51) Risk limit 6 
(52) Internal control and risk management 221 
(C) Internal Control 1040 
  
(53) Risk policy / risk procedure 61 
(54) Risk-aware culture 40 
(55) Material risk 120 
(56) Risk reporting 81 
(57) Risk discussion 5 
(58) Review of risk 78 
(59) Risk oversight 14 
(60) Risk profile 153 
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(61) Risk at acceptable level 52 
(62) Risk analysis on common risk 12 
(63) Risk communication 18 
(64) Risk awareness and review session 26 
(65) Risk information system 20 
(66) Risk identification, evaluation and management 138 
(D) Policy And Procedure 818 
Total Operational Risk Management Disclosure 4103 
 
However, turning to each 27 items in the list, the most popular items under operational 
risk threat category include operating losses, business risks and material litigations. 
Examples of these most reported risks are as follows: 
 
The reduction in the Group's operating profit was mainly due to losses in the Integrated 
Liner Logistics' segment of RM847.6million.  
(MISC Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
Risks forbearance shall not exceed capabilities and capacity to manage; Any  business 
risks to be assumed shall be within the Group’s core competencies to manage… 
(IOI Corporation Berhad, Annual Report, 2009) 
 
The DRC reviewed and deliberated on reports and updates formulated by TM Group 
Legal and Compliance on the following matters: 
 TM’s litigation risk exposure 
 Strategic litigation risk management programme 
 (Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
Second, Table 4.4 shows the distribution of operational risk management on an item-
by-item basis. From the 66 items identified through content analysis under this sub-
category, they are further grouped into four sub-categories which are (a) corporate 
assurance, (b) risk management, (c) internal control, and (d) policy and procedure. A 
general note is that the corporate governance code which include the internal control 
and risk management might have contributed to the operational risk disclosure 
generally. However, most disclosures are bland statements (which is too general and do 
not clearly explain the risk-relevant to investors) such as those disclosures related to 
internal control system and risk management policy. These disclosures mirror statement 
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on internal control guideline and noticeably reflect the pressures of regulations on 
companies in relation to risk management.  
 
4.3.2 Environmental Risk Disclosure 
 
Environmental risk, as drawn from the definition in Chapter 2, arises from 
macroeconomic forces, which are factors essentially beyond the organisation’s control. 
It comprises disclosures relating economic risk such as national economic conditions 
and the global financial crisis; to potential natural disaster conditions; to political risk, 
legal and regulatory risk; and to industry-specific risks associated with actions of 
competitors, suppliers and customers.    
 
Table 4.5: Environmental Risk Disclosure 
 N (Item) Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Environmental risk 
disclosure 
25 1 110 29.88 33.27 
 
Table 4.5 shows the distributional parameters of total environmental risk disclosure. 
The average disclosure under this category is 29.88 sentences from the overall total of 
25 items. At least one sentence has been disclosed by companies in the sample with the 
maximum disclosure of 110 sentences.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the frequency distribution of environmental risk on an item-by-item 
basis. The most popular item disclosed under this category is economic 
outlook/economic prospect (110 sentences, 14.73%) and global economic 
outlook/prospect (102 sentences, 13.65%). This is followed by investor relations (83 
sentences, 11.11%) and geographic risk (82 sentences, 10.98%). Environmental risk is 
a category of disclosure which is essentially unregulated, so it is left to the discretion of 
management. The results suggest that this category of risk disclosure is not only 
relatively low, but is focused on broad commentary on the macroeconomic outlook and 
general conditions for investors. Typical examples of the most reported environmental 
risk are as follows:  
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To boost sales in the wake of economic uncertainty in the domestic market, two up-
graded versions of existing models were introduced.  
 (Proton Holdings Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
The Group’s diversified income streams continue to provide an optimal buffer against 
ongoing economic volatility both in Malaysia and abroad and its concentration on the 
ownership and management of regulated utilities operating under long-term 
concessions underpins the Group’s ability to continue to perform well even in times of 
global economic uncertainty. 
 (YTL Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
The additional capacity will enable PTP to capitalize on the additional demand  and 
new opportunities once the global economic recovery gathers momentum later in 2010. 
 (MMC Corporation, Annual Report 2009) 
 
The insurance industry outlook remains positive, but continues to be challenging 
against the anticipated slowdown in domestic demands arising from the global 
economic uncertainty. Berjaya Sompo remains optimistic that it will forge ahead 
despite these challenges. 
 (Berjaya Corporation Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
Though there are signs of recovery globally, regionally and domestically, we are 
cautiously optimistic of the prospects for the financial year 2010. Fortunately, due to 
our long-term strategies which form the foundation of our growth, the Boustead Group 
is comfortably diversified. 
 (Boustead Holdings Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
 
FUTURE PROSPECTS AND OUTLOOK 
 The Malaysian economy is recovering and consumer spending and confidence are also 
seen to be improving, which augurs well for the retail industry whose performance it is 
closely linked to. 
 (AEON Co. (M) Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
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Table 4.6: Environmental Risk Disclosure, by Item 
 Environmental Risk 
Disclosure (Sentence) 
(1) Economic outlook/prospect 110 
(2) Global economic outlook/prospect 102 
(3) Investor relations 83 
(4) Geographic risk 82 
(5) Economic volatility/uncertainty 38 
(6) Global growth prospect/global opportunity 37 
(7) Global financial crisis/meltdown/turmoil 34 
(8) Economic risk 28 
(9) Global demand/Domestic demand 56 
(10) Global economic crisis/uncertainty 54 
(11) Country risk 22 
(12) Environmentally hazardous substance 22 
(13) Changes in the regulatory risk / regulatory risk 21 
(14) Impact of financial crisis/economic crisis 14 
(15) Changes in the commercial risk / commercial risk 13 
(16) Softened demand 12 
(17) Political uncertainty/risk 4 
(18) Global energy outlook scenario  3 
(19) Social risk 2 
(20) Increasing competition in the operation’s countries 2 
(21) Risk of global warming 2 
(22) Changes in the legal risk / legal risk 2 
(23) Risk of sewage flooding 2 
(24) Risk associated with water borne transportation 1 
(25) Risk of pollution caused by storm discharges 1 
Total Environmental Risk Disclosure 747 
 
4.3.3 Financial Risk Disclosure 
 
Financial risk, based on the definition in Chapter 2, covers financial risk management 
objectives and policies, interest rate risk, foreign currency exchange rate risk, price and 
commodity, credit risk, market risk, and cash flow and liquidity risk as well as other 
risks which relates to financial risks.  
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Table 4.7: Financial Risk Disclosure 
 N (Item) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Financial risk 
disclosure 
45 1 804 114.29 175.89 
 
Table 4.7 shows the statistical parameters of financial risk disclosure for 45 items. The 
mean disclosure under this category is 114.29 sentences, which it is the highest mean of 
the risk disclosure categories in this study. Table 4.8 shows the frequency distribution 
of financial risk items. Financial risk items further categorized into eight sub-
categories: (a) financial risk management objectives and policies, (b) foreign currency 
exchange risk, (c) interest rate risk, (d) credit risk, (e) cash flow and liquidity risk, (f) 
price and commodity risk, (g) market risk, and (h) other risk-related financial risks.   
 
Based on Table 4.8, the results indicate that overall, financial risk management 
objectives and policies (1146 sentences) are the most reported. This result may be due 
to the fact that most of the companies seem to comply with the requirement in FRS 132 
to provide financial risk management objectives and policies (Ismail and Abdul 
Rahman, 2011). Besides financial risk management, other most popular financial risk 
disclosure items are foreign exchange risk (1154 sentences, 22.44%), interest rate risk 
(982 sentences, 19.09%), credit risk (957 sentences,  18.61%), cash flow and liquidity 
risk (439 sentences, 8.54%), price and commodity risk (169 sentences, 3.29%) and 
market risk (147 sentences, 2.86%).  
 
Table 4.8: Financial Risk Disclosure, by Item 
Items Financial Risk 
Disclosure (Sentence) 
(1) Financial risk management 56 
(2) Financial risk management objectives and policies 228 
(3) Finance risk exposure 16 
(4) Risk from financial instrument 101 
(5) Risk exposed from financial instruments 32 
(6) Risk specific to obligation 117 
(7) Risk of ownership 230 
(8) Risk estimates and material adjustments / critical judgements 249 
(9) Risk assumptions  111 
(10) Risk of future refinancing 6 
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(A) Financial Risk Management Objectives and Policies 1146 
  
(11) Foreign currency exchange risk 512 
(12) Foreign currency exchange risk exposure 478 
(13) Risk of foreign currency transactions 53 
(14) Risk of foreign currency translation 66 
(15) Forward foreign exchange contract 45 
(B) Foreign Currency Exchange Risk 1154 
  
(16) Interest rate risk 804 
(17) Interest rate risk exposure 142 
(18) Interest rate profile 7 
(19) Interest rate and borrowing exposure 22 
(20) Interest rate swap 7 
(C) Interest Rate Risk 982 
  
(21) Credit risk 589 
(22) Credit risk concentrations 78 
(23) Customer credit history 9 
(24) Credit risk limit 8 
(25) Risk of non-performance by creditors 16 
(26) Credit risk exposure 251 
(27) Credit facilities 6 
(D) Credit Risk 957 
  
(28) Cash flow risk / cash flow exposure 135 
(29) Liquidity risk / Liquidity exposure 304 
(E) Cash Flow and Liquidity Risk 439 
  
(30) Price and commodity risk 117 
(31) Price and commodity exposure 27 
(32) Bunker price risk 4 
(33) Bunker price risk exposure 1 
(34) Exposure to adverse movements in vegetable oil prices 1 
(35) Price volatility risk 19 
(F) Price And Commodity Risk 169 
  
(36) Market risk 124 
(37) Systemic risk 4 
(38) Market risk exposure 19 
(G) Market Risk 147 
  
(39) Risk of material misstatement 129 
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(40) Insurance risk 12 
(41) Claims on disputed taxes, supply of goods/services & 
compensation 
1 
(42) Value-at-risk on loan and derivatives portfolio 1 
(43) Counter-party risk 3 
(44) Risk of loss related to the bankruptcy of a vendor 2 
(45) Risk of no prospect of future loans and advances to customer 
recovery 
1 
(H) Others 149 
Total Financial Risk Disclosure 5143 
 
As expected, the abovementioned items are the most disclosed items as they have been 
specified in the Financial Reporting Standard (FRS 132). Based on the FRS 132, there 
are four major types of risk that should be identified. They are
27
: 
 
(1) Market risk which includes both potential for loss and potential for gain. 
i) Currency risk – value of instrument may fluctuate due to changes in 
foreign exchange rate 
ii) Fair value interest rate risk – value of instrument may fluctuate due to 
changes in market interest rates 
iii) Price risk – value of instrument may fluctuate as a result of changes in 
market prices 
(2) Credit risk – one party fails to discharge an obligation and causes the other party 
 to incur a financial loss. 
(3) Liquidity risk or funding risk – an entity encounters difficulty in raising funds to 
 meet commitments related with financial instruments. 
(4) Cash flow interest rate risk – future cash flows of an instrument may fluctuate  due 
to changes in market interest rates.  
 
The financial risk item ‘other’ has been created because these disclosures were of a 
more general nature regarding financial risk (e.g., global financial risk conditions 
affecting the firm). 
 
 
 
                                               
27
Source: Lazar and Choo (2008) 
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4.3.4 Strategic Risk Disclosure 
 
Strategic risk, as defined in Chapter 2, refers to risk arising from operating in a 
particular industry and risks associated with the company’s future business plans and 
strategies. As shown in Table 4.9, the average disclosure under the strategic risk 
category is 29.5 sentences from the overall total of 26 items. Table 4.10 shows the 
distribution of strategic risk items. 
 
Table 4.9: Strategic Risk Disclosure 
 N (Item) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Strategic risk 
disclosure 
26 1 237 29.5 50.81 
 
Table 4.10: Strategic Risk Disclosure, by Item 
  Strategic Risk 
Disclosure (Sentence) 
(1) Company prospects 237 
(2) Industry outlook / prospect 143 
(3) Company outlook 62 
(4) Competition in market share 35 
(5) Strategic risk 30 
(6) Competition in industry 29 
(7) Strategic opportunity business investment 24 
(8) Business expansion (investment) 23 
(9) Investment risk 21 
(10) International market prospect 19 
(11) Disposal of business 17 
(12) Joint venture risk 16 
(13) International market access / entrance 16 
(14) Product growth opportunity 15 
(15) Market penetration 13 
(16) Product support opportunity 13 
(17) International market presence 11 
(18) Acquisition risk 11 
(19) Acquisition-driven growth strategy 10 
(20) Use of technology to gain competitive edge 9 
(21) International market exposure 7 
(22) Strategic initiatives to enhance its competitive position 2 
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(23) Risk of stranded assets and poor return on investment 1 
(24) Electric technology as a threat 1 
(25) Risk of unforeseen complications of new technologies or 
innovation 
1 
(26) Difficulties in developing new products and services at 
competitive prices 
1 
Total Strategic Risk Disclosure 767 
 
From the 26 items identified, the most popular strategic risk disclosures are company 
prospects (237 sentences, 30.90%) and industry outlook/prospect (143 sentences, 
18.64%).  These results attempt to explain the requirement by the Bursa Malaysia 
(Chapter 9 Continuing Disclosure) which requires companies to discuss industry trends, 
development and group performance in their annual reports (Amran et al., 2009). 
Though there is no specific requirement to disclose any specific risks, the Appendix 9C 
Contents of annual report, paragraph 7 of the Chapter 9 Continuing Disclosure by 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements have some requirements on the issues to be 
reported in the company’s annual reports.  
 
The Chairman’s statement which represents the collective view of the board of 
directors setting out a balanced summary which includes the following: 
(a) A brief description of the industry trend and development. 
(b) A discussion and analysis of the group’s performance during the year and the 
material factors underlying its results and financial position. It should emphasis 
trends and identify significant events or transactions during the year under 
review; and 
(c) The prospects of the listed issuer. 
 
In the face of this stock exchange requirement, the extent of disclosure of these items is 
still relatively low.  Examples of the strategic risks reported are as follows: 
 
The Division is increasing its exposure to China, particularly the mining sector to  
capitalize on the twin trends of urbanization and resource scarcity. 
 (Sime Darby Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
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Addressing Major Strategic Risks  
In this regard, the Division will continue to provide an active and supporting role to 
address major strategic risks in  particular the tariff review, fuel cost pass through             
mechanism and pricing study, and Malaysian Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) 
structure/challenges to ensure the successful identification of strategic risks 
implementation plans and the associated risk mitigation plans. 
 (Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
 
4.4 RISK DISCLOSURES BY COMPANIES 
 
This section analyses the extent to which different degrees of disclosure categories are 
concentrated or disbursed across companies within the sample. 
 
Table 4.11 shows that all companies disclose some information about operational risk 
and financial risk. However, there are a few companies that do not disclose 
environmental risk and strategic risk information which leave the disclosed companies 
of that two types of risk information are 97.66% and 99.22%, respectively. Further 
analysis shows that for environmental risk and strategic risk, numbers of companies 
that do not disclose any information under these two categories are three and one, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.11: Companies Disclosing Risk Information 
Category Percentage of Total Sample (N=128)  
Operational risk 100.00% 
Environmental risk  97.66% 
Financial risk  100.00% 
Strategic risk  99.22% 
 
4.4.1 Operational Risk Disclosure 
 
Based on Figure 4.4, a majority of the companies (77.34%) had less than 10 sentences 
operational risk threat disclosed in their annual reports. Only one company disclosed 50 
sentences or more about operational risk threat. 
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Figure 4.4: Operational Risk Threat, by Company 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Operational Risk Management, by Company 
 
Based on Figure 4.5, the majority of companies (56.25%) disclosed less than 30 
sentences on operational risk management in their annual reports. There are 3 
companies that disclosed 90 sentences or more in their annual reports. 
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Figure 4.6: Operational Risk Disclosure, by Company 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the majority of companies (65.63 %) disclosed less than 40 sentences 
of total operational risks in their annual reports. The frequency of disclosure of total 
operational risks is skewed to the left, as revealed by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was significant (p = 0.000) and a visual inspection 
of the stem-and-leaf plot confirmed that the operational risk disclosure by companies 
were positively skewed. This result indicates that the assumption of normality was 
violated. This normality test suggests that the degree of total operational risk disclosure 
is widely disbursed across companies in the sample. The inference is that the use of 
regulatory guidelines (by Bursa Malaysia) over this category of disclosure has resulted 
in a diversity of disclosure practices amongst listed companies.  
 
4.4.2 Environmental Risk Disclosure 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the number of companies that disclosed different degrees of 
environmental risk information. There is a dominant concentration of 97.66% of 
companies disclosing less than 15 sentences on environmental risks in their annual 
reports. This is a disclosure category that faced minimal regulation. The result in Figure 
4.7 infers that Malaysian listed companies tend not to voluntarily disclose information 
items about environmental risk, which is a category of company risk that is normally 
outside managements’ control. 
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Figure 4.7: Environmental Risk Disclosure, by Company 
 
4.4.3 Financial Risk Disclosure 
 
The results in Figure 4.8 show that the degree of disclosure of financial risk information 
is well disbursed amongst companies in the sample. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
indicates that the frequency distribution in Figure 4.8 is significantly normal (p=0.083). 
Hence, while the levels of financial risk disclosure are high (e.g., only one company 
disclosed less than 20 sentences of financial risk), the mandating of such disclosures 
has still resulted in widely spread degrees of disclosure across companies. This result is 
consistent with Othman and Ameer (2009) who conclude that the extent of compliance 
of FRS 132 is varied among Malaysian companies even though majority of firms had 
complied with FRS 132.  
 
163 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Financial Risk Disclosure, by Company 
 
4.4.4 Strategic Risk Disclosure 
 
Figure 4.9 shows a concentration of companies at the low end of disclosures of 
information about strategic risk. Hence, a majority of the companies (83.59%) 
disclosed less than 10 sentences on strategic risks in their annual reports.  Similar to the 
results from Figure 4.7 relating to the voluntary disclosure of environmental risks, the 
results in Figure 4.9 infer that most Malaysian listed companies are not inclined to 
voluntarily disclose much information about strategic risk. 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Strategic Risk Disclosure, by Company 
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4.5 RISK DISCLOSURES BY INDUSTRIES 
 
The 128 firms which constitute the sample of this study are extracted from the Bursa 
Malaysia top 200 companies by market capitalization. These firms were categorized 
into seven major sectors based on Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange classification (as 
shown in Chapter 3). These sectors include Trading/Services (42 firms), Construction 
(9 firms), Consumer Product (26 firms), Industrial Product (34 firms), Plantations (6 
firms), Properties (7 firms) and Infrastructure and Technology (4 firms). Table 4.12 
shows the results of risk disclosure among industries.  
 
The results show that the average risk disclosures for all industries are in the range of 
80 to 100 sentences per company except for the infrastructure and technology industry 
which has the highest level of disclosure, 102.25 sentences per company. In general, the 
results provide evidence that firms in infrastructure and technology industries disclose 
more information than firms in other type of industries. For this particular industry, 
being subject to more rapid changes in the development of new instruments and 
technology compared to others will encourage them to increase their disclosure. 
Moreover, the nature of this industry will influence the companies to have more risk 
information disclosed (Amran et al., 2009).  
 
Table 4.12: Average Risk Disclosure per Company and a One-Way ANOVA Test 
INDUSTRY 
AVERAGE 
DISCLOSURE 
ONE WAY ANOVA 
TEST 
F Sig. 
Trading/Services 97.93 
1.2135629 
 
0.303955 
 
Industrial Product 84.14 
Consumer Product 80.68 
Construction 97.00 
Properties 92.57 
Plantation 99.86 
Infrastructure and Technology 102.25 
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It was expected that industry categories would be found to have an effect on the level of 
disclosure, given the findings in previous accounting disclosure studies (e.g., Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2005). However, as shown in the Table 4.12, a one-way ANOVA test 
demonstrates that there is no significance different between industries. Though these 
findings do not support most of the results found in previous literature, the results of 
this study support other studies which have found an insignificant industry-risk 
disclosure relationship (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007). 
Perhaps  the strengthening of Bursa Malaysia’s disclosure guidelines on risk and 
internal controls since the global financial crisis, coupled with a propensity for firms in 
Malaysia to mimic the wording of compliance text in their annual reports, may help 
explain the lack of industry differences. 
 
4.6 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Several highlights can be drawn from the results. As indicated in Table 4.1, the overall 
mean score for total risk disclosure among Malaysian public listed companies in the 
year 2009 was 90.68 sentences. It is noticeable that total sentences for risk disclosure 
ranges from 41 sentences to the maximum of 244 sentences. The total risk disclosures 
mean score in this study is relatively high as compared to the results found in Amran et 
al. (2009). Using a total of 100 Malaysian public listed companies’ annual reports in 
the year 2005, Amran et al. (2009) found that the average total risk management 
disclosure sentences disclosed was only 20.22 sentences, and the risk management 
disclosure ranges from the minimum of three sentences to the maximum of 78 
sentences. The increase in risk reporting from year 2005 (as evidenced by Amran et al., 
(2009)) to 2009 is not altogether a big surprise considering the rising attention towards 
risk reporting triggered by the global financial crisis. The results also suggest that 
Malaysian companies have improved their disclosure level on risk over the years.  
 
Second, the overall result for risk disclosure also shows that the entire 128 companies 
in the sample disclosed some information on risk, namely, operational risk and 
financial risk. These results were not consistent with studies done by Amran et al. 
(2009) in which they found that of the risk type being disclosed, only 96 percent of the 
companies selected in their studies disclosed some kind of information on operation 
risk and 64 percent of the companies disclosed information on financial risk. However, 
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the result on strategic risk reveals that 99.22% companies make disclosure on the 
events related to the strategic decision about their companies while in Amran et al. 
(2009), they show that 97 percent of the companies in their sample disclosed 
information on strategic risk. As a comparison, the results on these three types of 
categories show some incremental disclosure over the years by Malaysian companies 
which may be the reflection of the increase in financial reporting requirements 
especially on financial and operational risks information. Though a few companies are 
identified to not disclose environmental and strategic risk disclosures, overall, these 
results suggest that majority companies in the sample try to signal some kind of risk 
information to the investors at the same time. Based on the signalling theory, investors 
will perceive a higher level of risk of an organisation if such information were not 
disclosed. Blacconiere and Patten (1994) suggest that if management do not disclose 
information which other firms have disclosed, investors would assume it is because the 
information is adverse. 
 
Third, turning to each risk category, it is found that the financial risk category is the 
highest type of risk disclosure in this study. Some items mainly interest rate risk, credit 
risk and foreign currency risk show significant level of disclosure compared to other 
items. All of these items can be found in the notes to the accounts section. Centring on 
the five risk items related to Financial Instruments: Presentation and Disclosure (FRS 
132), further analysis on the types of financial risk is shown in the Table 4.13.  
 
Table 4.13: Financial Risk Related to FRS 132 
Types Of Risk Total Disclosure (%) 
Foreign currency exchange risk 22.44% 
Interest rate risk 19.09% 
Credit risk 18.61% 
Cash flow and Liquidity risk 8.54% 
Price and commodity risk 3.29% 
Market risk 2.86% 
 
 
The results in Table 4.13 show that the highest score is 22.44% for the foreign currency 
exchange risk. The results are inconsistent with the results of Othman and Ameer 
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(2009) and Ismail and Abdul Rahman (2011) in the Malaysian context. Othman and 
Ameer (2009) and Ismail and Abdul Rahman (2011) find that interest rate risk is the 
highest type of market risk disclosed by top 500 companies in the year 2006 and top 
150 companies in the year 2007, respectively. Othman and Ameer (2009) argue that 
this phenomenon is due to the fact that most of the companies in Malaysia are exposed 
to interest rate risk in carrying out their businesses. Instead, this study finds different 
results regarding financial risk disclosure in which the highest score is foreign currency 
exchange risk. This result may be because of the economic factors in the year 2009 
where it was a challenging operating environment by Malaysian companies due to 
higher foreign exchange translation losses, the impact of foreign currency exchange 
exposure and foreign currency exchange debts/borrowings (e.g., Sime Darby Berhad, 
Annual Report 2009; Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Annual Report 2009). 
 
On top of that, most of the Malaysian top companies are seem to comply with the 
requirement in FRS 132 to provide disclosures on financial risk management. Even 
though the extent of compliance with FRS 132 by Malaysian companies varies 
(Othman and Ameer, 2009), the mandatory nature of the regulatory disclosure 
provisions is likely to explain the risk information increases (Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter, 2003). 
 
Considering the second highest risk disclosure category in this study, it is operational 
risk. This study has divided operational risk disclosure into two sub-categories, namely 
operational risk threat and operational risk management. Operational risk threat is more 
related to beyond the requirement of risk reporting by the company, whereas 
operational risk management is more towards compliance with the guidelines for the 
Statement of Internal Control issued by the Bursa Malaysia. Additionally, the bulk of 
operational risk threat can be found in the chairman’s statement section and operation 
review section while operational risk management mostly can be found in the statement 
of internal control section. Of the risk items being disclosed under operational risk 
threat, operating losses and business risk are the most reported. These results show that 
most of the sampled companies are willingly to provide transparency by disclosing 
information about risks they are facing in conducting their businesses. Despite of 
competitiveness, these companies are open to sharing their operating losses to the 
public. The point is that, companies with operational losses might be more concerned 
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about the existence and severity of this risk within their business lines (Hemrit and 
Arab, 2011). 
 
With regards to the sub-category of operational risk management, risk assessment and 
methodology as well as internal control and risk management are the most reported. 
These results correspond to the findings of Ismail and Abdul Rahman (2011) who 
report that operation risk, risk assessment, control environment and control activities 
are the most disclosed information. There are two plausible explanations for these 
results. First, these disclosures prominently reflect the demanding pressures by public 
listed companies in Malaysia to follow the guidelines for their internal control 
statement. Managements are aware that investors deprived of detailed company risk 
information; therefore, voluntary disclosure of internal control by companies could 
signal their commitment to maintaining effective internal control to safeguard 
shareholders’ investment and company’s assets (Haron et al., 2010). Second, according 
to signalling theory, managers have the incentive to voluntarily disclose operational 
risk to signal to investors their ability in coping with the risk within the firm. These 
companies will also be encouraged to disclose information relating to their capabilities 
with respect to operational risk management in order to convince the market that losses 
affecting their capital are less likely to happen. Therefore, even though to follow the 
guidelines is not mandatory, most of the companies choose to comply with them. 
Operational risk information by companies could benefit the community in the form of 
providing relevant information on the state of risk management and internal control 
within a company and also as a signal to the quality of the firm.  
 
The category of strategic risk is among the two least disclosure, averaging 767 
sentences. This result is slightly higher than finding by Amran et al. (2009) who found 
that strategic risk is only 647 sentences.  In comparison with the studies by Amran et al. 
(2009), it is evident from this small gap that Malaysian companies choose to disclose 
less risk information voluntarily. This is because, although there is the general 
requirement of the Bursa Malaysia for companies to discuss industry trends and 
company performance, it is so general that it does not explicitly require companies to 
discuss risks (Amran et al., 2009). Under signalling theory, an incentive for a firm to 
disclose potential information on risk is that not doing so will subject the management 
to substantial reputation and litigation costs if the risk becomes known through 
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subsequent events (Skinner, 1994). Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) support the view that 
managers may draw negative attention by withholding information. To avoid the 
company from being into a competitive disadvantage, when necessary, managements 
only disclose not more than the minimum required information. In other words, if one 
company provides overall detail on its strategic problems and strategic risk 
management, competitors of the company might relatively glean its valuable and vital 
commercial insight. In a different aspect, managements can always find positive ways 
of describing risk and risk management for fear of this competitive disadvantage.  
 
With regard to the final category, environmental risk disclosure, economic 
outlook/prospect and investor relations demonstrate the highest disclosure. These 
results show that the directors acknowledge the need for shareholders to be informed of 
all material business matters affecting the company especially during the global 
economic downturn. For example, one company writes:  
 
Under the current global economic scenario, as business fundamentals and credible 
accounting become the new touchstones by which investors judge corporate quality, the 
company has continued to maintain good communications with its investors and 
analysts, in an effort to avoid undue market volatility and ensure that the company gets 
credit for the strategies they pursue. The core of good investor relations practice hinges 
on the need for clarity in communication, top management commitment of time, 
consistency in reporting over time, and being proactive in anticipating questions.  
(Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Annual Report 2009) 
 
The global economic crisis seems to reflect the information disclosure by companies on 
environmental risk. Almost all companies under study stated this scenario in their 
annual reports and try to predict the future. Management is less willingly to talk about 
the downside risk situation, unless the risks are completely out of their control, such as 
economic outlook or economic prospect due to the national and global economic crisis. 
The following quotations are examples relating the economic outlook/prospect that has 
been disclosed by companies under study: 
 
There are signs of a slow but sure economic recovery on the global and domestic 
fronts. In line with this, TNB’s Board of Directors, while cautious, is optimistic about 
our prospects going forward. While external factors will to some extent impact on the 
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Group’s performance in the new financial year, TNB will undertake the necessary 
measures to mitigate volatile operating costs while enhancing our operational 
efficiencies...through undertaking the necessary due diligence and professional 
assessment of the risks and profitability involved.  
(Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Annual Report 2009). 
 
While 2009 ended on an optimistic note, the economic outlook for 2010 still falls short 
of the pre-crisis years. The crisis has not only altered ICT expenditure, but also 
customers’ consumption behaviour.  
(Telekom Malaysia Berhad, Annual Report 2009). 
 
2009 was a volatile year, troubled by a worldwide economic slowdown and financial 
turmoil in the world’s major markets. This economic crisis had an adverse effect on our 
exports of auto parts and plastic products and sales of automobiles and auto parts, palm 
oil, palm oil products and tourism.  
(Oriental Holdings Berhad Annual Report 2009) 
 
On the one hand, managers may have incentives to voluntarily disclose environmental 
risk disclosure because investors would perceive a higher level of risk in the firm’s 
environment in the absence of such disclosure. On the other hand, it would give 
pressure for the managers to transparently disclose too much risk information as this 
issue could affect a company’s share price. Since investors were expected to be already 
aware about some of the current issues such as the economic/financial crisis around the 
world, they would somehow speculate on how it would affect individual local 
companies. By disclosing management’s perspective (‘through management’s eyes’) on 
how the external economic condition or situation could affect the company, this would 
signal credible information to investors for them to estimate the future value of a 
company’s share price. Moreover, disclosing risk information especially the 
uncontrollable risk would give a positive signal involving the firm’s transparency about 
the exposure to the aftermath from the global economic slowdown. As a result, this 
could prevent the decline of share prices (Skinner, 1994) because this additional risk 
information is likely to attract investors and improve the firm’s value as well as can 
prevent competitive advantage by peers. 
 
171 
 
The statistical tests conducted demonstrated that risk disclosures do not vary much 
between companies in different industries. The results showed that risk disclosures are 
in the range of 80 to 100 sentences for all industries except for the infrastructure and 
technology industries. These infrastructure and technology industries may be subject to 
more complex and fast-moving nature than others, and therefore, increase their 
disclosure in order to avoid the appearance of failing to meet the rapid development in 
technologies for other similar companies. The relatively parallel level of risk disclosure 
by other industries reflects the high level of competition (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 
1986).  
 
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to examine the nature and extent of corporate risk disclosure 
practices of 128 large Malaysian companies in the year 2009. The level of risk 
disclosure is measured using a content analysis approach. Content analysis is used to 
reveal absolute corporate risk disclosure levels of Malaysian companies.  
 
The analysis has revealed a significant level of risk information disclosed by companies 
in the sample including financial risk, operational risk, strategic risk and environmental 
risk categories. Most disclosures are found to be related to financial risk and 
operational risk. It is observed that most disclosures are in accordance to the Financial 
Reporting Standard (FRS 132). Meanwhile, some other disclosures are about being 
generalised policy statements based on the integrity of the company’s internal control 
system and risk management procedures aiming to assure the investor of the annual 
report that these procedures are in place. Therefore, it is inferred that managers are 
seeking to demonstrate that they are accountable to shareholders by being able to 
manage risk at best.    
 
The results presented in this chapter will be utilised in the next chapters for conducting 
further analysis in order to examine the link between corporate risk disclosure and 
management-specific characteristics and ownership characteristics as well as the impact 
of corporate risk disclosure on firm value.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF DETERMINANTS AND VALUE 
RELEVANCE OF RISK DISCLOSURE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents the results of descriptive, univariate and multivatiate analysis of 
the data collected on risk disclosure and its determinants. The analysis includes tests of 
the hypotheses (hypotheses two until ten) as specified in Chapter 3. This chapter also 
provides a discussion of these results.  The results of data analysis are presented in two 
parts. The first part relates to the results of risk disclosure analysis using upper echelons 
characteristics (age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity) and ownership 
characteristics (family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership). The 
second part is concerned with results about the value relevance to investors in the share 
market of the risk-related disclosures in company annual reports.  
 
The premise of this thesis is that risk-related disclosures represent information of 
importance to the decision making of shareholders, but the nature and extent of these 
disclosures is determined largely by management. Hence, evidence that certain 
characteristics of key management personnel are predictors of risk-related disclosure is 
only of interest if it is found that these risk-related disclosures have relevance to 
shareholders’ decision-making and affect the equity value of the company. The two 
phases of data modelling and analysis in this chapter, therefore, provide a 
complementary picture of the corporate risk-related disclosure issue. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
continuous and dichotomous variables used in the regression tests for both the upper 
management/ownership models and value relevance model. Both of these models are 
further analysed in Section 5.3 utilising Pearson product moment correlation analysis 
between the independent variables. Section 5.4 reports the results of the multiple 
regression analysis for the determinants of risk disclosure using the baseline model 
which contains upper management and ownership characteristics as the independent 
variables. To ascertain the credibility of the initial analysis, Section 5.5 presents the 
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results of several additional tests that were conducted to determine the sensitivity and 
the robustness of the regression results given in the baseline model. Section 5.6 
examines the results of the multiple regression analysis for the value relevance of risk 
disclosure. Section 5.7 examines whether endogeneity problem exists. Section 5.8 
discusses the overall findings of the study. Section 5.9 - summary and conclusions ends 
the chapter. 
 
5.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
 
5.2.1 Determinants of Risk Disclosure 
 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present the descriptive statistics of the continuous and 
dichotomous variables, respectively, used in the baseline model for regression tests of 
risk disclosure and its determinants. As reported in Table 5.1, the mean value of total 
risk disclosure is 90.68 sentences (the average number of risk disclosure sentences 
disclosed by the 128 sampled companies in 2009) which is approximately 37% of the 
maximum score of 244 sentences. The table shows that there is a fair amount of 
variation in the disclosure frequency for the sampled companies. The overall disclosure 
frequency ranges from 41 to 244 sentences. The mean score for each category of risk 
disclosure reveals that financial risk disclosure is highest (40.18 sentences), closely 
followed by operational risk disclosure (38.67 sentences). The risk categories of 
environmental risk disclosure (5.84 sentences) and strategic risk disclosure (5.99 
sentences) are much lower. 
 
Turning to predictor variables, Table 5.1 shows that in terms of upper management 
characteristics, the age of CEOs ranges from 38 years old to 75 years old with the 
average age of 54 years old. The age of CACs on the other hand ranges from 40 years 
old to 88 years old with the average age of 63 years old. With respect to functional 
track characteristics, Table 5.2 shows the majority of CEOs and CACs are in the 
‘throughput’ category. This is shown by the average value of 64.8 percent and 85.2 
percent, respectively. With regards to tenure characteristics, the length ranges from zero 
to 40 years for the CEOs and zero to 37 years for the CACs with the average of 11.34 
years and 8.54 years, respectively. This result shows that the CEOs tenure in Malaysian  
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables 
  N N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
(Sentence count for 
disclosure items. Applies to 
each risk disclosure 
category) 
     
      
Total Risk Disclosure 
(TOTAL_RD)  
 
128 41 244 90.68 36.623 
Operational Risk Disclosure 
(OPER_RD) 
 
128 9 144 38.67 23.386 
Environmental Risk 
Disclosure (ENVIRO_RD) 
 
128 0 24 5.84 3.956 
Financial Risk Disclosure  
(FIN_RD) 
 
128 14 86 40.18 11.962 
Strategic Risk Disclosure 
(STRAT_RD) 
 
128 0 25 5.99 4.713 
Age CEO (years) 
(AGE_CEO) 
 
128 38 75 53.76 7.347 
Age CAC (years) 
(AGE_CAC) 
 
128 40 88 63.42 9.515 
Tenure CEO (years) 
(TEN_CEO) 
 
128 0 40 11.34 10.157 
Tenure CAC (years) 
(TEN_CAC) 
 
128 0 37 8.54 7.211 
Family Ownership (ratio) 
(FAMCTRL) 
 
128 0.000 0.670 0.137 0.199 
Government Ownership 
(%) (GOVOWN) 
 
128 0.000 82.040 13.359 18.684 
Foreign Ownership (%) 
(FOROWN) 
 
128 0.000 59.610 9.274 12.701 
Size (RM mil) (LNSIZE) 
 
128 234.1 71363.0 5695.0 10286.7 
Leverage (ratio) (LEV) 
 
128 0.000 3.880 0.367 0.584 
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companies is longer than the CACs tenure, suggesting that some of the CEOs are also 
likely to be the founder or pioneer of the companies. 
 
Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Dichotomous Variables 
N 128 
Dichotomous Variable 1 0 
Functional Track CEO 64.8% 35.2% 
(FUNCTR_CEO) 83 45 
Functional Track CAC 85.2% 14.8% 
(FUNCTR_CAC) 109 19 
Education of CEO 26.6% 73.4% 
(EDU_CEO) 34 94 
Education of CAC  56.3% 43.7% 
(EDU_CAC) 72 56 
Ethnicity CEO 34.4% 65.6% 
(ETHN_CEO) 44 84 
Ethnicity CAC 50.8% 49.2% 
(ETHN_CAC) 65 63 
Auditor Size 74.2% 25.8% 
(BIG4) 95 33 
Trading / Services sector 32.8% 67.2% 
(TRADSERV) 42 86 
Consumer sector 20.3% 79.7% 
(CONSUMER) 26 102 
Industrial sector 26.6% 73.4% 
(INDUSTRIAL) 34 94 
Construction sector 7.0% 93.0% 
(CONSTRUCTION) 9 119 
Plantation sector 4.7% 95.3% 
(PLANTATION) 6 122 
Property sector 5.5% 94.5% 
(PROPERTY) 7 121 
Infrastructure and Technology sectors 3.1% 96.9% 
(INFRATECH) 4 124 
 
 
In terms of ownership characteristics, family domination is found in Table 5.1 to vary 
from the proportion of zero to 67 percent, with an average proportion of family 
ownership about 14 percent. With regards to government ownership, the percentage 
ranges from zero to about 82 percent with an average ownership of 13.36 percent. The 
percentage of foreign shareholdings for the sample ranges from zero to 59.61 percent, 
with average foreign shareholdings of about 9.27 percent. 
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The mean size, as represented by total assets of the firm, is RM 5,700,000, 000. The 
average for firm leverage is 36.66 percent which is slightly lower than the sample 
documented by Amran et al. (2009) and higher than that documented by Ismail and 
Abdul Rahman (2011). The average for firm leverage in their samples was 43.12 
percent and 24 percent, respectively.  
 
As reported in Table 5.2 for the education characteristics, the majority of CEOs (73.4 
percent) do not have any professional accounting qualifications or MBA qualifications. 
On the other hand, more than half of the CACs (56.3 percent) hold professional 
accounting qualifications or MBA qualifications. With respect to the ethnicity of 
managers, Bumiputera
28
 CEOs represent an average of 34 percent of the sample 
companies, indicating non-Bumiputera CEOs domination in the Malaysian 
corporations. However, the average of CACs who are Bumiputera is slightly higher 
(50.8%) than the non-Bumiputera CACs (49.2%).   
 
In terms of auditor size, 74.2 percent of companies are audited by a Big 4 audit firm, 
which is higher than that reported by Yatim’s (2010) 69.1%, and almost similar to the 
one reported by Hassan et al. (2008), 74.38%. Finally, with respect to the industry 
classification, 32.8 percent of companies fall under the trading/services sector. This is 
followed by the industrial product sector and consumer product sector which comprise 
of 27 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The rest of the industry classifications form 
a minority proportion which comprise of construction, plantation, property and 
infrastructure and technology industries with the average values of 7.0 percent, 4.7 
percent, 5.5 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the continuous and dichotomous variables  presented in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are intended to convey a broad profile of the nature and extent of 
corporate risk disclosure practices, as well as the background profile of factors that are 
modelled as prospective explanatory variables. These descriptive statistics are not 
presented for the purpose of establishing that corporate risk disclosure has increased 
(decreased) due to predictor variables (continuous and dichotomous). 
                                               
28
 In this study, Bumiputera refers to the Malay group and non-Bumiputera refers to the non-Malays 
which include Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian Indians and other ethnicity background.  
177 
 
5.2.2 Value Relevance of Risk Disclosure 
 
Table 5.3 displays the descriptive statistics of the sampled firms’ value as proxied by 
their share prices (180 days after the financial year end). Note that all public listed 
companies in Malaysia must prepare their annual reports and ensure that the audited 
annual reports are available to public not later than six months (180 days) after the 
financial year end. The table also offers descriptive statistics for risk disclosure and 
other variables related to the value relevance model, namely earnings per share and 
book value of net assets per share. Note that Table 5.3 is presented separately to Table 
5.1 because it presents the profile of a self-contained set of variables which are to be 
used for a separate model – the value-relevance model – in which regulated and non-
regulated risk disclosure become the independent variables, not the dependent variable 
of total risk disclosure as presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.3  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
Share prices (SP) 
(in RM)  (180 days 
after financial year 
end) 
0.19 43.88 3.891 5.647 
 
Earnings per share 
(EPS) (in sen) 
-79.60 261.50 23.855 38.702 
 
Book value of net 
assets per share 
(BVNAS) (in RM) 
-1.87 11.88 2.403 2.028 
 
Total Risk 
Disclosure (TRD) 
(sentence) 
41 244 90.920 32.817 
 
Regulated Risk 
Disclosure (RRD) 
(sentence) 
14 86 40.150 12.294 
 
Non-regulated  
Risk Disclosure 
(NRRD) (sentence) 
18 165 50.780 27.165 
178 
 
Table 5.3 reveals that there is a broad range of variation in the sample. Total risk 
disclosure level ranges from 41 to 244 sentences with a mean of 90.92 sentences and a 
standard deviation of 32.817.
29
 Total risk disclosure has been categorized further into 
regulated risk disclosure and non-regulated risk disclosure. Regulated risk disclosure 
ranges from 14 sentences to 86 sentences with a mean of 40.15 sentences and a 
standard deviation of 12.294. Non-regulated risk disclosure ranges from 18 sentences to 
165 sentences with a mean of 50.78 sentences and a standard deviation of 27.165. 
Earnings per share ranges from -79.60 sen to 261.50 sen, with a mean of 23.86 sen and 
a standard deviation of 38.70. Book value of net assets per share ranges from -1.87 to 
11.88 with a mean of 2.40 and a standard deviation of 2.03. Market value of a company 
as measured by share prices (180 days after the financial year end) ranges from RM0.19 
to RM43.88 with a mean of RM3.89 and a standard deviation of 5.65. 
 
Normality tests were conducted on all variables having continuous data in Tables 5.1 
and 5.3. Price (2000) states that a reasonably accurate way of determining if the degree 
of skewness is "significantly skewed" is to compare the numerical value for "skewness" 
with twice the "standard error of skewness" and include the range from minus twice the 
standard error of skewness to plus twice the standard error of skewness. If the value for 
skewness falls within this range, the skewness is considered not seriously violated. 
Similarly, a range of "normality" can be constructed for kurtosis by multiplying the 
standard error of kurtosis by 2 and going from minus that value to plus that value. 
These range tests were conducted and it was found that all these variables computed to 
be within the acceptable range for both skewness and kurtosis. One exception was total 
assets data which has been transformed to its natural logarithm. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
29
 This table represent different figure of mean and standard deviation of total risk disclosure in this study 
as the overall sample of companies are reduced to 117 instead of 128 firms originally. The use of a 
higher sample size for descriptive statistics in Chapter 4 compared to inferrential data analysis in Chapter 
5 is not consequential to the findings. As noted already in the results, the average sentences of total risk 
disclosure is 90.68 in Chapter 4 and 90.92 in Chapter 5. The removal from the sample of a small number 
of firms that had a small amount of missing data was deemed unnecessary. 
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5.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
 
5.3.1 Correlation Analysis of Determinants of Risk Disclosure 
 
To examine the correlation between the independent variables, a Pearson product-
moment correlation (r) is computed. Correlation analysis measures the strength or 
degree of linear association between two variables. Firstly, it is important to assess the 
validity of the disclosure score since the measurement of disclosure score requires 
judgement by the researcher. A firm’s disclosure policies as well as disclosure 
strategies are coordinated across several means and resources which include disclosure 
components of the disclosure index (Botosan, 1997). Hence, there should be a direct 
positive relationship between the overall disclosure level and its components, as well as 
between each component compared to another. Table 5.4 presents the results of a 
Pearson correlation test between total risk disclosure frequency and its components. 
The correlation results presented in the table indicate that the four disclosure 
components (operational risk disclosure, environmental risk disclosure, financial risk 
disclosure and strategic risk disclosure) exhibit a positive and highly significant 
correlation with the total risk disclosure.  
 
Secondly, the Pearson product-moment correlation analysis has been performed to test 
the correlation between the dependent variable (risk disclosure sentences) and 
independent variables. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients enable the 
measurement of correlation between disclosure sentences and other variables. Table 5.5 
reports the results for the test of correlation. 
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Table 5.4 
Correlation Coefficients between the Components of Risk Disclosure Frequency 
Variables 
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Total Risk Disclosure Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
1.000     
Operational Risk  Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.895** 
0.000 
1.000    
Environmental Risk  Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.464** 
0.000 
0.283** 
0.001 
1.000   
Financial Risk  Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.617** 
0.000 
0.267** 
0.002 
0.180* 
0.042 
1.000  
Strategic Risk  Pearson correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
0.526** 
0.000 
0.315** 
0.000 
0.497** 
0.000 
0.231** 
0.009 
1.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Total Risk Disclosure is the total risk disclosure sentences. Operational Risk, Environmental 
Risk, Financial Risk and Strategic Risk are proportions of the Total Risk Disclosure sentences. 
 
Turning to correlations between the independent and dependent variables, Table 5.5 
shows that ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO), family ownership (FAMCTRL), 
government ownership (GOVOWN) and company size (LNSIZE) are significantly 
related to total risk disclosure (p < 0.01). Age of CEO (AGE_CEO), tenure of CEO 
(TEN_CEO), leverage (LEV) and auditor size (BIG4) are also significantly related to 
total risk disclosure (p < 0.05). Other independent variables and control variables are 
not correlated with total risk disclosure. The correlation coefficient between age of 
CEO, tenure of CEO and family ownership with the total risk disclosure are negative. 
These results indicate that risk disclosure decreases with the increase of the CEOs’ age 
and their tenure in the company as well as when the ownership of the company belongs 
to the family members.  
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Table 5.5 
Correlation Coefficients between Risk Disclosure and Independent Variables 
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AGE_CEO -0.188* -0.176* -0.125 -0.104 -0.061 
AGE_CAC 0.044 0.060 -0.077 0.023 0.013 
FUNCT_CEO 0.095 0.120 -0.035 0.000 0.093 
FUNCT_CAC 0.047 0.052 0.069 -0.064 0.173 
EDU_CEO 0.116 0.178* -0.087 -0.030 0.069 
EDU_CAC 0.105 0.099 0.226** -0.056 0.216* 
TEN_CEO -0.181* -0.181* -0.135 -0.049 -0.119 
TEN_CAC -0.002 -0.017 -0.170 0.135 -0.125 
ETHN_CEO 0.490** 0.521** 0.222* 0.108 0.348** 
ETHN_CAC -0.022 -0.053 0.003 -0.007 0.128 
FAMCTRL -0.277** -0.321** -0.086 -0.028 -0.182* 
GOVOWN 0.445** 0.415** 0.267** 0.188* 0.315** 
FOROWN 0.022 -0.013 0.055 0.057 0.024 
LNSIZE 0.456** 0.414** 0.255** 0.237** 0.287** 
LEV 0.179* 0.245** 0.032 0.003 -0.012 
BIG4 0.199* 0.227** 0.039 0.019 0.170 
TRADSERV 0.156 0.211* -0.030 -0.050 0.185* 
CONSUMER -0.165 -0.146 -0.013 -0.102 -0.144 
INDUSTRIAL -0.111 -0.105 -0.065 0.001 -0.191* 
CONSTRUCTION 0.076 0.018 -0.035 0.111 0.183* 
PLANTATION 0.039 0.003 -0.010 0.087 0.040 
PROPERTY 0.014 -0.084 0.193* 0.112 0.066 
OTHERS 0.064 0.116 0.087 -0.048 -0.086 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
With respect to the regulatory guidance influenced operational risk disclosure, this is 
significantly positively correlated to ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO), government 
182 
 
ownership (GOVOWN), company size (LNSIZE), leverage (LEV) and auditor size 
(BIG4) and is significantly negatively correlated to family ownership (FAMCTRL) (p 
< 0.01). Similar to the total risk disclosure, both age of CEO (AGE_CEO) and tenure of 
CEO (TEN_CEO) are significantly negatively related with operational risk disclosure 
(p < 0.05). Another upper echelons characteristic that is correlated with operational risk 
disclosure is education of CEO (EDU_CEO) which is significantly positively related (p 
< 0.05). This indicates that CEOs who are lower age, have been in the position of CEO 
for a shorter period and hold either a professional accounting or MBA qualification 
tend to manage firms that disclose more operational risk information. 
 
With regards to financial risk disclosure, it is significantly positively related to 
government ownership (GOVOWN) and company size (LNSIZE). In relation with 
upper echelons characteristics, no variable is found to have correlation with financial 
risk disclosure. This indicates that demographic characteristics of top managers are 
likely to have no influence towards regulated financial risk disclosure.  
 
Unregulated disclosures in categories of environmental and strategic risks reveal 
similar significant relationships with upper echelons and ownership characteristics. 
Both variables are significantly positively related to ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO), 
government ownership (GOVOWN) and company size (LNSIZE). However, only 
strategic risk disclosure is negatively correlated with family ownership (FAMCTRL) (p 
< 0.05) and significantly positively related to education of the CAC (EDU_CAC). This 
indicates that family ownership companies and CACs with higher education tend to 
narrower disclosure of more non-technical risk information.  
 
With respect to industry classifications, the results are varied in terms of discretionary 
disclosures. The trading/services sector is found to disclose more information on 
operational risk and strategic risk. Companies within the construction sector also tend 
to disclose more information on strategic risk. However, companies within the 
industrial sector are found to disclose less information on strategic risk. Companies 
within the property sector on the other hand tend to disclose more environmental risk. 
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5.3.2 Correlation Analysis of Value Relevance of Risk Disclosure 
 
Table 5.6 gives the results of the Pearson correlation coefficients between share prices 
(180 days after the financial year end) and key reported accounting numbers, namely, 
earnings per share and book value of net asset per share. It also gives the correlations 
between share prices and risk disclosure levels (total risk disclosure, regulated risk 
disclosure and non-regulated risk disclosure). These results show that there is a positive 
and significant relationship (p < 0.01) between share price (SP) and both earnings per 
share (EPS) and book value of net asset per share (BVNAS) as expected in the value 
relevance model suggesting the earnings and assets have value relevance to equity 
market investors. This is consistent with prior value relevance studies (e.g. Hassan and 
Mohd Salleh, 2010). 
 
However, with regard to the relationship between share prices and total risk disclosure, 
the correlation is not significant although total risk disclosure has the expected sign. 
Total risk disclosure does not appear to have value relevance. However, non-regulated 
risk disclosure (i.e., operational, environmental and strategic categories) is found to be 
significant and positively related to share price so gives preliminary evidence of having 
value relevance to equity market investors. This preliminary evidence that value-
relevance could apply to non-regulated categories of risk disclosure suggests that 
security analysts view voluntary disclosures, especially in the sensitive area of risk, as 
proprietary information. Analysts would tend to give greater attention to proprietary 
information as a potential signal for share price arbitrage decisions. 
 
With respect to the correlation among variables for both determinants of risk disclosure 
and value relevance of risk disclosure, the correlation matrix confirms that 
multicollinearity is at acceptable levels between the independent variables, as they do 
not correlate above 0.80 with the exception of the correlations between total and non-
regulated components of risk disclosure.  
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Table 5.6 
Correlation Matrix between Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variables Share 
Prices 
(SP)  
Earnings 
per Share 
(EPS) 
Book 
Value of 
Net Asset 
per Share 
(BVNAS) 
Total Risk 
Disclosure 
(TRD) 
Regulated 
Risk 
Disclosure 
(RRD) 
Non-
regulated 
Risk 
Disclosure 
(NRRD) 
Share 
Prices (SP) 
1      
Earnings 
per Share 
(EPS) 
0.796** 1     
Book Value 
of Net Asset 
per Share 
(BVNAS) 
0.348** 0.291** 1    
Total Risk 
Disclosure 
(TRD) 
0.149 0.064 0.280** 1   
Regulated 
Risk 
Disclosure 
(RRD) 
-0.014 -0.060 0.138 0.607** 1  
Non-
regulated 
Risk 
Disclosure 
(NRRD) 
0.186* 0.105 0.276** 0.933** 0.281** 1 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
 
5.4 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINANTS OF RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 
5.4.1 Baseline Model 
 
Table 5.7 summarises the results from multiple regression analysis linking upper 
echelons characteristics, ownership characteristics and total risk disclosure and its 
components. In terms of the strength of each regression in Table 5.7, the F-value for the 
total risk disclosure as well as for its components is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level except for the financial risk disclosure. When financial risk disclosure is 
the dependent variable, the model fit is not statistically significant. The adjusted R
2
 for 
each of the models for operational risk disclosure, environmental risk disclosure, 
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strategic risk disclosure and total risk disclosure, respectively, provide a reasonable 
level of explanatory power, ranging from 16.4 percent to 31.4 percent. The adjusted R
2 
of 31.4 percent for total risk disclosure is slightly lower than that reported in the 
previous Malaysian study by Amran et al. (2009). They modelled the relationship of 
company diversification strategy, leverage, company size and industry to the risk 
management disclosure, and obtained adjusted R
2 
of 43.3 percent. Other studies on risk 
disclosures also report adequate adjusted R
2 
such as studies by Ismail and Abdul 
Rahman (2011) within the Malaysian context and Hassan (2009) within the UAE 
context, which were 28.1 percent and 29.3 percent, respectively. Given that Ismail and 
Abdul Rahman (2011) had a multi-industry sample of similar size to this thesis (124 
companies), the comparison of its R
2
 value is justifiable. Since Hassan (2009) had a 
sample size of only 41 companies, its comparison would not be as strong. 
 
To test for multicollinearity, the variable inflation factor (VIF) statistic is computed for 
each independent variable contained in the model in Table 5.7. The results of this VIF 
test, not reported here, reveal that the VIF statistic is not above 10 for any of the 
independent variables. By meeting this VIF benchmark (Myers, 1990), it can be 
concluded that multicollinearity is not severe in its effect on the regression analysis 
results in this thesis. 
 
Further results revealed in Table 5.7 are that three out of the ten manager’s 
characteristics tested in the study are significantly associated with total risk disclosure. 
The results presented show a significant effect of functional track of CEO 
(FUNCT_CEO), tenure of CEO (TEN_CEO) and ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO) on 
total risk disclosure. The analysis also shows that government ownership is 
significantly related to total risk disclosure. 
 
The final four columns of Table 5.7 present the results for the disaggregated categories 
of total risk disclosure. Results indicate that education of CEO (EDU_CEO) and 
education of CAC (EDU_CAC) have significant effects on the disclosure of 
environmental risk whereas only education of CAC (EDU_CAC) has significant effect 
on strategic risk disclosure. The tenure of both positions (TEN_CEO and TEN_CAC) 
has significant effects on the disclosure of strategic risk and environmental risk, 
respectively. Ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO) and ethnicity of CAC (ETHN_CAC) 
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have a significant effect on the disclosure of operational and strategic risk information. 
For the financial risk disclosure, upper echelons characteristics are found to be 
unrelated to the disclosure of such information. The analysis also shows that only 
environmental risk disclosure is impacted by the existence of government as the owner. 
 
Each of the relationships found in Table 5.7 is now discussed in turn, in respect of the 
hypotheses that are tested.  
 
5.4.1.1 Upper Echelons and Total Risk Disclosure 
5.4.1.1.1 Chief Executive Officer (CEO)  
From the analyses in Table 5.7, the relationship between age of CEO (AGE_CEO) and 
total risk disclosure is negative and supports the contention that older managers are 
more conservative and have a tendency to not disclose more information on risk. Since 
older CEO are already established and obtain their place in society therefore they 
continue to choose a strategy that helps them maintain this position by disclosing less 
risk information. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant; hence, 
hypotheses H02A is rejected. This result is inconsistent with previous studies by Bamber 
et al. (2010) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who found that older generation of 
managers develop more conservative disclosure styles in their decision-making. 
 
Second, this study finds a significantly negative association between functional tracks 
of CEO (FUNCT_CEO) with total risk disclosure (p < 10%). This suggests that CEO 
with experience in ‘throughput functions’ will disclose less information on risk. This 
finding is consistent with recent findings by Bamber et al. (2010) that report managers 
promoted from accounting and finance reflect elements of conservatism and distaste for 
ambiguity. Therefore, this finding supports hypothesis H03A. 
 
Third, it is found that the education of CEO (EDU_CEO) in terms of those holding a 
professional accounting qualification or an MBA qualification is significantly 
positively related to total risk disclosures. This result shows that managers with higher 
qualifications incline to disclose more risk information. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant thus allowing this study to reject hypotheses H04A. This result is 
consistent with a study done by Ge et al. (2009). 
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Table 5.7: Multiple Regression Results – Baseline Model 
 
MODEL 1: RDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + β5EDU_CEOjt + β6EDU_CACjt + 
β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + β10ETHN_CACjt + β11FAMCTRLjt + β12GOVOWNjt + β13FOROWNjt + β14LNSIZEjt + 
β15LEVjt + β16BIG4jt + β17DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt 
 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
(Constant) -104.427 -1.704* -77.789 -1.747* -12.837 -1.565 13.220 0.489 -27.022 -2.887*** 
AGE_CEO -0.003 -0.033 0.031 0.342 -0.055 -0.560 -0.081 -0.752 0.078 0.821 
AGE_CAC -0.014 -0.140 -0.002 -0.023 0.063 0.573 -0.081 -0.675 0.068 0.645 
FUNCT_CEO -0.164 -1.866* -0.146 -1.638 -0.105 -1.079 -0.101 -0.947 -0.069 -0.745 
FUNCT_CAC -0.040 -0.464 -0.003 -0.030 -0.043 -0.449 -0.100 -0.959 0.025 0.270 
EDU_CEO 0.028 0.305 0.104 1.135 -0.171 -1.706* -0.038 -0.350 -0.086 -0.897 
EDU_CAC 0.079 0.795 0.034 0.339 0.235 2.126** -0.020 -0.164 0.233 2.203** 
TEN_CEO -0.183 -1.958* -0.131 -1.385 -0.089 -0.861 -0.145 -1.287 -0.173 -1.754* 
TEN_CAC 0.067 0.687 0.072 0.729 -0.192 -1.777* 0.154 1.307 -0.123 -1.191 
ETHN_CEO 0.291 2.938*** 0.331 3.295*** 0.114 1.042 0.046 0.389 0.159 1.522 
ETHN_CAC 0.025 0.311 -0.011 -0.135 0.092 1.049 -0.006 -0.066 0.164 1.949* 
FAMCTRL -0.069 -0.773 -0.132 -1.456 0.035 0.351 0.049 0.452 0.024 0.252 
GOVOWN 0.185 1.854* 0.103 1.015 0.203 1.848* 0.182 1.517 0.137 1.304 
FOROWN 0.028 0.328 -0.017 -0.202 0.033 0.361 0.064 0.636 0.085 0.955 
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 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
SIZE 0.349 3.563*** 0.260 2.619*** 0.294 2.716*** 0.244 2.065** 0.261 2.519** 
LEV -0.068 -0.676 -0.004 -0.040 -0.140 -1.262 -0.070 -0.577 -0.155 -1.460 
BIG4 0.047 0.566 0.076 0.900 0.029 0.318 -0.068 -0.675 0.097 1.096 
TRADSERV 0.152 0.370 0.177 0.424 -0.101 -0.223 -0.173 -0.349 0.700 1.610 
CONSUMER 0.148 0.419 0.150 0.418 0.079 0.202 -0.130 -0.304 0.546 1.459 
INDUSTRIAL 0.189 0.492 0.201 0.514 0.010 0.024 -0.080 -0.172 0.509 1.250 
CONSTRUCTION 0.199 0.844 0.126 0.527 0.010 0.037 0.081 0.283 0.542 2.171** 
PLANTATION 0.136 0.678 0.097 0.476 0.017 0.078 0.028 0.118 0.374 1.768* 
PROPERTY 0.145 0.687 0.071 0.334 0.228 0.981 0.019 0.074 0.409 1.832* 
INFRATECH 0.105 0.655 0.180 1.107 0.060 0.340 -0.155 -0.804 0.178 1.052 
Adjusted R
2
 0.314 0.295 0.164 0.005 0.233 
F-Value 3.530*** 3.315*** 2.085*** 1.030 2.681*** 
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Notes: 
***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level 
RD = measured by risk disclosure score for year 2009, AGE_CEO = Age of CEO, AGE_CAC = Age of CAC, FUNCT_CEO = Functional track of CEO, FUNCT_CAC = 
Functional track of CAC, EDU_CEO = Education of CEO, EDU_CAC = Education of CAC, TEN_CEO = tenure of CEO, TEN_CAC = Tenure of CAC, ETHN_CEO = 
Ethnicity of CEO, ETHN_CAC = Ethnicity of CAC, FAMCTRL = Family ownership, GOVOWN = Government ownership, FOROWN = Foreign ownership,  LNSIZE = 
Company size, LEV = Leverage, BIG4 = Auditor size, DUMMY (INDUSTRY) = Industry classification. 
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Fourth, the results provide support for the relationship between the CEO’s tenure 
(TEN_CEO) with total risk disclosure, which reveals a negative significant relationship 
(p < 10%). This finding suggests that long-tenured CEOs become devoted to their 
paradigm and avoid information that disconfirms this paradigm (Hambrick and 
Fukutomi, 1991). This result also indicates that the longer a CEO serves in affirm, the 
lower total risk disclosure is expected. Therefore, hypothesis H05A can be accepted.  
 
Finally, the relationship between ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO) and total risk 
disclosure is positive, suggesting that greater risk disclosure is associated with 
Bumiputera CEOs. The coefficient is significant for the relationship between 
Bumiputera CEOs (ETHN_CEO) and total risk disclosure. Hence, hypothesis H06A is 
accepted. This result is consistent with prior findings by Haniffa and Cooke (2002). 
They found a significant association between Bumiputera composition and voluntary 
disclosure for the Malaysian sample.  
 
5.4.1.1.2 Chair of Audit Committee (CAC) 
Table 5.7 reveals that all the variables of CAC characteristics have the predicted sign 
except for the variable tenure. The relationship between the tenure of CAC 
(TEN_CAC) and total risk disclosure is positive suggesting that the longer years CACs 
are in their position, the more corporate risk disclosure will occur. However, none of 
the variables have a significant relationship with total risk disclosure. Therefore, 
hypotheses H02B, H03B, H04B, H05B and H06B are rejected. These results might infer that, 
the CAC’s decisions are relatively secondary and subordinate to the CEO; therefore, the 
CEO might affect a company disclosure by putting pressure on the CAC in relation to 
risk disclosure decision making.  
 
5.4.1.2 Upper Echelons Characteristics and Operational, Environmental, 
Financial and Strategic Risk Disclosures 
As reported in Table 5.7, the individual results of risk disclosure types, namely 
operational risk disclosure, environmental risk disclosure, financial risk disclosure and 
strategic risk disclosure do not have any significant relationship with the age of CEO 
and CAC and the functional track of both CEO and CAC.  
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Perhaps, the most interesting finding is the influence of the education variable on risk 
disclosure. While earlier analysis reveals no significant findings on the association 
between education and total risk disclosure, segregating total risk disclosure into its 
four components reveals some significant results. Specifically, the results show a 
negative and significant coefficient with regard to the association between education of 
CEO (EDU_CEO) and environmental risk disclosure. Although the coefficient of 
EDU_CEO is significant at the 10 percent level, the coefficient is negative, which 
differs from the prior prediction of a positive relationship between education level and 
risk disclosure. However, the education of the CAC (EDU_CAC) is positively and 
significantly associated with both the environmental risk disclosure and strategic risk 
disclosure. These contradictory results require further explanation. This is considered in 
the discussion on Section 5.8.1.3. 
 
The results reported in Table 5.7 indicate that tenure of CEO (TEN_CEO) and tenure of 
CAC (TEN_CAC), to some extent, have influence on the disclosure of risk information. 
Specifically, the results depict a negative and significant relation between the tenure 
variable and both environmental risk and strategic risk disclosure. These results are 
consistent with prior expectations.  
 
As for the results regarding the ethnicity of CEO and CAC, it shows some influence on 
operational risk disclosure and strategic risk disclosure. Specifically, the results show 
positive and significant coefficient with regard to the association between ethnicity of 
CEO (ETHN_CEO) and operational and strategic risk disclosure. The positive result 
implies more disclosure on operational and strategic risk when the CEO and CAC are 
Bumiputera.  
 
5.4.1.3 Ownership Characteristics and Total Risk Disclosure 
Regarding family ownership, this study finds a negative direction on the association 
between family ownership (FAMCTRL) and total risk disclosure. Since the result is not 
significant, hypothesis H07 is rejected. This result is inconsistent with a study done by 
Liu and Sun (2010) who found a negative and significant relationship between family 
ownership and disclosure quality in the Chinese context. Similarly, Ho and Wong 
(2001), Chau and Gray (2002) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) document evidence of a 
negative association between voluntary corporate disclosure and the proportion of 
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family members on the board within companies in Hong Kong and Singapore as well as 
Malaysia. 
 
Interestingly, in the case of government ownership, this study finds a positive 
significant association between the government ownership (GOVOWN), measured by 
the proportion of government shareholders in the top 30 largest shareholders and total 
risk disclosure. In the total risk disclosure model, government ownership is found to be 
significant at the 10 percent level, thus hypothesis H08 is accepted. This supports the 
notion that the presence of government control reduces agency costs, possibly because 
they have greater monitoring power over the firm’s activities. The result of this study is 
consistent with the prior studies by Wang et al. (2008) who reported a positive and 
significant relationship between state-owned shares and the overall disclosure and 
strategic information in China. Similarly, using Malaysian companies as a sample, Said 
et al. (2009) and Arshad et al. (2012) find a positive and significant relationship 
between government ownership and corporate social responsibility disclosure and 
corporate risk disclosure  (i.e. quantity and quality risk disclosure), respectively.  
 
The relationship between foreign ownership (FOROWN) and total risk disclosure is 
positive and supports the argument of the previous research findings that it is possible 
that foreign investors can influence corporate disclosure practices by disclosing more 
information. However, the coefficient is not statistically significant, hence, hypothesis 
H09 is rejected. The result is inconsistent with prior findings by Wang et al. (2008) who 
found a significant positive relationship between the proportion of foreign ownership 
and the level of strategic voluntary disclosure for a Chinese sample. Similarly, in the 
Malaysian context, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a positive association between 
foreign ownership and voluntary disclosure. However, the result in this study is 
consistent with the findings by Said et al. (2009) in relation to corporate social 
responsibility disclosure using Malaysian evidence. 
 
5.4.1.4 Control Variables and Corporate Risk Disclosure 
Turning to the control variables, only company size (LNSIZE) is found to be positively 
and significantly related to total risk disclosure at the 1 percent level. This result is as 
expected since larger sized firms will have greater risk disclosure as they are more 
closely monitored by the external markets. This result is consistent with other studies in 
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the Malaysian context such as Amran et al. (2009) and Ismail and Abdul Rahman 
(2011).  
 
The effect of leverage (LEV) which is the popular proxy for risk was found to be 
negative but not significant. Leverage is used as a control variable for firms that are 
currently facing financial difficulties because firms with higher leverage are expected to 
disclose more information (Aljifri and Hussainey, 2007) since there is higher 
monitoring costs by firms and at the same time to satisfy the need of creditors (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). However, the insignificant relationship differs from the prior 
prediction of a positive relationship between firm leverage and corporate risk 
disclosure.  
 
The effect of auditor size (BIG4) on corporate risk disclosure is predicted to be 
positive.  The Big 4 audit firms are expected to encourage companies to enhance the 
extent of risk information disclosure as they have their reputation (Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2004), based on the observed dominance of large audit firms in the market for 
publicly held companies. However, the auditor size (BIG4) variable is found to be 
positive in sign but was not significant.  
 
Finally, the effect of industry is found to have no significant effect on total risk 
disclosure. This result is inconsistent with a study done by Amran et al. (2009) who 
found that infrastructure and technology industries were found to be positively and 
significantly related to risk management disclosure within the Malaysian context.  
 
5.5 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES FOR DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
 
To ascertain the credibility of the initial analysis presented in Table 5.7, several 
additional analysis tests are carried out. These additional tests are conducted to 
determine the sensitivity of the results as well as to determine the robustness of the 
findings reported earlier in Section 5.4. The first test repeats the regression model 
(Model 1) using a different proxy to measure managers’ age characteristics. Then, the 
baseline model is further tested by creating new variables for education namely, 
professional accounting qualifications and MBA qualifications, to examine the 
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influence of the managers’ specific higher education on improving risk disclosure. 
Finally, the baseline model is further re-examined to test the robustness of the 
regression analysis performed earlier, by replacing the model with the separate upper 
echelons model and ownership model. 
 
5.5.1 Alternative Measurement for Age – Dichotomous Variable 
 
In the baseline model, the age variable (AGE) is treated as a continuous variable and it 
appears that using the actual age of CEO and CAC is not significantly associated with 
risk disclosure. To further investigate this issue, this study explores the possibility of 
CEO and CAC having an influence on risk disclosure when they are divided into age 
cohort (Bamber et al., 2010). Perhaps, the results of age may have been improved if the 
variable is treated as a dichotomous variable using this age cohort. Following studies 
done by Bamber et al. (2010), this study uses World War II (WWII) event as a cut of 
point. The variable takes a value of one if the CEO and CAC were born before WWII; 
otherwise it takes a value of 0.  
 
The results reported in Table 5.8 indicate that none of the coefficients of age cohort of 
CEO and CAC treated as a dummy variable (AGE_CEO_DUMMY) and 
(AGE_CAC_DUMMY) are statistically significant for each of the types of risk 
disclosure (operational risk, environmental risk, financial risk and strategic risk) as well 
as for the total risk disclosure. Other individual results are not significantly different 
from those in the earlier models. This suggests that age of the CEO and CAC is not an 
effective predictor of the extent of risk disclosure.  
 
5.5.2 Education of CEO and CAC – Professional Accounting Qualifications and 
MBA Qualifications 
 
Consistent with prior studies such as Ge et al. (2009), this study does not find any 
significant association between education and total risk disclosure. Perhaps, the 
insignificant findings may be due to the lack of the CEO or CAC to influence the 
disclosure of risk information in general regardless of their higher education level. 
However, the initial analysis found that the education level of CEO and CAC does 
influence the disclosure of environmental risk and strategic risk information. Since 
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Table 5.8: Multiple Regression Results – Age using Dummies 
 
MODEL 2: RDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEO_DUMMYjt + β2AGE_CAC_DUMMYjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + β5EDU_CEOjt + 
β6EDU_CACjt + β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + β10ETHN_CACjt + β11FAMCTRLjt + β12GOVOWNjt + β13FOROWNjt + 
β14LNSIZEjt + β15LEVjt + β16BIG4jt + β17DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt 
 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
(Constant) -105.982 -1.843* -72.367 -1.733* -13.200 -1.715* 2.543 0.100 -22.957 -2.603*** 
AGE_CEO_DUMMY 0.026 0.298 0.057 0.640 0.038 0.389 -0.056 -0.526 0.009 0.095 
AGE_CAC_DUMMY 0.007 0.079 0.002 0.019 0.067 03674 -0.034 -0.314 0.071 0.745 
FUNCT_CEO -0.164 -1.873* -0.148 -1.675* -0.112 -1.167 -0.091 -0.857 -0.073 -0.788 
FUNCT_CAC -0.038 -0.438 0.007 0.081 -0.031 -0.322 -0.118 -1.113 0.024 0.259 
EDU_CEO 0.021 0.235 0.095 1.047 -0.165 -1.673* -0.042 -0.385 -0.080 -0.850 
EDU_CAC 0.083 0.857 0.034 0.350 0.221 2.070** -0.007 -0.060 0.235 2.298** 
TEN_CEO -0.193 -2.092** -0.139 -1.482 -0.120 -1.175 -0.158 -1.417 -0.147 -1.502 
TEN_CAC 0.054 0.565 0.064 0.653 -0.204 -1.921* 0.136 1.170 -0.114 -1.116 
ETHN_CEO 0.290 2.946*** 0.333 3.346*** 0.119 1.100 0.030 0.253 0.175 1.677* 
ETHN_CAC 0.020 0.249 -0.014 -0.172 0.082 0.924 -0.011 -0.111 0.166 1.953* 
FAMCTRL -0.072 -0.818 -0.130 -1.457 0.026 0.268 0.032 0.299 0.043 0.463 
GOVOWN 0.190 1.925* 0.104 1.043 0.218 2.003** 0.194 1.626 0.122 1.165 
FOROWN 0.028 0.340 -0.016 -0.193 0.045 0.489 0.063 0.623 0.080 0.906 
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 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
LNSIZE 0.344 3.545*** 0.257 2.615*** 0.292 2.728*** 0.233 1.985** 0.270 2.617*** 
LEV -0.067 -0.660 -0.002 -0.016 -0.141 -1.267 -0.067 -0.549 -0.164 -1.532 
BIG4 0.053 0.623 0.088 1.008 0.044 0.466 -0.079 -0.763 0.099 1.090 
TRADSERV 0.156 0.383 0.168 0.406 -0.070 -0.155 -0.135 -0.273 0.651 1.502 
CONSUMER 0.151 0.430 0.145 0.406 0.100 0.257 -0.102 -0.240 0.504 1.349 
INDUSTRIAL 0.191 0.499 0.189 0.489 0.036 0.086 -0.044 -0.094 0.461 1.138 
CONSTRUCTION 0.204 0.871 0.125 0.528 0.034 0.133 0.098 0.347 0.512 2.06** 
PLANTATION 0.142 0.710 0.100 0.493 0.035 0.158 0.040 0.164 0.356 1.679* 
PROPERTY 0.153 0.726 0.076 0.355 0.255 1.097 0.030 0.117 0.392 1.756* 
INFRATECH 0.107 0.672 0.176 1.096 0.075 0.428 -0.139 -0.726 0.155 0.922 
Adjusted R
2
 0.315 0.297 0.165 -0.002 0.228 
F-Value 3.536*** 3.337*** 2.093*** 0.987 2.631*** 
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Notes: 
***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level 
RD = measured by risk disclosure score for year 2009, AGE_CEO_DUMMY = Age of CEO (dummy), AGE_CAC_DUMMY = Age of CAC (dummy), FUNCT_CEO = 
Functional track of CEO, FUNCT_CAC = Functional track of CAC, EDU_CEO = Education of CEO, EDU_CAC = Education of CAC, TEN_CEO = tenure of CEO, 
TEN_CAC = Tenure of CAC, ETHN_CEO = Ethnicity of CEO, ETHN_CAC = Ethnicity of CAC, FAMCTRL = Family ownership, GOVOWN = Government ownership, 
FOROWN = Foreign ownership, LNSIZE = Company size, LEV = Leverage, BIG4 = Auditor size, DUMMY (INDUSTRY) = Industry classification 
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these results on education level show conflicting outcome, it may have been different if 
the variable is segregated into two different variables namely, professional accounting 
qualifications and MBA qualifications.  
 
Consistent with prior study by Ge et al. (2009), the variable education is measured 
using an indicator variable with the value of one if the CEO and CAC holding a 
professional accounting qualification (CPA) and 0 otherwise. The variable education is 
also measured using an indicator variable with the value of one if the CEO and CAC 
hold an MBA qualification and 0 otherwise. Variables labelled as CPA_CEO, 
MBA_CEO, CPA_CAC and MBA_CAC are incorporated into the regression model. If 
the assumption is true, the coefficients of all the new created variables are expected to 
be positive and significant. The results are shown in Table 5.9. 
 
As reported in Table 5.9, the total risk disclosure results as well as the individual risk 
disclosure results do not change significantly from the baseline model (Model 1). As for 
the results regarding education, treating the education variable as two different types 
(professional accounting qualifications and MBA qualifications) does give some 
significant results. The table shows a significant positive coefficient for the association 
between CAC holding professional accounting qualifications (CPA) and both 
environmental and strategic risk disclosures. The coefficient of CPA_CAC is 
significant at the 5 percent level and 1 percent level, respectively. These results support 
the prior prediction of a positive relationship between CAC with a professional 
accounting qualifications and risk disclosure. Although CEO education is significant in 
the baseline model (Model 1), the association is not significant anymore in this 
regression. This suggests that the presence of CAC who hold professional accounting 
qualifications is likely to be an effective measure to achieve higher environmental risk 
disclosure and strategic risk disclosure. 
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Table 5.9: Multiple Regression Results – Professional Accounting Qualifications and MBA Qualifications 
 
MODEL 3: RDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + β5CPA_CEOjt + β6MBA_CEOjt +β7CPA_CACjt 
+ β8MBA_CACjt + β9TEN_CEOjt + β10TEN_CACjt + β11ETHN_CEOjt + β12ETHN_CACjt + β13FAMCTRLjt + β14GOVOWNjt + β15FOROWNjt + 
β16LNSIZEjt + β17LEVjt + β18BIG4jt + β19DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt 
 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
(Constant) -116.104 -1.867* -82.894 -1.825* -13.903 -1.663* 10.128 0.367 -29.434 -3.114*** 
AGE_CEO 0.000 -0.004 0.033 0.359 -0.051 -0.511 -0.078 -0.723 0.076 0.813 
AGE_CAC 0.010 0.099 0.013 0.126 0.073 0.648 -0.062 -0.499 0.100 0.928 
FUNCT_CEO -0.163 -1.841* -0.145 -1.610 -0.105 -1.073 -0.102 -0.950 -0.061 -0.658 
FUNCT_CAC -0.067 -0.750 -0.020 -0.216 -0.056 -0.563 -0.123 -1.143 -0.006 -0.063 
CPA_CEO 0.062 0.721 0.108 1.237 -0.112 -1.175 0.020 0.194 -0.066 -0.730 
MBA_CEO -0.033 -0.363 0.044 0.474 -0.166 -1.633 -0.093 -0.840 -0.074 -0.770 
CPA_CAC 0.129 1.228 0.065 0.610 0.255 2.190** 0.020 0.160 0.304 2.747*** 
MBA_CAC -0.018 -0.217 -0.020 -0.246 0.067 0.752 -0.034 -0.350 0.009 0.109 
TEN_CEO -0.188 -1.994** -0.134 -1.397 -0.095 -0.910 -0.152 -1.337 -0.169 -1.702* 
TEN_CAC 0.060 0.612 0.067 0.673 -0.198 -1.817* 0.149 1.255 -0.130 -1.256 
ETHN_CEO 0.287 2.846*** 0.328 3.186*** 0.119 1.064 0.047 0.386 0.144 1.352 
ETHN_CAC 0.025 0.310 -0.011 -0.129 0.088 0.988 -0.009 -0.093 0.174 2.058** 
FAMCTRL -0.053 -0.581 -0.122 -1.316 0.048 0.474 0.061 0.552 0.045 0.476 
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 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
GOVOWN 0.181 1.816* 0.101 0.990 0.201 1.818* 0.177 1.467 0.137 1.304 
FOROWN 0.020 0.235 -0.022 -0.256 0.031 0.324 0.052 0.499 0.093 1.033 
LNSIZE 0.358 3.630*** 0.265 2.639*** 0.303 2.774*** 0.248 2.081** 0.278 2.681*** 
LEV -0.103 -0.985 -0.027 -0.255 -0.159 -1.368 -0.104 -0.819 -0.183 -1.661* 
BIG4 0.060 0.695 0.084 0.965 0.035 0.370 -0.051 -0.488 0.093 1.031 
TRADSERV 0.194 0.470 0.204 0.485 -0.079 -0.172 -0.128 -0.257 0.724 1.665* 
CONSUMER 0.171 0.482 0.164 0.455 0.096 0.243 -0.111 -0.258 0.570 1.526 
INDUSTRIAL 0.215 0.558 0.217 0.552 0.027 0.064 -0.056 -0.119 0.531 1.307 
CONSTRUCTION 0.212 0.894 0.134 0.555 0.020 0.078 0.094 0.330 0.544 2.185** 
PLANTATION 0.159 0.787 0.111 0.539 0.033 0.149 0.056 0.230 0.380 1.785* 
PROPERTY 0.155 0.734 0.078 0.362 0.235 1.003 0.031 0.121 0.412 1.850* 
INFRATECH 0.139 0.849 0.202 1.214 0.079 0.436 -0.126 -0.638 0.211 1.229 
Adjusted R
2
 0.312 0.286 0.154 --0.005 0.238 
F-Value 3.304*** 3.034*** 1.925*** 0.973 2.591*** 
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Notes: 
***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level 
RD = measured by risk disclosure score for year 2009, AGE_CEO = Age of CEO, AGE_CAC = Age of CAC, FUNCT_CEO = Functional track of CEO, FUNCT_CAC = 
Functional track of CAC, CPA_CEO = CEO holding professional qualifications, MBA_CEO = CEO holding MBA qualifications, CPA_CAC = CAC holding professional 
qualifications, MBA_CAC = CAC holding MBA qualifications, TEN_CEO = Tenure of CEO, TEN_CAC = Tenure of CAC, ETHN_CEO = Ethnicity of CEO, ETHN_CAC 
= Ethnicity of CAC, FAMCTRL = Family ownership, GOVOWN = Government ownership, FOROWN = Foreign ownership , LNSIZE = Company size, LEV = Leverage, 
BIG4 = Auditor size, DUMMY (INDUSTRY) = Industry classification 
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5.5.3 Multiple Regression Results – Re-examination 
 
Results reported in all regression models earlier suggest that certain upper echelons and 
ownership characteristics have a significant impact on risk disclosure. Thus to 
determine the stability of the findings, the multiple regression results of the baseline 
model are re-examined by a) leaving out all of the ownership variables and b) leaving 
out the entire upper echelons variables. Thus, upper echelons model and ownership 
model are created separately. 
 
5.5.3.1 Upper Echelons Model 
As noted in Table 5.10, the overall results without the ownership variables does not 
change significantly from the baseline model, except for functional track of CEO 
variable, which is now statistically insignificant. In fact, the findings suggest consistent 
results regarding the direction and significance level for each of the coefficients of the 
tested variables. Furthermore, it can be seen that the adjusted R
2
 and the F-value for the 
total risk disclosure, involve a slight decrease compared to the baseline model (Table 
5.7). The findings thus indicate that the use of the baseline model instead of the upper 
echelons model produces better explanatory power.  
 
5.5.3.2 Ownership Model 
Another alternative approach is leaving out the upper echelons variables. Therefore, the 
baseline model is replaced by the ownership model. The results are presented in Table 
5.11. The F-value for the total risk disclosure for the multiple regression results using 
the ownership model is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The adjusted R
2
 is 
24.8 percent for the total risk disclosure. The results in Table 5.11 show a better result 
for the ownership variables compared to the prior analysis using the baseline model. 
Apart from government ownership, family ownership appears to be negatively and 
significantly related to risk disclosure. Prior literature on the relation between family 
control on the corporate board and disclosure (see e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) 
reports a similar result to this study. Therefore, support is given to the prediction of 
agency theory in which the majority of family member on the board will bring about 
less disclosure of risk information due to their ability to get inside information in the 
capacity as a family member.  
 
200 
 
Table 5.10: Multiple Regression Results – Upper Echelons Model 
 
MODEL 4: RDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + β5EDU_CEOjt + β6EDU_CACjt + 
β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + β10ETHN_CACjt + β11LNSIZEjt+ β12LEVjt + β13BIG4jt + β14DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt 
 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
(Constant) -125.333 -2.067** -88.074 -2.008** -15.320 -1.893* 6.898 0.259 -28.837 -3.139*** 
AGE_CEO -0.048 -0.557 -0.008 -0.094 -0.082 -0.870 -0.107 -1.040 0.050 0.551 
AGE_CAC -0.019 -0.187 -0.011 -0.109 0.060 0.544 -0.079 -0.662 0.076 0.724 
FUNCT_CEO -0.138 -1.588 -0.115 -1.312 -0.095 -0.991 -0.095 -0.914 -0.064 -0.698 
FUNCT_CAC -0.014 -0.159 0.025 0.289 -0.026 -0.279 -0.090 -0.875 0.031 0.351 
EDU_CEO 0.028 0.312 0.097 1.055 -0.160 -1.604 -0.027 -0.252 -0.080 -0.838 
EDU_CAC 0.103 1.039 0.051 0.508 0.261 2.395** -0.001 -0.005 0.242 2.336** 
TEN_CEO -0.162 -1.739* -0.118 -1.252 -0.069 -0.671 -0.127 -1.136 -0.159 -1.621 
TEN_CAC 0.094 0.971 0.091 0.937 -0.163 -1.535 0.175 1.519 -0.112 1.110 
ETHN_CEO 0.379 4.296*** 0.411 4.619*** 0.176 1.809* 0.094 0.890 0.197 2.129** 
ETHN_CAC 0.027 0.331 -0.013 -0.162 0.098 1.111 -0.001 -0.007 0.168 2.003** 
LNSIZE 0.402 4.239*** 0.296 3.089*** 0.344 3.292*** 0.288 2.539** 0.297 2.982*** 
LEV -0.073 -0.732 -0.011 -0.113 -0.137 -1.236 -0.069 -0.578 -0.160 -1.525 
BIG4 0.055 0.658 0.071 0.850 0.042 0.465 -0.050 -0.505 0.116 1.338 
TRADSERV 0.169 0.408 0.188 0.451 -0.083 -0.182 -0.159 -0.322 0.707 1.632 
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 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
CONSUMER 0.159 0.446 0.153 0.427 0.095 0.242 -0.116 -0.273 0.554 1.484 
INDUSTRIAL 0.168 0.435 0.167 0.429 0.009 0.022 -0.074 -0.160 03513 1.266 
CONSTRUCTION 0.173 0.731 0.111 0.464 -0.016 -0.063 0.056 0.197 0.520 2.096** 
PLANTATION 0.146 0.725 0.100 0.494 0.034 0.153 0.041 0.170 0.379 1.801 
PROPERTY 0.137 0.647 0.051 0.238 0.232 1.000 0.031 0.121 0.422 1.907* 
INFRATECH 0.100 0.623 0.166 1.025 0.061 0.347 -0.147 -0.768 0.190 1.129 
Adjusted R
2
 0.307 0.294 0.160 0.008 0.237 
F-Value 3.809*** 3.643*** 2.210*** 1.053 2.977*** 
N 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Notes:  
***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level 
RD = measured by risk disclosure score for year 2009, AGE_CEO = Age of CEO, AGE_CAC = Age of CAC, FUNCT_CEO = Functional track of CEO, FUNCT_CAC = 
Functional track of CAC, EDU_CEO = Education of CEO, EDU_CAC = Education of CAC, TEN_CEO = Tenure of CEO, TEN_CAC = Tenure of CAC, ETHN_CEO = 
Ethnicity of CEO, ETHN_CAC = Ethnicity of CAC, LNSIZE = Company size, LEV = Leverage, BIG4 = Auditor size, DUMMY (INDUSTRY) = Industry classification 
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Table 5.11: Multiple Regression Results – Ownership Model 
 
MODEL 5: RDjt= β0 + β1FAMCTRLjt + β2GOVOWNjt + β3FOROWNjt + β4LNSIZEjt + β5LEVjt + β6BIG4jt + β7DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt 
 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
(Constant) -78.610 -1.381 -59.067 -1.434 -6.883 -0.899 1.671 0.070 -14.331 -1.627* 
FAMCTRL -0.145 -1.698* -0.209 -2.433** -0.020 -0.212 0.033 0.344 -0.031 -0.344 
GOVOWN 0.297 3.241*** 0.233 2.519** 0.247 2.434** 0.188 1.805* 0.215 2.193** 
FOROWN 0.005 0.064 -0.041 -0.482 0.014 0.144 0.074 0.765 0.043 0.479 
LNSIZE 0.301 3.089*** 0.232 2.358** 0.228 2.113** 0.213 1.924* 0.200 1.921* 
LEV -0.035 -0.347 0.026 0.257 -0.128 -1.139 -0.040 -0.346 -0.165 -1.522 
BIG4 0.034 0.393 0.082 0.950 -0.035 -0.366 -0.076 -0.781 0.048 0.522 
TRADSERV 0.068 0.163 0.148 0.352 -0.317 -0.685 -0.200 -0.422 0.511 1.143 
CONSUMER 0.023 0.063 0.077 0.213 -0.175 -0.439 -0.154 -0.376 0.310 0.806 
INDUSTRIAL 0.100 0.255 0.157 0.397 -0.217 -0.500 -0.087 -0.196 0.316 0.755 
CONSTRUCTION 0.113 0.480 0.078 0.330 -0.157 -0.603 0.047 0.174 0.408 1.620 
PLANTATION 0.025 0.126 0.033 0.163 -0.167 -0.751 -0.017 -0.077 0.196 0.910 
PROPERTY 0.081 0.380 0.032 0.149 0.068 0.285 0.028 0.114 0.275 1.203 
INFRATECH 0.088 0.539 0.155 0.944 0.030 0.164 -0.127 -0.686 0.135 0.779 
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 TOTAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
OPERATIONAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISK DISCLOSURE 
FINANCIAL RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
STRATEGIC RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat Coefficients t-stat 
Adjusted R
2
 0.248 0.234 0.075 0.028 0.138 
F-Value 4.233*** 3.988*** 1.793** 1.279 2.565*** 
N 128 128 128 128 128 N 128 128 128 128 
Notes: 
***Significant at 0.01 level; **Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.1 level.   
RD = measured by risk disclosure score for year 2009, FAMCTRL = Family ownership, GOVOWN = Government ownership, FOROWN = Foreign ownership, LNSIZE = 
Company size, LEV = Leverage, BIG4 = Auditor size, DUMMY (INDUSTRY) = Industry classifications. 
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5.6 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES FOR VALUE RELEVANCE OF RISK 
DISCLOSURE 
 
5.6.1 Total Risk Disclosure and Firm Value 
 
Table 5.12 tests the value relevance of total risk disclosure in the share market. The 
results of regression analysis of Model 6 (Table 5.12) show that the F-value is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level with the R
2 
of 71.0 percent (Adjusted R
2
 = 
65.3 percent). The statistics show that the model explained 65.3 percent of the variation 
in share price of the firm in 2009. Although the adjusted R
2
 may be considered high, it 
is however, lower than that reported in the previous Malaysian study by Ismail et al. 
(2012), who examined the influence of voluntary risk disclosure on firm’s market 
value, which was 83.7 percent.  
 
Table 5.12 
Multiple Regression Results – Value Relevance of Total Risk Disclosure  
 
MODEL 6: SPjt= β0+ β1EPSjt + β2BVNASjt + β3TRDjt+ β4TRD*FAMCTRL_20jt 
+β5TRD*GOVCTRL_20jt + β6TRD*FORCTRL_20jt + εjt 
Dependent Share Price (180 days after financial year end) 
R
2
 0.71 
Adjusted R
2
 0.653 
F-Value 37.419 
Model Sig. 0.000 
 Coefficient t-stat Sig. 
Constant -0.898 -0.829 0.409 
EPS 0.798 13.018 0.000 
BVNAS 0.096 1.610 0.110 
TRD 0.070 0.939 0.350 
TRD*FAMCTRL_20 0.104 1.685 0.095 
TRD*GOVCTRL_20 0.043 0.563 0.575 
TRD*FORCTRL_20 -0.108 -1.925 0.057 
Notes: SP = measured by share price (180 days after the financial year end), EPS = Earnings per share, 
BVNAS = Book value of net assets per share, TRD = Total risk disclosure, FAMCTRL_20 = Family-
controlled firm, GOVCTRL_20 = Government-controlled firm, FORCTRL_20 = Foreign-controlled firm  
 
Model 6 in Table 5.12 indicates the increased in total risk disclosure (TRD) positively 
influences firm’s share price in year 2009. However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant, hence, hypotheses H10A can be rejected. This result is consistent with a 
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previous study by Ismail et al. (2012) who found that quantitative voluntary risk 
disclosure has no significant relationship with share prices. 
 
The model in Table 5.12 also includes interaction terms between total risk disclosure 
and family-controlled firms (TRD*FAMCTRL_20), total risk disclosure and 
government-controlled firms (TRD*GOVCTRL_20) and total risk disclosure and 
foreign-controlled firms (TRD*FORCTRL_20). From Table 5.12, it is shown that the 
two interaction terms between total risk disclosure and family-controlled firms 
(TRD*FAMCTRL_20) and foreign-controlled firms (TRD*FORCTRL_20) are related 
to market value. This outcome further emphasizes that companies with greater family 
control and higher total risk disclosure will tend to have higher firm values. In contrast, 
companies that is foreign-controlled and has higher total risk disclosure, tend to have 
lower firm values. One plausible explanation might be because investors have a 
different perception towards foreign-controlled companies in Malaysia.  
 
5.6.2 Regulated Risk Disclosure and Firm Value 
 
The results reported in Table 5.13 are related to the value relevance of regulated risk 
disclosure (RRD). As noted in Table 5.13, the overall results for the regulated risk 
disclosures do not change significantly from the previous model (Model 6) except for 
the negative coefficient of regulated risk disclosure. This indicates that higher regulated 
risk disclosure has a negative impact on firm value. However, the result is not 
statistically significant; hence hypothesis H10B is rejected. 
 
Further, from Table 5.13 it is found that the interaction term between regulated risk 
disclosure and foreign-controlled firm (RRD*FORCTRL_20) is significant at 10 
percent level. The results show a negative and significant result for the interactions 
between regulated risk disclosure and foreign-controlled firm (RRD*FORCTRL_20) 
with the firm value. Greater regulated risk information disclosed reduces the market 
value of foreign-controlled companies in Malaysia. One plausible explanation for the 
trade-off which could weaken the investors’ perspectives is the risk information that 
foreign-controlled companies disclose are more towards compliance with the 
accounting standards which is just a plain statement without the actual condition faced 
by the companies.  
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Table 5.13 
Multiple Regression Results – Value Relevance of Regulated Risk Disclosure  
 
MODEL 7: SPjt= β0+ β1EPSjt + β2BVNASjt + β3RRDjt+ β4RRD*FAMCTRL_20jt 
+β5RRD*GOVCTRL_20jt + β6RRD*FORCTRL_20jt + εjt 
Dependent Share Price (180 days after financial year end) 
R
2
 0.665 
Adjusted R
2
 0.647 
F-Value 36.365 
Model Sig. 0.000 
 Coefficient t-stat Sig. 
Constant 0.226 0.198 0.843 
EPS 0.791 12.938 0.000 
BVNAS 0.119 2.016 0.046 
RRD -0.010 -0.158 0.875 
RRD*FAMCTRL_20 0.087 1.344 0.082 
RRD*GOVCTRL_20 0.070 1.047 0.297 
RRD*FORCTRL_20 -0.097 -1.700 0.092 
Notes: SP = measured by share price (180 days after the financial year end), EPS = Earnings per share, 
BVNAS = Book value of net assets per share, RRD = Regulated risk disclosure, FAMCTRL_20 = 
Family-controlled firm, GOVCTRL_20 = Government-controlled firm, FORCTRL _20 = Foreign-
controlled firm   
 
5.6.3 Non-Regulated Risk Disclosure and Firm Value 
 
The results presented in Table 5.14 are related to the value relevance of non-regulated 
risk disclosure. This study also does not find a significant association between non-
regulated risk disclosure (NRD) and firm value. Although the direction of the 
coefficient of non-regulated risk disclosure is positive, the coefficient is not significant; 
therefore, hypothesis H10C is rejected.   
 
In terms of the association between the interaction terms of non-regulated risk 
disclosure and family-controlled firms (NRRD*FAMCTRL_20) and non-regulated risk 
disclosure and foreign-controlled firms (NRRD*FORCTRL_20), significance is found. 
These interaction results are consistent with the results found in Model 6.  
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Table 5.14 
Multiple Regression Results – Value Relevance of Non-Regulated Risk Disclosure  
 
MODEL 8: SPjt= β0+ β1EPSjt + β2BVNASjt + β3NRRDjt+ β4NRRD*FAMCTRL_20jt 
+β5NRRD*GOVCTRL_20jt + β6NRRD*FORCTRL_20jt + εjt 
Dependent Share Price (180 days after financial year end) 
R
2
 0.674 
Adjusted R
2
 0.657 
F-Value 36.968 
Model Sig. 0.000 
 Coefficient t-stat Sig. 
Constant -0.674 -0.842 0.402 
EPS 0.799 13.036 0.000 
BVNAS 0.088 1.483 0.141 
NRRD 0.081 1.073 0.285 
NRRD*FAMCTRL_20 0.122 2.006 0.047 
NRRD*GOVCTRL_20 0.045 0.579 0.564 
NRRD*FORCTRL_20 -0.110 -1.973 0.051 
Notes: SP = measured by share price (180 days after the financial year end), EPS = Earnings per share, 
BVNAS = Book value of net assets per share, NRRD = Non-regulated risk disclosure, FAMCTRL_20 = 
Family-controlled firm, GOVCTRL_20 = Government-controlled firm, FORCTRL_20 = Foreign-
controlled firm  
 
5.7 ENDOGENEITY TEST  
 
Research that models and tests the relationship between corporate outcomes (such as 
the level of financial performance or extent of corporate disclosure) and various 
governance mechanisms, ownership structures or management characteristics can be 
subject to the problem of endogeneity. Broadly, a loop of causality between the 
independent and dependent variables of a model leads to endogeneity. The problem of 
endogeneity occurs when the independent variable is correlated with the error term in a 
regression model. This implies that the regression coefficient in an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression is biased. 
 
The results presented earlier in this chapter on the OLS regressions reveal that there is a 
significant positive relationship between corporate risk disclosure and the ethnicity of 
CEO. CEO ethnicity is consistently found to be the most significant hypothesised 
explanatory variable in Tables 5.7, 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10. These results indicate that firms 
with a Bumiputera CEO will disclose higher risk information. However, intuitively, 
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there could be loop causality between a CEOs ethnicity and a firm’s risk disclosure. It 
was hypothesised in H06A that Bumipitera CEOs, due to ethnic-religious values they 
hold, would influence their firm towards higher disclosure of risk information. 
However, reverse causality could be argued. Thus, boards of firms wishing to change 
the level of risk disclosure might be prepared to change the CEO when the opportunity 
to make a change arises. Over time, boards wishing to reduce the level of risk 
disclosure might choose a non-Bumiputera CEO, whereas those wishing to increase the 
level of risk disclosure might choose a Bumiputera CEO. Because of this reverse causal 
relationship, the ethnicity of CEO will be endogeneous. 
 
The problem of endogeneity, between ethnicity of CEO and corporate risk disclosure 
can be statistically tested. This problem is statistically referred to as simultaneity 
because it has to do with two variables simultaneously causing each other. To solve this 
problem, instrumental-variable estimation is used. In particular, an instrument (or a set 
of instruments) that is assumed to be exogeneous is selected and then two-stage 
simultaneous least squares (2SLS) regression is performed. In this case, the 
endogeneous independent variable is ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO). The instrumental 
variable (deemed to be exogeneous to risk disclosure level) could be the firm’s earnings 
per share (EPS). The reverse causality model between ETHN_CEO and RD that 
contains the instrumental variable EPS, is shown in equation 5.1. Equation 5.1 is 
regressed simultaneously with the ‘baseline model’ developed for this study and 
repeated in equation 5.2.  
 
ETHN_CEOjt = β0 + β1RDjt + β2FAMCTRLjt + β3GOVOWNjt + β4FOROWNjt + 
β5EPSjt + εjt .............................................................................................................(5.1)  
 
 RDjt= β0 + β1AGE_CEOjt + β2AGE_CACjt + β3FUNCT_CEOjt + β4FUNCT_CACjt + 
β5EDU_CEOjt + β6EDU_CACjt + β7TEN_CEOjt + β8TEN_CACjt + β9ETHN_CEOjt + 
β10ETHN_CACjt + β11FAMCTRLjt + β12GOVOWNjt + β13FOROWNjt + β14LNSIZEjt + 
β15LEVjt + β16BIG4jt + β17DUMMY (INDUSTRY) + εjt .....................................(5.2) 
 
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 above were run simultaneously using the 2SLS estimator. The 
results are presented in Table 5.15.  
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Table 5.15  
Simultaneous Equation Models using 2SLS Estimator 
Panel A 
Simultaneous equation model estimated with 2SLS (Dependent variable: Ethnicity of CEO) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>[z] [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
RD 0.005 0.001 5.79 0.000 0.003 0.007 
FAMCTRL -0.635 0.174 -3.64 0.000 -0.976 -0.293 
GOVOWN 0.006 0.001 3.26 0.001 0.002 0.010 
FOROWN -0.002 0.002 -1.09 0.274 -0.007 0.002 
EPS -0.001 0.001 -1.00 0.319 -0.002 0.000 
CONSTANT -0.152 0.104 -1.45 0.146 -0.357 0.053 
Panel B 
Simultaneous equation model estimated with 2SLS (Dependent variable: Risk disclosure) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>[z] [95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
AGE_CEO -0.251 0.616 -0.41 0.683 -1.459 0.956 
AGE_CAC 0.308 0.558 0.55 0.580 -0.785 1.403 
FUNCT_CEO 9.073 13.225 0.69 0.493 -16.847 34.994 
FUNCT_CAC 6.333 12.269 0.52 0.606 -17.713 30.380 
EDU_CEO -43.085 32.076 -0.134 0.179 -105.953 19.782 
EDU_CAC 4.142    9.701      0.43 0.669 -14.872 23.157 
TEN_CEO -0.205 0.452 -0.45 0.650 -1.092 0.681 
TEN_CAC -0.008   0.679 -0.01 0.990 -1.341 1.323 
ETHN_CEO 136.688 27.269 5.01 0.000 83.240 190.135 
ETHN_CAC 1.227 7.601 0.16 0.872 -13.671 16.125 
FAMCTRL 79.037 33.506 -2.36 0.018 13.364 144.709 
GOVOWN -0.716 0.363 1.97 0.049 -1.429 -0.003 
FOROWN 0.378 0.393 0.96 0.336 -0.393 1.150 
SIZE 1.408 3.910 0.36 0.719 -6.254 9.072 
LEV 3.701 8.957 0.41 0.679 -13.854 21.258 
BIG4 7.587 9.890 0.77 0.443 -11.796 26.971 
TRADSERV -3.989 42.158 -0.09 0.925 -86.617 78.639 
CONSUMER 6.581 41.966 0.16 0.875 -75.671 88.834 
INDUSTRIAL -0.020 41.673 -0.00 1.000 -81.698 81.656 
CONSTRUCTION 0.760 44.392 0.02 0.986 -86.247 87.768 
PLANTATION 34.440 48.117 0.72 0.474 -59.868 128.748 
PROPERTY 4.483 44.246 0.10 0.919 -82.237 91.205 
INFRATECH -11.533 53.125 -0.22 0.828 -115.657 92.590 
CONSTANT -6.285 93.555 -0.07 0.946 -189.650 177.080 
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The result of the Hausman test for both equations is Chi
2
 (df = 24) = 66 (p = 0.000). 
This significant Chi
2
 for the simultaneous equation confirms that there is endogeneity 
problem existing between risk disclosure and ethnicity of CEO. Therefore, the OLS 
results shown previously in Table 5.7 would have been biased. These results need to be 
replaced with the findings given in Table 5.15 above. By running the 2SLS estimator, 
Table 5.15, Panel B, deals with the endogeneity problem and still shows ETHN_CEO 
to be significantly related to RD (P>[z] = 0.000). It also confirms the reverse 
relationship in Table 5.15, Panel A, that RD is significantly positively related to 
ETHN_CEO. 
 
5.8 DISCUSSIONS 
 
5.8.1 Management-Specific Characteristics and Risk Disclosure 
5.8.1.1 Age 
This study finds an insignificant association between the managers age (AGE) and 
disclosure of risk information in the baseline model as well as in the alternative models. 
The findings of this study suggest that the age of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
the Chair of Audit Committee (CAC) does not influence corporate risk disclosure, 
which is not supportive of the upper echelons theory prediction and most prior findings 
from developed markets (e.g. Child, 1974; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1986). Thus, 
this study concludes that the age of the CEO and the CAC does not lead to higher or 
lower risk disclosure. 
 
One plausible explanation for the insignificant finding between managers age and risk 
disclosure is the Malaysian corporations are likely to comprise of older managers.  This 
could be seen from the descriptive analysis (Table 5.1) which provides evidence of an 
average of 54 years old and 63 years old for the CEO and CAC, respectively. It is 
argued that older managers who have deeper understanding of firm-specific and job-
specific knowledge which enables them to understand its environment and competition 
are reluctance to reveal risk information. This may possibly indirectly explain the 
insignificant findings of this study.  
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5.8.1.2 Functional Track 
From the analyses conducted, it is found that functional track of managers (FUNCT), 
proxied by the ‘throughput function’ and ‘output function’, is negatively associated 
with risk disclosure, but this relationship is not significant in all models except for the 
functional track of CEO (FUNCT_CEO) and total risk disclosure in the baseline model. 
The results show a negative and significant coefficient between functional track of 
CEO (FUNCT_CEO) and total risk disclosure at the 10 percent level. This result 
demonstrates that to some extent, managers in the ‘throughput’ background develop 
lower risk disclosure as they handle things (e.g., risk information differently due to 
their training and background in accounting to be more conservative and prudent. This 
result is consistent with the prior study by Bamber et al. (2010) who reported a negative 
contribution from directors with accounting or finance background (i.e. a ‘throughput 
function’) in disclosing earnings forecast. They suggest that these managers develop 
disclosure styles that reflect lower tolerance of ambiguity.  
 
The findings of this study support the upper echelons theory that suggests managers’ 
functional career tracks (e.g., marketing, accounting, legal) affect their preferences 
(e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). Upper echelons theorists 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984, p. 200) suggest that managers’ primary functional career 
track affect his/her choices because ‘career experiences partially shape the lenses 
through which they view current strategic opportunities and problems’. A functional 
career track helps managers to practice strategies in line with their own functional 
expertise (e.g., Smith and White, 1987; Thomas et al., 1991; Jensen and Zajac, 2004). 
 
5.8.1.3 Education 
Interestingly, this study finds a significant association between managers’ education 
(EDU), proxied by managers holding professional accounting qualifications and/or 
MBA qualifications and environmental risk disclosure as well as strategic risk 
disclosure in the baseline model. The results show a positive and significant association 
between education of CAC (EDU_CAC) and environmental risk disclosure as well as 
strategic risk disclosure. As in the alternative models, the results provide strong support 
for the relationship between CAC holding professional accounting qualifications and 
disclosure of environmental risk and strategic risk.  These results imply that CAC have 
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more influence in the broader risk area (i.e., environmental risk and strategic risk) 
rather than in the technical information area (i.e. operational risk and financial risk). 
 
However, the results are negative and significant between education of CEO 
(EDU_CEO) and environmental risk disclosure. This result appears to be insignificant 
in the alternative models even though the coefficients are negative. This insignificant 
relationship between CEO education and risk disclosure supports prior findings by Ge 
et al. (2009) who found that the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) holding Certified 
Public Accountant (CPA) background do not appear to have a strong directional effect 
on accounting choices.  
 
One plausible reason why managers’ education does not improve risk disclosure in total 
may be due to the measurement of the variable. This study only focuses on the CEO 
and CAC who are holding professional accounting qualifications and MBA 
qualifications. Perhaps, each director comes from a different education background that 
could influence their cognitive value. For example, in a Nigerian study, Eze et al. 
(2011) focus on different education backgrounds of small business managers on an 
Information Technology (IT) adoption study. They examine different education 
background of managers and categorized them into six groups, namely, First School 
Leaving Certificate, West African Examination Council, Professional Certificates, 
National Diploma/Vocational programme, First Degree/Higher National Diploma and 
Post Graduate Degree. Their results show that managers with West African 
Examination Council Certificate and managers with National Diploma will negatively 
and significantly influence the extent of IT adoption. However, their results do not 
support upper echelons theory. Nonetheless, representation of formal education of top 
managers, to some degree, indicates a person’s knowledge and skill base. Perhaps, 
investigation on the different education level of managers such as Doctorate, Masters 
Degree, Bachelor Degree, Diploma, College or others will provide an interesting 
avenue for future research. 
 
5.8.1.4 Tenure 
Supporting the prediction of upper echelons theory, this study finds a significant 
negative association between the CEO tenure in the firm and risk disclosure. The 
findings of this study suggest that longer-tenured CEO in the firm is associated with 
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lower risk disclosure, which is consistent to the upper echelons theory prediction. A 
longer-tenured CEO who has expertise in the organization may not want to disclose 
more risk information may be due to the danger of litigation is outweigh the positive 
effects of reporting more risk. A longer-tenured CEO is seems to be more risk averse 
and resist to change as they may be already comfortable in their position for a long 
time. This finding is to a certain degree consistent to the previous paper by Finkelstein 
and Hambrick (1990) in relation to the top management team tenure and organizational 
outcomes in which they found a positive association between team tenure and strategic 
perseverance as well as strategic conformity.  
 
The finding of CEO tenure in this study also appears to support the findings as is 
commonly presented in the past literature regarding risk-taking propensity. Risk-taking 
propensity requires a willingness to embrace strategic change and uncertainty that 
would seem to favour shorter tenure. These advantages of short-tenured appear to 
exceed the advantages of long-tenured which seem to be firm-specific human and 
social capital, knowledge and power. Furthermore, long-tenured CEOs are likely to 
remain more rigid in maintaining the status quo. 
 
5.8.1.5 Ethnicity 
Strong findings were obtained in this study regarding ethnicity of CEO (ETHN_CEO). 
There is a positive and significant relationship between ethnicity and risk disclosure in 
the baseline model as well as in the upper echelons model at the 1 percent level. The 
positive result implies that risk disclosure is higher when CEO on the board is 
Bumiputera (Malay). This result supports the upper echelons theory. In this view, 
Malay CEO which is from the lower socio-economic group in Malaysia tends to take 
up more transparent strategies as compared to other ethnics by disclosing more risk 
disclosure. This findings support previous findings by Haniffa and Cooke (2002) who 
suggest that Malay directors perform their businesses based on Islamic business ethics 
by disclosing more compared to Chinese directors. Business ethics in Islam covers 
transparency and as such, the Malays may be expected to be less secretive in their risk 
disclosure practice. These arguments seem more reasonable because for Muslims, racial 
values come after Islamic values.  
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Haniffa and Cooke (2002, p.317) further suggest that ‘the governmental focus on 
culture may solicit a response to secrecy from those who feel threatened’. They found 
less voluntary disclosure associated with boards dominated by Chinese directors. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) recent study on the relationship between culture and 
corporate social reporting also documents similar findings and suggests that disclosure 
is attributed to cultural sensitivity and is largely endorsed by government policy. 
 
Addressing the endogeneity issue, the Hausman test gives evidence that there is a 
reverse effect between ethnicity of CEO and corporate risk disclosure. This finding 
infers that the views of a CEO on corporate transparency can be a factor affecting that 
CEO’s appointment to, and retention in, the position. It indicates that firms whose 
boards prefer their firm to provide greater transparency in the form of higher risk 
disclosure will be more inclined to appoint, over time, a CEO with Bumiputera 
ethnicity. Alternatively, boards that prefer lower corporate risk disclosure will be more 
inclined to appoint, over time, a CEO with non-Bumiputera ethnicity.  
 
5.8.2 Ownership Characteristics and Risk Disclosure 
5.8.2.1 Family Ownership 
Agency theory addresses the role of the ownership structure as a complementary 
mechanism to a board’s effectiveness. Different from the conflict of interest between 
outside shareholders and managers in a diffused ownership (such as in the UK and US), 
the agency problem in Asia where an ownership concentration structure is more 
common, moves between the controlling owners and minority shareholders (Claessens 
and Fan, 2002). The controlling owners of the firm, who are in many cases also the 
managers, exercise their rights by increasing effective control and power in a firm. 
They also could influence and determine how the company is run depends on their 
private benefits that may expropriate the rights of minority shareholders. 
 
In the case of family ownership, this study finds an insignificant association between 
the family ownership, proxied by the proportion of family members on the board to the 
total number of directors (FAMCTRL) and risk disclosure. In all models except for the 
ownership model, the family-owned company is found to be insignificant. In the 
ownership model, however, the family-owned company is found to be negatively and 
significantly related to total risk disclosure and operational risk disclosure at the 10 
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percent level and 5 percent level, respectively. These findings suggest that family-
owned companies tend to reduce their contribution of the management's responsiveness 
to investors especially in their operational area. In line with the argument by Mohd 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002), this may be due to the 
secretive policy within the company.  
 
5.8.2.2 Government Ownership 
In respect of the government ownership variable, this study finds interesting results on 
the relationship between the government-owned companies and risk disclosure. The 
coefficient of government ownership (GOVOWN) is consistently positively and 
significantly associated with risk disclosure as predicted. It implies that the higher the 
government shareholding in a company the higher the level of risk disclosure. The 
result suggests that the presence of a large government owner may increase 
managements’ propensity to disclose more to reflect the government’s commitment to 
transparency. On top of that, the greater risk disclosure by government-owned company 
could increase in the level of confidence among investors; reduce uncertainty in the 
quality of the reporting and ultimately could improve access to international capital 
market.   
 
This finding is similar to a prior study by Said et al. (2009) who found a positive and 
significant relationship between government ownership and the level of corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. The evidence of a significant association between 
government ownership and disclosure in this study extends the earlier findings by Eng 
and Mak (2003). The study by Eng and Mak (2003) reports a positive and significant 
association between government ownership and voluntary disclosure. Using a 
Singapore sample, their study suggests that government ownership increases moral 
hazard and agency problems; therefore, disclosure is a means of mitigating these 
problems.  
 
The role of government interventions in enhancing the extent of the level of corporate 
risk disclosure in Malaysian companies appear to be vital. The government ownership 
is an important mechanism that ensures companies will comply with accounting 
standards and other legal requirements (Said et al., 2009). Companies with the 
involvement of government as investors are also likely to be better governed (Caves 
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and Christensen, 1980; Kay and Thomson, 1986; Martin and Parker, 1995; Ramirez and 
Tan, 2004; Ang and Ding, 2006). Additionally, government interventions may generate 
pressures and monitoring power (Wang et al., 2008) for companies to disclose 
additional risk information because the government is a body that needs to gain the 
trust of the public. As a result, the awareness by management of these companies is 
more towards the importance of maximising shareholders’ value over self-interests by 
disclosing more risk information. 
 
5.8.2.3 Foreign Ownership 
Consistent with expectations, this study finds a positive association between foreign 
ownership (FOROWN) and risk disclosure. However, none of the coefficients are 
significant.  
 
The findings of this study do not support previous studies such as Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) which found that corporate social disclosure is associated with the presence of 
foreign ownership in the company. Nonetheless, the results of this study are similar to 
prior studies by Said et al. (2009). In their study, they assessed the relationship of 
corporate governance characteristics which comprise foreign ownership with corporate 
social responsibility disclosure. They did not find sufficient evidence regarding foreign 
ownership and argued that the involvement of foreign shareholders does not enhance 
the extent of corporate social disclosure in Malaysia. Results reported in the ownership 
model (Model 5) of this study also find an insignificant relationship between foreign 
ownership and corporate risk disclosure. 
 
5.8.3 Value Relevance of Risk Disclosure 
 
This study does not find any significant association between total risk disclosure 
(TRD), regulated risk disclosure (RRD) and non-regulated risk disclosure (NRRD) and 
the variation in share price (see: Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6). Specifically, this study finds a 
positive but non-significant association between both total risk disclosure and non-
regulated risk disclosure and the firm value (see: Tables 5.4 and 5.6). The findings of 
this study are limited by the lack of a clear measure of the quality of the disclosed risk 
information. Further, the evidence of lack of value relevance implies that most of the 
firms disclosed little information on risk especially non-regulated risk information due 
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to several reasons. First, less pressure from regulators will lead companies to provide 
less substantive decision-useful information on risk and uncertainty to investors. 
Second, the information disclosed is possibly unreliable, not timely, and irrelevant. Due 
to the lack of availability of the credibility and timeliness of risk information for the 
relevant time period, the impact of risk disclosure may be impounded in the share price. 
Third, the lack of value relevance of risk disclosure is also likely due to the fact of 
market efficiency problems in which large companies have considerable amount of 
uncertainty spinning around their prospects. Fourth, in light of emerging capital market, 
the market was relatively not efficient due to the inside knowledge in the hands of 
controlling shareholders. This inside information may be due to the increased 
availability of relevant information from the management and not from the annual 
reports which will reduce its value relevance (i.e. do not have significant impact to the 
companies’ share prices). 
 
The results also find that there is a negative but non-significant association between 
regulated risk disclosure and firm value. Even though there is no statistical evidence of 
the significant relationship, this result could possibly suggest that the cost of 
compliance with regulated risk disclosure is higher than the non-compliance costs (e.g. 
Hassan et al., 2009). This result could also possibly suggest that disclosure of new and 
significant risk surrounding business environment could scare investors, therefore, 
companies rather give a generalised risk disclosure (especially in compliance to the 
financial reporting standard) which in turn do not have value-relevance to investors 
and potentially reducing its value. Alternatively, in light of the new risk information, 
new disclosures could influence investors’ assessments which result in disclosures 
being associated with impending decline in share price.  
 
Additionally, the results consider the interaction terms between family-controlled firms 
and total risk disclosure, regulated risk disclosure and non-regulated risk disclosure, 
respectively. These results found that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between the interaction term TRD*FAMCTRL_20, RRD*FAMCTRL_20 at 10 percent 
levels and NRRD*FAMCTRL_20 at 5 percent level. The inference is that family-
controlled firms in Malaysia that disclose higher risk information experience higher 
share prices compared to non-family controlled firms. As found earlier in this study, the 
relationship between family ownership and risk disclosure is not statistically significant 
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in all models except in the ownership model (Model 5) where the relationship of family 
ownership and risk disclosure appear to be negative. The findings suggest that the 
presence of a higher proportion of family members on boards will lead to lower risk 
disclosure. However, the findings on the interaction terms are perhaps the adverse 
effect on the role of family members. Since family-controlled firms are likely to not 
encourage exposing risk information, the higher risk information disclosed by this type 
of company will inform their shareholders that the risk information disclosed are more 
credible and important.  
 
The interaction terms of government-controlled firms with total risk disclosure, 
regulated risk disclosure and non-regulated risk disclosure are not significantly 
associated with the variation in share price. As suggested earlier in this study, the 
pressure from the government as a major shareholder is believed to influence these 
companies to disclose more risk information. Therefore, it is expected that government-
controlled firms will disclose more risk information than companies without 
government-controlled. The result may be due to the fact that there is political 
influence, for example, monitoring power by the government where the government are 
the main agent contracting with the firm.  
 
This study also finds a negative significant association between the interaction of 
foreign-controlled firms with total risk disclosure (TRD*FORCTRL_20), regulated risk 
disclosure (RRD*FORCTRL_20) and non-regulated risk disclosure 
(NRRD*FORCTRL_20) to share price. These results suggest that foreign-controlled 
company that disclose higher risk information tend to have lower firm value compared 
to locally-owned companies. There might be three possible reasons on the negative 
market reaction for more risk disclosure by foreign-controlled companies. First, the 
more risk information disclosed by foreign-controlled companies could be a sign of bad 
news disclosure contained in the level of risk disclosure. The inference is foreign-
controlled are known to disclose ‘bad news’ more readily than non-foreign controlled 
companies. Second, this may be due to a different perception on foreign-controlled 
firms in which they are likely to have incentives to skew the volume of risk disclosure 
mainly for image management and not the reality of risk exposure; therefore, the value 
of the company would be discounted. Third, foreign-controlled companies are typically 
a multinational group of companies, so there is possibility that the market has already 
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obtain risk information which may be publicly available through the multinational 
group reporting in other countries. Therefore, risk disclosure in the annual report within 
Malaysia may not provide new information, hence reducing its value.  
 
5.9 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, the findings of the present study are presented based on various analyses 
conducted. Firstly, a number of additional analyses in relation to the determinants of 
corporate risk disclosure are conducted to test the stability and robustness of the 
findings. This consists of examining the relationship between upper management 
characteristics and corporate risk disclosure using different measurements of age and 
education; testing the baseline model without the ownership variables as well as 
without the upper management variables. Secondly, several analyses are conducted to 
test the value relevance of corporate risk disclosure by companies sampled (i.e. greater 
risk disclosure increases a firm’s value).  
 
Drawing from previous literature on upper management demographic characteristics, 
five manager-specific characteristics were selected and investigated namely, age, 
functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity. The regression analyses show that the 
effect of manager-specific characteristics (i.e. functional track, tenure and ethnicity) on 
corporate risk disclosure is statistically significant. These results are as predicted by the 
upper echelons theory. The results of this study suggest that firms with ‘output 
function’, shorter-tenured and Bumiputera CEO have disclosed more risk information. 
The endogeneity test between risk disclosure and ethnicity of CEO shows that there is a 
reverse causal relationship between these two variables where companies wishing to 
change their level of risk disclosure would be inclined, through their board, to consider 
changing, at an opportune time, their CEO to one with a different ethnic background. 
Inversely, no significant relationship was found between all manager-specific 
characteristic (i.e. age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity) and other top 
level manager (i.e. CAC) with corporate risk disclosure. It is important to note that the 
association between risk disclosure and manager-specific characteristics is still 
ambiguous. It could also be argued that unlike the effect of manager-specific factors on 
other types of corporate accounting choices and disclosure examined in prior studies, 
the manager-specific factors affecting the level of risk disclosures are different.       
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Upper echelons theory suggests that managers’ demographic characteristics are the 
appropriate starting point for exploring reasons for differences in individual managers’ 
preferences. Drawing on a comprehensive review of a broad set of literatures, this study 
posit and ﬁnd partial associations between managers’ demographic characteristics and 
their tendency to disclose risk information, although the explanatory power of the 
demographic characteristics is moderate. 
 
With regards to ownership structures, this study reports significant results on the 
relationship between government ownership and corporate risk disclosure. The result 
shows a consistently positive and significant impact on corporate risk disclosure. The 
role of government ownership supports the incentive of active monitoring hypothesis 
which is seen as a mechanism for minimizing information asymmetry. 
 
Interestingly, in the additional analysis using the baseline model without the upper 
management characteristics, this study finds a significant and negative relationship 
between family ownership and corporate risk disclosure. The findings suggest that 
lower corporate risk disclosure is associated with firms dominated by family 
relationships.     
 
Finally, with respect to value relevance analyses, this study finds no significant results 
of the impact of risk disclosure on a company’s value. This result does not support the 
‘disclosure principle’ argument that companies employ risk reporting as a mechanism 
to inform  investors  and  reduce  information  asymmetry,  which leads  to  a higher 
firm value. While risk disclosure is nowadays increasingly required by regulations, 
therefore there is  a policy question as to whether  the  current  requirements  for  risk  
disclosure  in annual  reports  are comprehensive and effective.  Risk disclosure 
regulation might have prescription on what to be reported but the quality is not 
measured or regulated so firms merely balancing compliance cost and benefits 
reporting. Unless the firm thinks it’s value-relevant to investors and regulated, higher 
disclosures would be expected from them. On the other hand, it could be that 
companies follow  a benchmark  of good practice  communications  and meet market's 
expectation,  therefore  any  increase  in disclosure  has either  a low  effect or no  effect  
on  the  firm value.  Alternatively, it could be that these companies have no or low 
information asymmetry specifically in risk disclosure or otherwise, because it could  be  
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that  investors  rely  on  other  sources  of  information  rather  than the annual  report  
to make their  decisions. 
 
However, the findings revealed in this chapter show that only when the analysis on the 
interaction between ownership control (i.e. family control and foreign control) and 
corporate risk disclosure has been done, then only investors perceive that the risk 
information is credible and relevant. These findings clearly demonstrate that the 
ownership control of a firm is of substantial significance in determining the value 
relevance of annual report disclosures by companies. The  next chapter  presents  the 
conclusions from the  findings,  draws  key implications and limitations and highlights  
potential  suggestions for  future  research.                 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
222 
 
      CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The core purpose of this chapter is to reflect and highlight the findings related to the 
research objectives and discuss the contribution and implications of the study as well as 
suggestions for future research. This final chapter is organised into six sections. Section 
6.2 summarises the main findings of this study. Next, Section 6.3 addresses the 
potential implications of the study, followed by a discussion on research scope and 
limitations in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 offers several possible avenues for further 
research. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes the thesis. 
 
6.2 SUMMARY OF METHOD AND FINDINGS 
 
This study has investigated the nature and extent of corporate risk reporting in the 
Malaysian setting. In measuring disclosure levels, several previous studies have used 
content analysis of annual reports. Various content analysis metrics are used. This study 
uses frequency of sentences containing pre-determined risk-related keywords. The 
sentence coding scheme separates disclosure into four categories (i.e., operational risk, 
environmental risk, financial risk and strategic risk). The keywords relating to risk 
definitions are used to avoid subjective judgements and inconsistencies in computing 
the text of risk disclosure (Mir et al., 2009; Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990). A worksheet is 
developed to capture what risk information has been disclosed and the volume of the 
risk information disclosed. This study is focusing on the whole sections of the annual 
reports (e.g., chairman statement, statement on corporate governance, statement on 
internal control and operations review, notes to the accounts), for 2009 with a total of 
128 non-financial companies from the top 200 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia’s 
Main Board based on the market capitalization.  
 
Risk disclosures among Malaysian companies are found to primarily focus on financial 
risk and operational risks. The findings also indicate that these two types of risk 
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disclosures dominate over the other two types of risk disclosures – strategic risk and 
environmental risk. From the content analysis, it can be concluded that there is risk-
related information disclosed by companies in their annual reports but the disclosure of 
risk information not comprehensive. In particular, strategic risk and environmental risk 
information is limited. This reveals that though additional non-regulated risk 
information is disclosed, it is poorly provided. Despite the fact that all categories of risk 
disclosures could have relevance to investors and other stakeholders, it is found that 
companies do not structure the risk disclosure according to any consistent or 
comprehensive framework, unlike financial report disclosures. In the context of risk 
information, the omitted disclosure could be as significant as that which is included in 
the text (see Jameson, 2000). Therefore, the texts that describe relatively limited or 
vague information in certain risk categories without allowing annual report users to 
glean the potential impact of those risks can obscure important decision-modelling 
information for stakeholders.   
 
Regulations on disclosure should function to ensure that investors have up-to-date, 
relevant information, so disclosure regulations should be deliberately intend to bridge 
the information gaps in the market.  The findings of this study indicate that financial 
reporting standards and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (i.e., statement on 
corporate governance together with the statement on internal control) have influenced 
the extent of risk information (i.e., financial risk and operational risk) disclosed  by 
Malaysian companies. However, the quality of the information has not been 
determined. Previous research has found that while regulation is efficient in increasing 
the level of disclosure, there is no impact on the quality of information (see O’Shea et 
al., 2008). Hence, providing information on risk needs more effort that would enhance 
the value relevance of risk reporting. 
 
Moreover, this study examines the effect of top managers’ demographic characteristics 
(i.e., age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity) and ownership structure 
(i.e., family ownership, government ownership and foreign ownership) on the extent 
and type of corporate risk disclosure in Malaysia. The purpose is to examine what 
motivates and influences companies to go beyond disclosure requirements and 
voluntarily provide more risk-related information that could be relevant to stakeholders.  
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Driven by conﬂicting and inconclusive views on whether the backgrounds of key 
individuals can determine corporate strategic decisions (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 
1984; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Ge et al., 2009; Bamber et al., 2010), this study 
examines whether the CEO’s and the CAC’s age, functional track, education, tenure 
and ethnicity exert a significant influence on the firms’ risk disclosure. The influences 
from these CEO and CAC demographic characteristics and their risk-taking propensity 
and tendency to make information disclosure are constructed from upper echelons 
theory. This theory has been reviewed from strategic management, economics, finance 
and accounting literatures. The findings in this study show inconclusive evidence of the 
impact of these observable CEO and CAC characteristics on corporate risk disclosure. 
However, focusing on total risk disclosure, the key underlying factor that affects the 
extent to which risk information is disclosed is CEO ethnicity. The significant 
relationship between CEO ethnicity and total risk disclosure level suggests that 
companies with Bumiputera CEOs disclose more risk information than non-Bumiputera 
(i.e., Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian Indians and foreigners) CEOs. The findings from 
the Hausman test for endogeneity between risk disclosure and ethnicity of CEO 
confirms that endogeneity exist. Therefore, this result could infer that companies 
seeking higher risk disclosure will tend to have a CEO with Bumiputera ethnicity. The 
findings also show that CEOs in the ‘throughput function’ reflect elements of 
conservatism (which are risk aversion and less confidence in disclosing risk 
information). Disclosure of risk information is also found to be negatively related to the 
CEO’s tenure, consistent with the prediction of upper echelons theory, suggesting that a 
longer-tenured CEO is not willing to take risks and is less confident in disclosing risk 
information which is full of uncertainty. However, with regards to CAC demographic 
characteristics (i.e., age, functional track, education, tenure and ethnicity), the results 
show no significant relationship with total risk disclosures. These results suggest that 
the CAC’s observable demographic characteristics are an insignificant factor in the 
CAC’s decision influence regarding corporate risk reporting. 
 
From a practical perspective, evidence on the relations between CEOs’ observable 
demographic characteristics and corporate risk disclosure can give evidence to 
investors that help them evaluate the propensity of a CEO to reduce information 
asymmetry relating to levels of risk of their investment. Knowing that Bumiputera with 
an output functional background and shorter-tenured CEOs are more likely to disclose 
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risk information unless it is regulated, can help investors interpret when no information 
might not necessarily indicate bad information (contrary to signalling theory that non-
disclosure signals bad new) (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001).  
 
Though this study does not document any significant relationship between family 
ownership and corporate risk disclosure using the baseline model, segregating the 
baseline model into an upper echelons model and an ownership model reveals some 
significant results. Focusing on the ownership model, there is a negative and significant 
impact of boards dominated by family directors on corporate risk disclosure. The 
negative and significant result between family ownership and corporate risk disclosure 
in this study supports the agency argument that these family-controlled firms are more 
likely to encounter higher agency costs because the family members who are also the 
directors are more focus on inside information and less likely to engage in reporting 
more risk information to outside investors. 
 
This study also produces findings which are important in relation to the role of 
government ownership and its influence over the extent of corporate risk disclosure. 
Similar to the findings of previous studies (e.g., Arshad et al., 2012), the central finding 
of this study is that there is a positive contribution from government as a major 
shareholder to determine the extent of corporate risk reporting in Malaysia. As large 
shareholders, government can play a positive role to act as a monitoring mechanism 
towards the company and provide better market access to risk information (i.e., lower 
agency costs and reduce information asymmetry). It appears that large government 
shareholders generate an incentive for directors to carry out diligent monitoring. This is 
due to the fact that government has the resources, expertise and motivation to certify its 
strong management controls and to actively monitor the actions of management. This is 
likely to improve the extent of corporate risk disclosure as supported by the active 
monitoring hypothesis. With regard to the ownership held by foreigners, this study 
documents no support for the relationship between foreign ownership and corporate 
risk disclosure. The evidence in this study suggests that the impact of foreign 
ownership on corporate risk disclosure is not strong.  
 
In addition, this study examines the benefits of enhancing risk information by 
empirically testing the impact of risk disclosure level on a firm’s value. Conventional 
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arguments suggest that greater disclosure increases stock price of the company. 
However, empirical evidence produces mixed results. This study has used regression 
analysis to assess the impact of risk disclosure level on the company’s share price to 
explain the effect of different types of risk disclosure on firms’ value. The relationship 
between the total risk disclosure level and the firms’ value as measured by the 
company’s share price shows no significance. Regulated risk disclosure and non-
regulated risk disclosure also have no impact on the firm’s value. This result differs 
from the predictions of the most of disclosure theory (i.e., signalling theory). Perhaps, a 
reason is the measurement of risk disclosures in this study lacks a clear measure of the 
quality of the disclosed risk information. Nonetheless, this study provides evidence of 
lack of value relevance which implies that firms disclosed insufficient information on 
risk to the share market. The inference is that greater pressure from regulators and the 
market is needed for companies to provide substantive decision-useful information on 
risk and uncertainty.  
 
Interestingly, this study finds a significantly positive relationship between share price 
and the interaction term of corporate risk disclosure and family-controlled firms. This 
implies that firms with a higher proportion of family members on the board that 
disclose higher risk information are treated as having more value-relevance by 
investors. Family-controlled firms are expected to have the advantage of inside 
information about risk levels, and would lose that information advantage if the 
company make greater public disclosure about risks. Therefore, higher risk information 
disclosed by a family-controlled company will signal to more important information 
about risks and uncertainties.  
  
By comparison, the interaction terms of government-controlled firms with corporate 
risk disclosure is not significantly associated with share price. This implies that firms 
with greater risk disclosure do not influence the company’s share price on the grounds 
that they are government controller. This study also finds a negative significant 
association with share price of the interaction of foreign-controlled firms and corporate 
risk disclosure. The inference is that foreign-controlled company that disclose higher 
risk information are viewed by investors as being more willing to provide ‘bad news’ 
information. The conveying of ‘bad news’ about corporate risk by foreign-controlled 
companies would lower the market to revise their share value downwards.   
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6.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Implications of a deficiency in the comprehensiveness of corporate risk disclosure 
The results reveal a much lower level of disclosure in the categories of environmental 
and strategic risk. This narrows the comprehensiveness of corporate risk disclosure 
mainly to operating and financial risk categories, where regulation predominantly 
applies. The fact that environmental and strategic risks are the types of risk that are 
usually outside the control of management would make them particularly relevant to 
investors. Management’s perspectives on such outside environmental and strategic risk 
contingencies, as gleaned from disclosures in annual reports, would be important to 
investors in their assessment of the value of the firm. Hence, the implication of the 
finding of a relatively deficient extent of disclosure of environmental and strategic risk 
information is that companies that meaningfully increase their voluntary disclosure in 
this area are likely to be viewed more favourably in the share market. Alternatively, the 
finding enables securities markets regulators in Malaysia to identify the need for 
companies to have more comprehensive risk disclosure. This could lead regulators into 
investigating the case for developing and introducing prescriptive regulations regarding 
minimum disclosures to be made by listed companies about aspects of environmental 
and strategic risks impacting on the company. 
 
Implications of management characteristics for corporate risk disclosure 
Those management characteristics found to affect the extent of corporate risk disclosure 
are the CEO having a Bumiputera ethnic background, a shorter tenure and an output 
functional track. The implication is that company boards concerned with creating 
responsiveness in management to providing more transparency on corporate risk should 
consider the importance of recruiting top managers with these ethnic and functional 
backgrounds and directing them in the early stage of their appointment. A further 
finding is that the CAC’s background, including age, functional track, education, tenure 
or ethnicity, does not have a significant effect on the extent of corporate risk disclosure. 
This finding about the CAC has an implication for corporate governance policy-makers 
who set certain requirements/recommendations about the Chair and members of a 
company’s Audit Committee. It suggests that corporate governance regulation requiring 
the CAC to have a specific education, functional track or other background 
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characteristics is unlikely to be a means of achieving improved corporate risk 
disclosure.  
 
Implications of ownership structure for corporate risk disclosure 
The results further reveal that corporate risk disclosure is significantly inversely related 
to the proportion of family ownership, whereas it is significantly positively related to 
the proportion of government ownership. Since controlling shareholders would have 
more direct access to corporate risk information, especially through their 
representatives on the board, these findings have implications for the minority or non-
controlling shareholders. They suggest that minority shareholders (as well as the 
public) are currently given access to higher amounts of risk-related information if they 
hold shares in government-controlled companies, but to lower amounts of risk-related 
information if they hold shares in family-controlled companies. So, to provide better 
protection to minority shareholders, there should be greater scrutiny and pressure 
exerted by Bursa Malaysia, the accounting bodies (e.g., MIA and ACCA) and the 
minority shareholders’ association, on the risk-related disclosure practices of family-
controlled listed companies. 
 
Implications for making corporate risk disclosure value-relevant 
The general finding from modelling the value relevance of corporate risk disclosure is 
that such information in annual reports is not currently viewed in the Malaysian share 
market as making a significant difference to the valuation of shares. This non-value-
relevant result is found in respect of regulated and non-regulated risk disclosures, 
respectively. The implication is that the cost of currently providing the aggregate 
amount of risk disclosure in annual reports does not outweigh the perceived benefits to 
shareholders. One exception is foreign controlled companies, where the greater risk 
disclosure is found to significantly negatively affect share price. This indicates value-
relevance, so the costs of higher risk disclosures in Malaysia would not outweigh the 
perceived benefit to shareholders of foreign-controlled companies in Malaysia. 
Otherwise, the implication is that both regulated and non-regulated corporate risk 
disclosure needs to be considerably improved in terms of its relevance as information 
that can be factored into models and judgements by market analysts and investors about 
a company’s current value or its risk profile in their portfolio investment decision-
making. Corporate regulators, accounting bodies and corporate management need to 
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systematically reassess the relevance to users of risk-related disclosures. Otherwise it 
will remain a relatively costly compliance exercise that does not reduce information 
asymmetry sufficiently for shareholders to benefit.    
 
6.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF RESEARCH 
 
When considering the conclusions of this study, several limitations need to be taken 
into account. These limitations relate to the study’s scope, theory application, model 
specification, variable measurement and result interpretation.  
 
First, in terms of scope, the Malaysian business context is relatively unique. Malaysia is 
of interest in this study not only because it is a developing country but because it is 
considerably ethnically diverse. Malaysia is a multiethnic society with Chinese and 
Malays dominating its economics and politics. The domination of Malays in politics 
and Chinese in commerce, business and economics in Malaysia, provides a unique 
research setting that is not found elsewhere (Abdullah, 2006). Furthermore, these 
differential ethnic groups maintain and practice their own cultural values and religious 
beliefs (Salleh et al., 2006). While other Asian countries such as Indonesia and 
Thailand have similar institutional environments and a strong ethnic minority Chinese 
presence in business, Malaysia is sufficiently different in its socio-cultural-political-
economic-business context to limit this study’s findings from being generalized to other 
countries.  
 
Second, the year of the study limits its scope to a point in time that is representative of a 
down-turn in the economic cycle. Data is chosen from the year 2009 only. This year is 
not representative of periods prior to corporate governance reforms or during buoyant 
financial markets. This year is chosen because it is during the volatile share market 
period of the global financial crisis (2007–2009). This provides an opportunity to assess 
the extent of risk disclosures in a market has heightened sensitivity to issues of 
corporate risk information. However, in such a market, the making of decisions on 
corporate risk disclosure by controlling shareholders and top management may change. 
Hence, the findings in this study about the effects of CEO and CAC characteristics and 
shareholder concentrations on risk disclosure levels may not be transferable to periods 
of lower share market volatility.  
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Third, only the largest 200 listed companies, and hence those with resources that 
usually make them more financially resilient, are included in this study. As evidenced 
in this study and prior studies, corporate risk disclosure is positively and significantly 
related to company size. Therefore, the sample of large companies in this study may be 
biased towards companies whose top management and controlling shareholders face 
greater requirements for, or are more willing to support, higher corporate risk disclose. 
At the same time, however, investors in these larger (more financially resilient) 
companies may view marginal increases in the level of disclosure of risk-related 
information as having more rapidly diminishing value relevance than the marginal 
increases in risk-related disclosures by smaller listed companies. The findings 
therefore, are limited in their generalizability to medium and smaller listed companies.  
 
Fourth, this study is limited by the ability of an agency theory perspective to be applied 
in the context of Malaysia’s capital market. Its generation of hypotheses and 
interpretation of results has been focused on traditional principal-agent behavioural 
assumptions and information asymmetry arguments. These assumptions and arguments 
originated in Western capital markets where there are relatively diverse shareholdings 
which provide a clear separation of ownership from control. Mechanisms to reduce 
information asymmetry, particularly ways to get management to provide more 
corporate disclosures (whether mandatory and voluntary) are found to be central to the 
efficient functioning of Western capital markets in terms of impounding credible 
publicly available information into share prices in a relatively rapid and unbiased way. 
However, in Malaysia and other Asian countries, many firms exhibit a concentrated 
ownership structure. The assumption of a clear separation of ownership from control 
does not often hold. In firms with concentrated ownership structures in the hands of 
family or government owners, pressures or incentives on management to publicly 
disclose corporate information can be muted. Instead, from the principal-agent 
perspective, the traditional information asymmetry problem due to separation of 
ownership and control tends to arise in respect of minority shareholders (Chu and 
Cheah, 2006). This study has not directly addressed the research question about the 
influence, if any, of minority shareholders in Malaysia on the level of regulated or non-
regulated corporate risk disclosure.   
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Fifth, alternative theories used in prior corporate disclosure literature, especially 
legitimacy and stakeholder theories, have not been invoked in this study. There is a 
large body of literature on voluntary corporate disclosure that has applied a legitimacy 
theory perspective (e.g., Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Mathews, 1993) or a stakeholder 
theory perspective (e.g., Ullman, 1985; Roberts, 1992) to the study of factors 
determining management’s decisions to voluntarily disclose information such as 
corporate intellectual capital and corporate social and environmental performance. 
Since these theories underpin voluntary disclosure decision-making, they do not have 
currency in explaining regulated corporate risk disclosure in this study. However, the 
findings concerning non-regulated disclosure, mainly in the categories of 
environmental risk and strategic risk disclosure are limited by the absence of potential 
legitimacy or stakeholder variables in the model specification in this study. Such 
variables could include management’s perceptions of the presence of a ‘legitimacy gap’ 
due to say, media reporting of allegedly financially dangerous strategies of the 
company, or management’s perceptions of the potential power of stakeholders such as 
supplier-creditors. However, such variables would require an extension to the sampling 
and data collection in this study. It would require the collection of primary data on 
management’s perceptions, which is a proposed direction for future research.   
 
Sixth, the measurement and classification chosen in this study for the dependent 
variable, corporate risk disclosure, has limitations. Only the quantity, not the quality, of 
disclosure has been measured. The quantity measure is based on a sentence count in 
which all sentences in the annual report containing one or more of a set of pre-
determined keywords, are added in an unweighted way. Other metrics and sources of 
publicly available data for the measurement of the quantity of corporate risk disclosure 
could have been chosen. Moreover, the classification of risk disclosures in this study 
has developed a four category typology which differs from, but draws on, several prior 
risk disclosure classification alternatives (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Cabedo and 
Tirado, 2004; Linsley and Shrivers, 2006; Deumes, 2008). The choice of the 
classification scheme remains reasonably arbitrary. Future research could seek to refine 
the methods of scoring both the quantity and quality of corporate risk disclosure. It 
could also seek a stronger theoretical base from which to substantiate the establishment 
of a corporate risk classification typology.      
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Seventh, the distributional properties of the risk disclosure and the error term in 
Equation 3.1 (p.134) is lack of srict exogeneity of the independent variables.  
 
Finally, the sample is heavily biased in favour of Trading/services, Industrial product 
and Consumer product sectors. Therefore, the interpretation of high level of disclosure 
should a limitation in this study since these three sectors might have more foreign 
currency exchange risk total disclosure as compared to others sectors. 
 
6.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Extensions to the present study are possible in the following areas: 
 
1. As the present study used a content analysis method to examine the risk 
 disclosure by  companies (i.e. in the categorisation of risk information), future 
 studies may test the risk disclosure using an alternative approach (i.e. meta-
 analysis approach). This alternative approach will allow researchers to re-
analyse data used in previous studies. Additionally, this alternative method 
could establish whether inconsistencies in finding are due to the research 
 method (including categorization of risk information) or to the context of the 
 study (e.g., country-specific, regulatory intervention). 
 
2. The present study finds the highest risk disclosure is financial risk which 
 emphasizes the attention given by regulators to one category of users, investors. 
Prior risk disclosure studies have also mainly focus on information needs for 
shareholders or other players in securities market. However, broader corporate 
governance regulation includes other corporate stakeholders. Perhaps future 
research could look at the relevance or usefulness of other risk disclosures (i.e. 
operational risk, environmental risk and strategic risk) to employees, corporate 
suppliers and customers as well as the public at large. 
 
3. This research relies mainly on the quantitative based research approach in 
 relation to determining the upper management characteristics. Perhaps future 
 research might follow up this study using more in-depth information perspective 
 such as interview, questionnaire, survey and case study to probe into issues 
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 not clearly explainable in this thesis. Firstly, by using interview and 
 questionnaire  approach, this can help to confirm upper echelons theory 
 arguments that the demographic characteristics are indicator of cognitive style 
 and values of top level managers. The purpose is to have more a direct 
 approach to providing evidence about the cognition  and values of management 
concerning decisions of risk disclosure preferences especially voluntary risk 
disclosure. Secondly, by using a survey approach, this can help in setting a set 
of hypothetical scenario which relates to risk disclosures applicable to risk 
disclosure decisions. Thirdly, by using a case study approach this could help a 
researcher to understand and give more dynamic picture of corporate risk 
disclosure practices. A case study approach can also provide the opportunity for 
investigation into the specific elements of upper management characteristics in 
greater depth.   
 
4. Finally, future studies could investigate management’s motivation or incentive 
for risk disclosures, and lack of disclosures, that are actually made. While the 
 findings of the current study indicate that the annual report risk disclosure level 
does not have an impact on the firm’s market value (i.e. value relevance), it is 
 difficult to judge whether annual report risk disclosure is of no use to investors. 
 With respect to value relevance studies, further investigation is needed to assess 
 the relevance and reliability of risk information. Future research could, perhaps, 
study corporate risk disclosure on share market in countries where economic 
and political risks are  higher because corporate risk disclosure have more 
relevance in that type of country setting. Moreover, future research could also 
delve into corporate risk disclosure (i.e. operational risk and strategic risk) in 
industries where there exists higher operational hazards (e.g., nuclear and 
energy consumptions) because corporate risk disclosure may be more relevance 
in the industries with  rapidly changing technologies.  
 
6.6 SUMMARY 
 
This study is pursued as an attempt to investigate the influence of the CEOs and CACs 
of the firm, ownership structures and firm value on corporate risk disclosures for 
Malaysian public listed companies. Generally, this study suggests that upper managers’ 
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demographic characteristics and ownership structures, to some extent, do matter in 
influencing the extent of corporate risk disclosure in Malaysia. However, not all 
elements of measured demographic characteristics and ownership structures are 
important as the study finds no evidence that upper managers’ demographic 
characteristics (i.e., age and education) and ownership structures (i.e., foreign 
ownership) is valued to influence the managers’ discretion. Nevertheless, the study 
provides strong support for the Bumiputera CEO and government ownership in 
enhancing the extent of corporate risk reporting disclosure in Malaysia. Perhaps, this 
study is the first to report a significant association between the ethnicity variable and 
corporate risk disclosure using upper echelons theory as prior studies mostly focused on 
legitimacy theory and political cost theory.  
 
This study makes a contribution to extant literature on risk disclosure. First, the 
literature on approaches to designing a classification typology for corporate risk is 
unsettled. This study develops a typology and associated definitions that can minimize 
the ambiguity and maximize the objectivity of measuring the nature and extent of 
corporate risk disclosure. Second, in  terms of key management players and the 
controlling shareholders, prior literature has not provide evidence on the influence of 
the CEO or CAC on risk disclosure, and the prior evidence on shareholder influence 
has been limited and mixed. This study provides new evidence on manager-specific 
effects in respect of the CEO and CAC. It also provides additional evidence on the 
effects of family, government and foreign shareholders on risk disclosure. Third, this 
study provides evidence that there is no value relevance for total risk disclosure as well 
as each category of risk disclosure to the Malaysian share market. Therefore, the results 
suggest that risk disclosures in companies’ annual reports is driven more by regulations 
than by the market, which has implications for securities regulators.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Decision rules for coding 
 
 Sentences are to be coded as risk disclosures if they inform the reader about any 
opportunity, prospect, danger, harm, hazard, exposure, threat, loss, uncertainty, 
exposure or outlook.  
 Disclosures must be specifically stated. Risk disclosures have to be mentioned 
explicitly; they cannot be implied.  
 Quantitative risk-related items in the financial statements will not be examined. 
The notes to the financial statements on the other hand, will be accounted for.  
 A sentence can be only accounted for more than once, if the sentence has more 
than one possible classification.  
 The same risk disclosure sentence shall be recorded as a risk disclosure each 
time the keywords is appeared. This implies that the same risk disclosure 
sentence can be coded more than once, because each time the keyword is 
appeared/mentioned it draws the attention of the reader. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
